Abstract

Friedgut, Kalai, and Nisan have proved that social choice functions can be successfully manipulated by random preference reordering with non- negligible probability. However, their results require two restrictions: the social choice function must be neutral, and the election must have at most 3 alternatives. In this thesis we focus on removing the latter restriction and generalizing the results to elections with any number of candidates. We also provide a survey of related work analyzing and comparing results from a number of authors.

Library of Congress Subject Headings

Social choice--Mathematical models; Elections--Mathematical models

Publication Date

6-10-2014

Document Type

Thesis

Student Type

Graduate

Degree Name

Computer Science (MS)

Department, Program, or Center

Computer Science (GCCIS)

Advisor

Christopher Homan

Advisor/Committee Member

Edith Hemaspaandra

Advisor/Committee Member

Zack Butler

Comments

Physical copy available from RIT's Wallace Library at JF1001 .P68 2014

Campus

RIT – Main Campus

Plan Codes

COMPSCI-MS

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