Social choice theory is concerned with developing and evaluating voting systems, both for the use of political and organizational elections and for use as decision making process for multiagent systems. Particularly in the context of multiagent systems, computational resistance to various types of control has become a desired property of a voting system. Though manipulative actions may always be possible, strong computational barriers to efficient control can give us sufficient confidence in the integrity of an election. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting that is resistant to a large number of cases of control. In particular, the variant Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control resistances among natural voting systems.
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Elections--Mathematical models; Voting--Mathematical models; Social choice--Mathematical models; Multiagent systems
Department, Program, or Center
Computer Science (GCCIS)
Menton, Curtis, "Range voting is resistant to control" (2009). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from
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