American University in Kosova

Rochester Institute of Technology

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Kosovo Security Force Post 2012

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List of Abbreviations

A 5 Adriatic Charter
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
C2 Control and command
DCAF The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
EU European Union
FOC Full Operational Capabilities
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
IMP International Military Presence
ISSR Internal Security Sector Review
KCC Kosova Chamber of Commerce
KCSS Kosovar Centre for Security Studies
KSF Kosovo Security Force
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
KP Kosovo Police
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
MA Members of the Assembly
MKSF Ministry for Kosovo Security Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PfP Partnership for Peace
RTK Radio Television of Kosovo
SSR Security Sector Reform
UNDP United Nations Development Program
Executive Summary

Since the end of the last war in Kosovo, June 1999, Kosovo has been under the sole defense of thousands of NATO troops who have had the task and duty from security and public order to border security and protection of all residents. Given the fact that NATO and KFOR troops are reducing their presence in Kosovo rapidly, the latter needs to act and strengthen its own security and defense capability in order not to allow any security vacuum in the territory of the Republic of Kosovo in the post 2012 period.

Kosovo has been through security challenges, from having no security structure to building up a modern security force whose mandate is mostly non-conventional military duties, but only humanitarian and civil protection tasks and missions. However, this Capstone Project recommends the following actions to the Government of Kosovo:

1. KSF has to reach full operational capabilities (FOC) as soon as possible
2. Implement constitutional review Kosovo’s Future Defense Force
3. To accelerate strategic regional compatibility: euroatlantic integration initiatives starting from membership into Adriatic Charter (Figure 4.8)
4. Consider the defense budget scenarios 2012 – 2017, raging from € 41,032,553 to € 86,182,381


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.5% GDP annual growth in Kosovo</th>
<th>4.5% annual budget increase for KSF/Defense Force to reflect the GDP growth</th>
<th>16% annual budget increase till 2017 to nearly reach the average 1.8% of GDP of seven Western Balkan Countries military expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
In order for Kosovo to think about a future Defense Force it will have to build up the existing one, the Kosovo Security Force, in accordance to NATO standards and requirements. It would show Kosovo’s partners that Kosovo can build a modern force that is multiethnic, professional, and self sustainable.

Currently, the Kosovo Security Force has a limited mandate and mission, but Kosovo ought to strengthen its defensive capability at a pace that corresponds in parallel with the withdrawal of KFOR and with the security needs of the state. The recent developments in Kosovo regarding constitutional change increase the prospect that new legislation regarding a new Kosovo Defense Force will be adopted in the Assembly in the near future so that the post 2012 period does not catch Kosovo off guard.

Currently Kosovo has no defensive capability, but it must work towards euroatlantic integration structures and be part of the big collective security family. Membership in NATO is set as a priority by the government of Kosovo, but it needs a lot of effort from Kosovo at the same from its partners and friends. When compared with other countries in the region, Kosovo turns out to have the smallest security/armed force in the entire region whether it is compared in correspondence with territory, population or economy. According to the survey findings, the most appropriate for KSF or the future Defense Force would be 6500 members (Figure 4.9). What makes Kosovo even more inferior is its undersized budget allocated to security. Currently, Kosovo allocates only 0.9% of its GDP to the Kosovo Security Force while the average the other six former republics of Yugoslavia, and including Albania as a neighbouring country, spend on military forces is 1.8% of their GDP. Kosovo must commence immediately allocating a fairer budget to the existing Security Force or to the future Defense Force so it could equalize itself with other neighbouring countries some of which are NATO members and some aspire to be.
1. **A Short Military History in the Western Balkans**

Military history covers vast areas, both topically and chronologically, which has influenced the contemporary form of military and security. Human nature has always caused wars and conflicts throughout history which has led to the innovation of sophisticated arms and armies to defend their kings and their country but also to conquer and expand. Studying military history enlightens us about the present existence of military and political power, socioeconomic, and technological developments. It seems though that enhanced military power enhances the nation’s authority and capability in the international system.

As one lieutenant colonel points out in his paper that “[t]he study of Alexander the Great, for instance, still offers relevant insights into the exercise of power—military, economic, and political—at the highest level…” (Lt. Col. John F. Votaw. p. 41). The military history of the long years from the first appearance of prehistoric man to the death of Frederick the Great in 1786 can be divided into four general periods. It is argued that the earliest is the millennia before 1000 B.C. when our first civilizations began competing with each other for different reasons. The following sixteen centuries cover the Iron Age empires from Assyria to Rome, and from 600 to 1400, belong to our Middle Ages; whereas, the final four centuries fit our early innovation of gunpowder, that marked the gunpowder era (Theodore Ropp, p.89).

The twentieth century, nonetheless, was the bloodiest century in human history. Europe witnessed horrible wars and conflicts that human beings had ever recorded. The Balkan region was impacted enormously, as well. In fact, the Balkans was initially involved in the Great War. Kosovo, as part of this region, was viciously affected by the events that had captured Europe. Kosovo is populated by ethnic Albanians and in the early 1900’s it was an integrated part of the ethnic Albania administered by the Ottomans. However, the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 gave a different shape to the territories in the Balkans which later on in 1990s ignited the wars during the breakup of Yugoslavia and reshaped almost the entire Balkan region.

Kosovo was brutally affected in the early 1900’s by the Great Powers of Europe and, more specifically, the great Powers of the Balkan states (Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece, known as the Balkan League) through their alliances to enhance their own state interests on the cost to Kosovo and ethnic Albanian territories by dividing the Albanian territory amongst themselves, as shown in the following map, Figure 1.1. The ethnic Albanian territory was divided, notably
Kosovo was annexed by force by Serbia. Indeed, most of the ethnic Albanian populated territory was divided amongst the Balkan states, as shown in Figure 1.2.

**Figure 1.1 Ethnic Albania Before Balkan Wars 1912-1913**

Source: “What Makes Ethnic Albania ???” albaniapress.com

In the second half of the twentieth century there has been a shift in terms of wars and conflicts. The rational political and military leaders emerged and began to think more reasonably and sensibly. Expansionist policies were perceived as almost an impermissible norm in international system. Indeed, the nature of economic and political cooperation began to dominate the Western Europe as the idea to face challenges and calamities alone was becoming more and more expensive and less efficient. Thus, the emerging of the alliances became necessary in order to set aside historical hostilities and to concentrate on economic and social prosperity.
Figure 1.2: Balkan Borders Alterations Before and After Balkan Wars 1912-1913
The economic and defense collaboration in the second half of the twentieth century has led to a peaceful and stable environment in Europe. After centuries of conflicts the European countries right after the Second World War decided to establish alliances through economic and military cooperation.

First, some Western European states gave priority to collective defense cooperation, thus creating the defense alliance in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Then, the European Union was set up with the aim of ending the frequent and bloody wars between neighbours, which culminated in the Second World War. As of 1950, the Western European states began to cooperate through Coal and Steel Community to unite European countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace (founders are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), (“The History of the European Union” europa.eu).

Furthermore, the last century has witnessed the peak of technological development in light of military innovation. Europe experienced numerous wars, two World Wars, and the Balkans witnessed the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia. Looking at the twentieth century from a different perspective it brought into existence different international organizations from the League of Nations to the United Nations Organization and the existence of the first and the most powerful multi-member and transatlantic military and political organization, known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This organization is a collective defense and collective security organization based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between North America and Europe. It was created in response to the growing Soviet threat towards Western Europe after the Second World War. The Soviet threat including also the communist takeovers in eastern and central Europe soon thereafter became a reality in eastern and central Europe creating the Eastern or the Socialist Bloc influenced by Moscow. This communist take over in the South Eastern Europe broke down in the late 1980s and early 1990s, while some federations, such as Yugoslavia, did not disband from the communist era in a relaxing and peaceful manner.
1.1. **North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO and its immense role in Kosovo**

In the post-World War II years, the United States became heavily involved in a whole series of alliances. In the post Second World War era, the most important and binding alliance with the nations of Western Europe is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This political and military organization was founded in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty. NATO is a security alliance that currently consists of 28 countries from North America and Europe. The primary goal of this organization is to uphold the allies’ freedom and security by political and military means. Basically, the allies’ freedom and security are protected by the core of the Alliance stated in article 5 of the Washington Treaty:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization nato.int)

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty states that an attack against one Ally is an attack against all -- is at the core of the Alliance, a promise of collective defense. Article 4 of the treaty ensures consultations among Allies on security matters of common interest, which after 60 years have expanded from a narrowly defined Soviet threat to the critical mission in Afghanistan, as well as peacekeeping in Kosovo and new threats to security such as cyber attacks, and global threats such as terrorism and piracy that affect the Alliance and its global network of partners. In addition to its traditional role in the territorial defense of Allied nations, NATO leads the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and has ongoing missions in the Western Balkans (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, state.gov).

This alliance became the center-piece of American foreign policy which contributed into
shaping Western Europe and after the end of the Cold War it influenced the former Eastern Bloc into integrating into Western Europe. The US through NATO has also contributed in shaping the Balkan region as we know it today.

During the 1990-s, NATO had played a vital role in the Balkan region, especially after the bloody breakup of Yugoslavia. The breakup of Yugoslavia was a result of occupying territories by force and annexing those territories as well. We witnessed in the 1990s, a long and agonizing crisis in Yugoslavia. The dissolution of Yugoslavia brought the deaths of tens of thousands, driven perhaps more than two million people from their homes outside their territories and internally displaced persons and caused turmoil in the Balkan region. And in the West it was generally believed that this crisis, including the civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the result of internal Yugoslav conflicts, and specifically the conflicts between Croats, Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. Later on in early 1998 till the second half of 1999, the next war of Yugoslavia spread out to the south of the country involving Kosovo.

From what was once a superpower in the Balkans and in the Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, now remains only a name in the history books. In 2006, Montenegro seceded from the Unity of Serbia and Montenegro state and in 2008 Kosovo broke away as well. Out of six Republics and two Autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia, now Serbia is left only with Vojvodina as an integrated part as shown below in Figure 1.3 and 1.4.

The war in Kosovo was a result of a century long oppression and discrimination from Serbia since the First and the Second Balkan wars, 1912 and respectively 1913, during which time Kosovo was forcefully annexed by Serbia. It is essential to state that Kosovar Albanians never felt a part of Yugoslavia, or the Slavs of the south, thus it always struggled to join the country it belonged to, the ethnic Albanian territory. Kosovo suffered enormously during and after the Balkan wars due to the extremist and expansionist policies pursued by Serbia. The Balkan wars outlined the Balkan fate of the 1990s. As one author quotes the British Foreign Secretary, Grey, regarding the Balkan conflicts of early 1910s, “[t]he war began as a ‘war of liberation’, it became war of annexation, and ended as a war of extermination” (Jr. L.L Farrar, proxy.lib.sfu.ca). Holding Yugoslavia together turned out to be expensive and it cost hundreds of thousands of innocent people. The extermination policy was the same as it was in the 1912 and 1913 only that in 1990s the military technology was greater.
Figure 1.3. Former Yugoslav Federation Before and After Breakup

Source: “BBC News”, bbc.co.uk

Figure 1.4. Kosovo in the World

Source: “BBC News”, bbc.co.uk

After the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the remaining territory of Yugoslavia extended the war to the south targeting Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo. The war
ended only with the 78 day NATO air bombardment in June 1999. Only after an agreement reached with Serbia and Montenegro to withdraw their troops from Kosovo did NATO halt the air campaign in June, 1999. Just days after, NATO sent its ground troops to Kosovo and ever since then NATO has played a major role in security and stability in Kosovo as well as in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in the Balkan region. It has contributed in the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) at the end of 1999 and allowed the transformation of the KLA into a civilian organization known as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. After Kosovo declared independence on February 17, 2008, NATO did not change its neutral role in Kosovo. However, on 12 June 2008, NATO agreed to start implementing its new tasks in Kosovo, which was to assist in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and in the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), and a civilian structure to oversee the KSF, the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force. The KPC ceased to be operational on 20 January, 2009, and the KSF stand up began on 21 January, 2009 (“NATO’s Role in Kosovo”, nato.int).

Currently, Kosovo is building up its security force based on the conditions set out on the plan drafted by President Martti Ahtisaari, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status (unosek.org). Kosovo’s security force is not a conventional armed force at the moment as it has a limited mandate and it does not play the same role as the other defensive forces in its neighboring countries. However, Kosovo is working towards a NATO compatible force that will be able to respond to humanitarian crisis in and outside Kosovo and to participate in peace building operations led by the United Nations or the European Union. The future of the Kosovo Security Force is a defense military force that will provide security to all the citizens in Kosovo regardless of their race, ethnicity, nationality, religion or gender. It ought to be a force that will defend every inch of its territory so that the border would not go through other or further alterations in the disadvantage of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo.

Kosovo has not declared nor will it ever aspire to return or retake any territory lost in the past. Kosovo has a Euro-Atlantic future and its goal is only to uphold and progress peace, security, stability, and prosperity for its existing territory and it is putting an enormous effort towards Euro-Atlantic integration.
2. Kosovo Security Force Historical Background

As Kosovo has a history towards its road to independence so does the buildup of its security force. The history of the current Kosovo Security Force is closely related with the liberation efforts of Kosovar Albanians, the independence from Serbia, and its state building capabilities. The current Kosovo Security Force has its roots on the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The foundation of this liberation force came into scene in 1990s during the ruthless oppression of the Milosevic regime.

During the 1998-1999 war, the international community was appalled by the humanitarian situation in Kosovo and by the beginning of 1999 the international community invited the delegation from then-Yugoslavia and the representatives from the ethnic Albanian majority to convene in Rambouillet and reach a peace agreement; an agreement known as the Rambouillet Accord. This Agreement was the proposal to stop the fighting in Kosovo as it identified the need for a peaceful and political solution to establish a peaceful environment in Kosovo and in order to contribute to the peace and stability in the region (Rambouillet Agreement, 1999, state.gov). The then Yugoslavia refused to accept its terms because its content held more rights to be given to the Albanian Kosovars than then Yugoslavia wanted to give to them and it believed that the agreement prelude to independence for Kosovo (Kissinger, 1999, independent.ie).

The Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign the agreement led to a 78 day NATO air campaign (March to June 1999) to stop a humanitarian catastrophe that was unfolding in Kosovo. Only after a Military Technical Agreement on June 9, 1999 was signed between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 9 June, did NATO halt the air campaign. On June 10, the international community through the “UNSCR 1244 welcomed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the principles for a political solution, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces and the deployment of an effective international civil and security presence, with substantial NATO participation” (NATO “The Kosovo Air Campaign,” nato.int).

The UNSCR 1244 had specified the conditions for demilitarization of Kosovo Liberation Army. Notably, item 9 (b) and 15, of the United Nations Security Resolution state:
9. (b) “[d]emilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

The KLA political leaders insisted to save the core of the KLA, thus creating the Kosovo Protectorate Corps. This organization was established by the UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 consisted of 3000 active and 2000 reserve members, but it absorbed a substantial KLA manpower (UNMIK SRSG Statements, unmikonline.org).

The UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 states:

The Kosovo Protection Corps shall be established as a civilian emergency service agency, the tasks of which shall be to:

(a) Provide disaster response services;
(b) Perform search and rescue;
(c) Provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas;
(d) Assist in demining; and
(e) Contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.


2.1: Post Independence Period in Kosovo

In the post independence period, February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Protectorate Corps was dissolved and the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was established. The establishment of the KSF resulted with a proposal for a new security architecture in Kosovo, based on the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo’s status, known as the Ahtisaari Plan. According to this Plan, “ [t]he KSF will have a maximum of 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members, without heavy weapons. Members of the KSF will be recruited from across Kosovo through a formal selection process developed jointly by Kosovo and the International Military Presence (IMP)” (The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement, unosek.org). As a new force which is a different organization and not associated with the previous KPC, the KSF still has more than half of its active members from the KPC organization. Hence, the KSF has some Kosovo Liberation
Given these transformations in the security organizations for one decade, one can surely presume that when the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement will be reviewed so will the security sector, namely the Kosovo Security Force and its status and mission. Kosovo will go towards a Defense Force which all the sovereign and independent countries have that will be built up and developed in accordance to NATO requirements and standards.

2.2. Security Vacuum in Kosovo

After the war was ended by the NATO bombing with the expulsion of Serbian military and police force from Kosovo, NATO established a Kosovo Force, known as the KFOR, and sent its ground troops to the territory of Kosovo. Kosovo Liberation Army was demilitarized and a new organization, known as the Kosovo Protectorate Corps (KPC), was created. However its role was far from being a defensive force. In 2007, the Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo’s status, known as the Ahtisaari Plan, addressed the security sector as well, and it proposed for a new security architecture in Kosovo. The plan was to dissolve the old KPC and build up of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).

KFOR has been the sole security provider in Kosovo since June 1999. However, recently KFOR is rapidly reducing its presence in Kosovo creating a security vacuum. Initially (June 1999) KFOR composed of some 50 000 men and women from NATO member countries, Partner countries and non-NATO countries under unified command and control. By early 2002, KFOR was reduced to around 39 000 troops. The improved security environment enabled NATO to reduce KFOR troop levels to 26 000 by June 2003 and to 17 500 by the end of 2003. By June 2008 KFOR was reduced to 14 759 troops, and by June 2009 down to 13 829 troops. Now in 2010 according to the latest information released on 26 February, KFOR has 9 923 troops in Kosovo (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, nato.int). There are talks at the NATO HQ and among NATO member states and NATO partner countries to further reduce KFOR personnel in Kosovo. As of late October 2010, NATO has declared that by spring 2011 its troops will be reduced to 5 000 (Ibid) and by 2012 NATO intends to reduce KFOR to 2,500 soldiers, depending on security conditions (“KFOR Troop Reduction Announced” Planken.org . 2010). As Figure 2.1 shows, KFOR is reducing at a pace which gives the idea that by 2013 at this pace of reduction,
KFOR personnel in Kosovo will be a lot less than the Kosovo Security Force personnel (2500 members).

**Figure 2.1: KFOR Personnel Reduction 1999 - 2010**

Source: The information on KFOR reduction comes from continuous update on KFOR website: [http://www.nato.int/kfor](http://www.nato.int/kfor).

2.3. **Stand up of the Kosovo Security Force**

Given the fact that NATO troops in Kosovo are reducing, Kosovo needs to focus on building up its own defense capacities. Based on the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, the latter has established the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) in 2009. This force consists of 2500 active members, and 800 reserves (Constitution of the Republic of Kosova, kushtetutakosoves.info). Till now the Kosovo Security Force has 2136 members. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, 1399 members come from the old organization called Kosovo Protectorate Corps (now inexistent), and the rest come from the four recruiting campaigns all over Kosovo, respectively 104 during the first campaign in 2009, 265 in the second campaign of the same year, 184 during the campaign in the first half of 2010, and 187 in the second half of 2010. The aim is that by the end of 2011, the KSF will be fully manned.
The KSF is a professional and multi-ethnic force that will be lightly armed and subject to democratic, civilian control through the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force and the Prime Minister to the Assembly. Democratic control of the security sector is one of the major requirements in democratic states (The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, dcaf.ch), particularly in Kosovo which is trying to build a democratic state.

The mission of the KSF is to conduct operations related to crisis response inside the country and abroad, civil protection operations within Kosovo, and to assist the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies in Kosovo. Such duties will include search and rescue operations; explosive ordnance disposal; the control and clearance of hazardous materials; fire-fighting; and other humanitarian assistance tasks. The KSF will represent and protect all the people of Kosovo without any discrimination related to race, colour, ethnicity, nationality, gender, religion, etc (Ministry of Kosovo Security Force, mksf-ks.org).

The goal of fulfillment to meet domestic and international standards by MKSF and KSF is appraised by both the national and international community. A better illustration regarding the MKSF and KSF personnel is illustrated in the following composition, Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: MKSF/KSF Personnel and Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile: Multiethnic, nonreligious, not politically affiliated</th>
<th>Civil official MKSF (see Annex 1): 125</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positions assigned by law: 3300</td>
<td>Uniformed officials in MKSF: 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active members: 2500</td>
<td>Currently serving: 2136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve members: 800</td>
<td>Women: Uniformed 100 or 4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian 42 or 24.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minority Percentage: Uniformed 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or 7.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian 8 or 4.62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The information about the KSF personnel comes from the Personnel Department, MKSF

2.4. KFOR Reduction and the Threat to Kosovo

If NATO (KFOR) is reducing its forces so rapidly, then the KSF must enhance its forces’ capabilities, always in accordance to the NATO standards, due to national security issues. This ought to occur simultaneously with the reduction of KFOR troops. Kosovo has established diplomatic and good relations with all the neighbouring countries but Serbia, from which Kosovo declared independence on 17 February, 2008. Serbia has affirmed that it will never recognize Kosovo; therefore Serbia is a potential risk for the independence of Kosovo. When KFOR leaves, Kosovo is defenseless and Serbia could easily take over the territory as it still considers Kosovo as its own territory. The declarations of Serbian politicians to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia pose a direct threat to Kosovo. The Serbian Constitution, Article 182, states “[i]n the Republic of Serbia, there are the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija”. Indeed, Article 114 of the Constitution states that the President of the Republic shall take the following oath before he assumes presidency, “I do solemnly swear that I will devote all my efforts to preserve the sovereignty and integrity of the territory of the Republic of Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija as its constituent part…” (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, parlament.gov.rs).

Although Kosovo is a state of compromise (the Ahtisaari Plan) as all the independent states in the region, Kosovo should have established its defense capability right after it declared independence. There were voices of support for this idea. During the Status Talks many organizations in their documents and analysis on Kosovo recommended that Kosovo must have

Also, it must be taken into consideration that despite the presence of NATO through KFOR in Kosovo, the people of Kosovo want their own defensive force. Thus, the build up of a strong security force will make Kosovo feel safer. Since Kosovo aims to be in Euro-Atlantic structures, it is another reason that the Kosovo Security Force will have to be developed. Such aims will only come to life if and only if the Kosovo Security Force develops its interoperability capability in accordance to NATO standards (Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, p.39 qkss.org).
3. Regional Comparison of the Security Forces/Military and the Relevance to Kosovo

Considering that it has declared its independence only three years ago, Kosovo has progressed in many aspects in the security sector. It has adopted the most advanced legal framework regarding democratic and civilian control over the security sector, specifically over the Kosovo Security Force. The Western Balkan region has an interesting history from a closed society under a communist regime to a region that has a euroatlantic future. During the last twenty years, since the communist era was over, these countries have gone through many reforms, including security sector reforms. Such reforms have been rewarding as numerous Western Balkan states have already joined international security organizations; such is the most powerful military and political organisation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

NATO integration has been an incentive for these countries to decrease their military manpower, thus the military expenditures and to go through many reforms, in particular reforms in the security sector. However, compared to Kosovo those countries are way ahead in euroatlantic path and have bigger and more advanced security forces. Kosovo can learn from the regional countries, especially from those that have recently joined NATO and those that are on their way to membership. From the regional countries, Slovenia, Croatia and Albania are full members of NATO, whereas Macedonia will join as soon as it resolves the name issue due to Greece blockage. Montenegro is also aiming to join NATO and is fulfilling its NATO criteria and requirements so it could obtain the invitation for membership. Bosnia and Herzegovina is also preparing itself towards NATO membership.

Each of these countries has increased transparency and accountability of the security sector which is a step forward, from a traditional defense to a contemporary security reform, which is that they strengthened democratic and civilian control of armed and security forces. Security sector reform is closely related with the requirement of transparency and accountability with that of good governance and with the protection of human rights and security. Indeed, the Security sector reform is made up of multidimensional elements. According to Theodor H. Winkler, from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), security sector is composed of five immense elements:
(1) The reforms are guided by the political leadership, according to democratic principles and the needs of state and society.

(2) The starting point is a broad view of the term “security”, including military, societal, economic and environmental security risks.

(3) The reforms include all services: military, police, intelligence agencies, state security, paramilitary organizations, and border guards.

(4) Security sector reform is not a one-off event, but a continuous process; it is not a goal in itself, but aims at providing security both to the state and to its citizens.

(5) The reforms concern both the organisation of the security sector (legal framework, structure of institutions, division of labour) and the human dimension of the security sector services, that is creating services staffed with professionals.


Each of these elements must be also respected by Kosovo in order to be closer with the NATO countries and NATO aspirant countries. According to Kosovar Center for Security Studies, the security sector reform (SSR) in Kosovo has gone through three periods. The first period is from 1999 till 2005 which is regarded dominantly as the Security Sector Building (SSB) capacity. The efforts were joined endeavour from the locals and the international community directed towards building security institutions such as the Kosovo Police (KP), Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and other relevant mechanisms. This period is considered as the time when the responsibilities of the security institutions were reserved for the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Kosovo and locals had limited responsibility.

The second period of the security reform in Kosovo started at the end of 2005 until the beginning of 2008 and is generally known as the time when transfer of responsibility began to occur from the international community to the local institutions. The internal security sector review (ISSR) of this period is considered as a turning point for Kosovo assessing the existing security sector while thinking towards building new security architecture in Kosovo. Furthermore, the establishment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice and the hand over of responsibilities from UNMIK to these newly established ministries characterized the importance of the SSR in Kosovo. Finally, the third period is indeed affiliated with the declaration of independence on February 17, 2008 and the adoption of the Constitution
of the Republic of Kosovo in April of the same year. The newly established legal framework instituted the new security architecture in Kosovo such as the Kosovo Security Force, Kosovo Security Council, Kosovo Intelligence Agency, in addition to the reform for police and emergency services (“Chronology of Security Sector Reform in Kosovo.” 2009. qkss.org).

3.1 Learning from Neighbouring Countries

The Kosovo Security Force (KSF), as one of the security organisations established by the Ahtisaari Package based on which the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova was established, needs further development. Kosovo needs to learn from the regional countries, not because they are the most advanced countries in the world when it comes to security and the euroatlantic area of security, but because the regional countries have almost similar experiences as Kosovo and have gone through similar transitions as Kosovo is going through now.

In order to learn from the experiences of the regional countries, the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (MKSF) has already taken some initiatives in this area. So far it has signed Memorandum of Understanding with numerous countries, including the neighbouring countries, such as Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. MKSF is also in discussion with numerous other NATO countries.

The MKSF has signed Memorandum of Understandings with:

- UK – 20 May 2009
- Lithuania – 30 November 2009
- Netherlands – 23 December 2009
- Turkey – 24 December 2009
- Albania – 16 February 2010
- Macedonia – 14 April 2010
- Montenegro – 3 November 2010 (MKSF web).

The Memorandum of Understanding between the MKSF and the Ministries of Defence from those countries, include exchange of information and experience in drafting different documents, drafting of legislation, defence and security policies, education and training, planning and programming and different doctrines. Kosovo, unlike the countries in the region, did not have to
go through a process of different army structures, from big, slow armed forces to reduction to more efficient and modernized armies. All the countries in the region, some more than others but they are all going through downsizing their personnel in armed forces.

**Figure 3.1: Where Kosovo Stands in European Military/Security Capabilities**


**NOTE:** The original graph is a little different, not updated with the new 2009 NATO member
states, Adriatic Charter (A5) and KOSOVO box was added to illustrate the fact that it is outside the Security Capabilities.

Kosovo is working to be part of the big collective security family, and part of the euroatlantic structures. Membership in NATO is set as a priority by the government of Kosovo. However, Kosovo is outside the security capability framework, outside the European and euroatlantic military and security capabilities, as shown above in Figure 3.1.
4. Survey Analysis Conducted in the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force and with the Members of Assembly

The capstone project questionnaire contained 11 major areas of questioning with various sub-questions (see Appendix A) and the respondents were allowed to make comments as to why they choose one or the other answer and also to make comments. All the questionnaires were anonymous, so that the respondents could give an honest unbiased answer. The survey data obtained for this capstone project reflects different stands and different views regarding the security sector in Kosovo, the Kosovo Security Force, democratic principles, legislation review, constitutional review, mission of KSF review, future Kosovo Defense Force, security capability, personnel, equipment for KSF, and other questions of interest for the current and a future force.

The capstone project survey was conducted in the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force (MKSF), with both military and civil servants working along in the integrated ministry. The questionnaire (Appendix A) aimed to ask from 30 to 35 MKSF employers, but there are 21 respondents for the entire questionnaire (70% - 60% responded). Further, the first set of questions was also sent to the Members of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. This question was sent via electronic mail to 108 out of 120 Members of the Assembly (12 of them did not have established e-mails due to being newly elected to the Assembly). Out of 108, only 6 of them responded. The interpretation of the results does not require a unique technique; nonetheless, the questionnaire will be presented in an explicit or illustrative pie charter that will show the respondents’ reply.

The following responses come from questions sent to the Members of the Assembly of Kosovo (6 out of 120 MAs).

Figure 4.1: Security sector and democratic principles in Kosovo and KSF according to MAs

| Q 1. Is the Security Sector in Kosovo consistent with the democratic principles? Answer with Yes or No? |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| a. Is state security and defense fully consistent with principles and norms of democracy? Yes No |

a. 100%  

b. 100%
Q 1. Out of those 6 Members of the Assembly (MA) respondents the majority think that the security sector in Kosovo, specifically the KSF, is consistent with democratic principles, under democratic and civilian control and an apolitical Organisation. However, one MA thought that the KSF is not as apolitical as possible. Interestingly enough as shown in the following chart, the majority of the employers asked about this same question, 57% responded that KSF is not as apolitical and 43% believe that state security and defense are not fully consistent with democratic principles.

The following responses come from questions posed to the MKSF personnel (21 out of 30).

Figure 4.2: Security sector and democratic principles in Kosovo and KSF according to MKSF staff

Q 1. The MKSF respondents think that the security sector in Kosovo, specifically the KSF, is not as consistent with democratic principles as one may have hoped; the MKSF is under democratic and civilian control but not as apolitical as possible. They believed that more could be done so that KSF could in actuality be as apolitical as possible and the whole security and defense to be in consistency with democratic norms and principles as any other modern security force. Answers differ in percentage wise from Figure 1 and Figure 2. This is so because they
know more about the KSF than the MAs do because the staff in MKSF know more about the democratic principles and norms in KSF than MAs from a distance or they judge the KSF only from what they perceive and not necessarily from day to day experience as MKSF staff.

**Figure 4.3: Kosovo actions as KFOR reduces its troops**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q 2. Witnessing rapid reductions of KFOR troops in Kosovo, what will Kosovo have to do to fill the gap? Which of the following you think needs doing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Review KSF mission to meet the security needs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Change the KSF law?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Build up a larger KSF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Develop a Kosovo Defense Force?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q 2. Out of 21 respondents the majority of them were to develop a Kosovo Defense Force or to review the KSF mission to meet the security and defense needs for Kosovo. So far KFOR has secured Kosovo and its territory, but with such a rapid reduction it is feared that the current KSF with this mission that is not a defensive force Kosovo may very much be vulnerable to instability and insecure.

**Figure 4.4: What Kosovo needs to do after 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q 3. What will Kosovo do after 2012? Circle the two most important suggestions?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Review the Ahtisaari Plan?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Amend the constitution?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Build a military force?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Transform KSF into a military organization?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q 3. In this question the respondents felt that in order to change this situation in Kosovo, whether it is defense and security or the supervised independence, Kosovo, first and foremost, must amend the Constitution. They next most important suggestion that they circled was to review the Ahtisaari Plan as soon as possible because even the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo was established based on that plan.

Figure 4.5: Will KSF go through another transformation after 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q 4. Will KSF need to go through another reform or transformation after 2012? Circle the two most important suggestions?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Keep KSF as it is?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Restructure of the KSF?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Go through a suitable vetting process of the existing KSF members?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q 4. Interestingly enough in this question it is reflected even a bitter criticism towards KFOR and our institutions that not all the KSF members are selected in the best way possible. It is crucial to remind the reader that in this questionnaire most of the respondents were uniformed or with a military or security background. Some of the civilian staff in MKSF previously served in Kosovo Protectorate Corps (KPC) organisation for 10 years but they were not selected to continue in the new KSF organisation. When this question was posed to them both the civilian and uniformed staff expressed their frustration and emphasized that the KSF needs restructuring and when it goes through it would be necessary for a more adequate and fairer vetting process because they believe that some KPC members did not deserve to be in KSF and some who deserved not to be in KSF are not.
Q 5. Will KSF continue to enhance capacity building after 2012? Answer with Yes or No?

a. Has KSF done sufficiently in capacity building?  
Yes  No

b. Will KSF continue cooperating with other organizations and sectors, within and outside Kosovo to enhance its professionalism? Yes  No

c. Will KSF continue training its staff?  Yes  No

Q 5. The majority of the respondents strongly believed that the KSF has not done enough in capacity building. They felt that the KSF could have done more since its 2 years of existence. They powerfully and without any hesitation support the enhancement of capacity building in and outside the country for its staff.

Figure 4.7: KSF issues after KFOR is no longer operational in Kosovo

Q 6. Looking at the future capability, what do you consider the most important issues for the KSF when KFOR is no longer operational in Kosovo? What are KSF plans? Answer with Yes or No?

a. Adequate build up of KSF and in compliance with NATO standards? Yes  No

b. Ask KFOR to assist in building up the KSF capabilities as it reduces its presence? Yes  No

c. Inquire NATO assistance in building up the KSF capability before KFOR withdraws? Yes  No

Q 6. Since the establishment of the KSF, all the political actors and uniformed ones in Kosovo have stated that the KSF will be built up in accordance to NATO standards and requirements. This has been done with the help of KFOR, NATO, and partners of Kosovo.
However, keeping in mind that KFOR is reducing its personnel, some respondents think that KSF must not look towards KFOR assistance as much as previously. Instead, the respondents feel that NATO can do more and it can help KSF directly to meet NATO standards.

**Figure 4.8: Kosovo in regional security cooperation initiatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q 7. Will Kosovo be involved in regional and international security cooperation initiatives after 2012? Prioritize from 1 to 4 from the most important one?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Membership into the Adriatic Charter where the regional countries are members of and it serves as a mechanism towards euroatlantic integration?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Membership in Partnership for Peace?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Starting partnership cooperation with NATO?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Symbolically participating in NATO-led missions?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q 7. As shown in the Pie Charter, most respondents identified regional security cooperation initiatives as most important or as a priority, namely the Adriatic Charter (53% gave a priority 1). Next most important initiative for Kosovo is identified to be Partnership for Peace (b); as priority two, the respondents felt considered the start of partnership cooperation with NATO (38% gave a priority 2). Regarding the participation in NATO led missions, 62% of the respondents gave a priority 4. This is due to the limited capacity and capability that KSF has.

**Figure 4.9: KSF appropriate personnel after 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q 8. Assuming that the law on KSF changes after 2012, will the number of the uniformed KSF personnel increase? Circle the number you think is most appropriate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. 2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. 3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. 4500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q 8. No respondent chose option A (the excel program did not show or recognize Zero on the Pie Chart). Forty seven percent of respondents thought that the KSF needs to increase its uniformed staff. In fact, those respondents noted that if this question had an option with a bigger number such as ten thousand they would have said KSF needs to increase its uniformed staff up to ten thousand. No respondent seemed to think about the economic implications of having such a huge number of personnel.

**Figure 4.10: What is most important for KSF after 2012**

Q 9. Assuming after 2012 (achieve FOC) the KSF reviews its mandate and mission, which of the following is most important for KSF? Prioritize them from 1 to 3 in order of importance? (1 as the most important).

a. KSF to get ready for more heavy weapons?

b. Armored Vehicles (transporters, tanks)?

c. Special Purpose Vehicles?

d. Anti-air capability?

e. Increase its defensive capabilities?

Q 9. The majority of the respondents gave a priority that after 2012 the most important objective for KSF is to increase its defensive capabilities. Under the current situation, the respondents argued, KSF has a mission but it has no defensive capability. Armored vehicles, such as tanks, were not given a priority. Indeed, no respondent gave a priority 1 to armored vehicles. The least most important among alternatives, according to respondents, is to build anti-air capabilities because it is expensive and a complicated task to be considered in the short term.
(Under B the pie chart does not show priority 1 and priority 5 because no respondent gave it a 1 priority or a 5 priority).

Figure 4.11: What KSF needs in the next two years

| Q 10. What does KSF need over the next 2 years in terms of equipment? Prioritize from 1 to 4 (1 as the most important) |
|---|---|
| a. Trucks (light and heavy duty) | ![Pie chart a. Trucks] |
| b. Vehicles (special and specific to missions) | ![Pie chart b. Vehicles] |
| c. Ambulances (4x4) | ![Pie chart c. Ambulances] |
| d. Buses & minibuses | ![Pie chart d. Buses & minibuses] |

Q 10. Percentage wise Special Vehicles specific to fulfill the mission are given a priority as 66 percent of respondents gave it a priority 1; second follow the light and heavy duty trucks with 47% of respondents giving it a priority 2. However, the least most important were buses and minibuses, giving it a priority 4. In fact, some respondents felt that KSF has more than enough of this category because all KSF members enjoy collective transport, free of charge to them but paid by the KSF budget.

Figure 4.12: What KSF needs in the next four years

| Q 11. Thinking four years ahead, which of the following is most important for KSF? Prioritize from 1 to 5? (1 as the most important). |
|---|---|
| a. Weapons/guns (individual and collective, light and heavy) | ![Pie chart a. Weapons/guns] |
| b. Equipment (demining, HAZMAT, special tents for decontamination) | ![Pie chart b. Equipment] |
| c. Tanks | |
| d. Armored vehicles | |
Q 11. From the pie charts above it seems clearly that priority number 1 is given to weapons and equipments that are directly related to KSF mission. Forty three percent of the respondents thought that individual and collective light weapons and mission oriented equipment must be a priority for KSF. In fact, helicopters have been identified as necessary in the next four years. Once again in the set of questions in Question 11 as in the set of questions in Question 9, it is confirmed that tanks are not a priority and in fact are the least of all in the priority list since 66 percent of respondents placed it as priority number 5.

Table 4.1: Major findings from the Capstone Project Survey

| Major Findings | It is interesting to see quite a difference in response and percentage wise in one set of questions in Q 1 between MAs and MKSF staff. Out of 6 Members of the Assembly (MA) respondents the majority think that the security sector in Kosovo is consistent with democratic principles. The majority of the employers asked about this same question, 57% responded that KSF is not as apolitical and 43% believe that state security and defense are not fully consistent with democratic principles. During the time the survey was conducted, a considerable number of MKSF revealed a bitter but a justifies criticism towards KFOR and Kosovar institutions that not all the KSF members were selected in the best way possible and in the most |
They felt that the KSF has lost a good amount of professionals and that if the majority of personnel from the previous organisation, the Kosovo Protectorate Corps, had been selected to serve in KSF the latter would be much more advanced and a lot more professional than the current KSF in which almost half of its members come from the civilian population and for most of them KSF is their first job.

Another fact worth mentioning is that the respondents did not think thoroughly about the budget and money implications when asked about KSF and a future Kosovo Defense Force, their capability, personnel and equipment. For example, when it came to personnel in the force, the majority of respondents chose the option with the highest number of personnel, in these questionnaire 6500 members. That is 4000 more than the current number. Even though Kosovo allocates only 0.9% to its GDP to KSF, respondents were not concerned about this and revealed that the government must plan to enhance the KSF budget even for a greater number of uniformed personnel. They strongly believed that Ahtisaari Plan must be reviewed and together with it the KSF laws, which currently as they are drafted limit the KSF tasks and duties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitations</th>
<th>The MA respondents from the Assembly of Kosovo were at a very symbolic participation which made more difficult to draw a comparison between the findings or the thoughts of the MAs with the findings or thoughts gathered from the MKSF staff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

In addition, this questionnaire brought into this project interesting ideas and perspectives about the KSF, KFOR, NATO, and the Kosovo institutions. The three most interesting set of questions were Question 1, Question 4, and Question 8.
In Question 1, the majority out of those 6 Members of the Assembly (MA) respondents think that the security sector in Kosovo, specifically the KSF, is consistent with democratic principles, under democratic and civilian control and an apolitical organisation. However, one MA thought that the KSF is not as apolitical as possible. Unlike the respondents in MKSF where they even explained why they thought they chose one option over the other, the MA respondents were sent the questions via e-mail and there was no direct communication with them due to their busy schedule. The most interesting aspect of the set of questions in Question 1, as shown in the pie charts above, the majority of those employers asked, in MKSF, about the same question, 57% responded that KSF is not as apolitical as it should be and only 43% believed that state security and defense are not fully consistent with democratic principles. They felt that if state security and defense were fully consistent with democratic norms and principles than maybe we would be closer to euroatlantic structures.

Interestingly enough in Question 4 it is revealed a bitter but a quite criticism towards KFOR and Kosovar institutions that not all the KSF members are selected in the best way possible. It is crucial to remind the reader that in this questionnaire most of the respondents were uniformed or with a military or security background. Some of the civilian staff in MKSF previously served in Kosovo Protectorate Corps (KPC) organisation for 10 years but they were not selected to continue in the new KSF organisation. However, they have applied and have been employed as civilian staff due to their expertise and professional background in the security sector. When this question was posed to them both the civilian and uniformed staff expressed their frustration and emphasized that the KSF needs restructuring and when it goes through it, it would be necessary for a more adequate and fairer vetting process because they believed that some KPC members did not deserve to be in KSF and some who deserved to be in KSF in are not.

Additionally, in Question 8, forty seven percent of respondents thought that the KSF needs to increase its uniformed staff in the post 2012 period. In fact, those respondents noted that if this question had an option with a bigger number such as ten thousand rather than the maximum 6500, they would have said KSF needs to increase its uniformed staff up to ten thousand. However, no respondent seemed to think about the economic implications on the Kosovo budget of having such a huge number of personnel.

Overall, the Questionnaire went really well due to the fact that it was conducted in such a way that respondents were given time and opportunity whenever they requested so to explain their
choice. Most importantly, the Questionnaire was anonymous, which needless to say it brought about their candid and straightforward response.
5. **KSF to Reach Full Operational Capabilities (FOC) as Soon as Possible**

“Full Operational Capabilities” is a term that in 2011 has been used very often in the Ministry of Kosovo Security Force (MKSF) which means that KSF be fully operational and fulfill its mission in accordance to the KSF laws and regulations and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. The Minister for the Kosovo Security Force has declared that the “[a]chievement of Full Operational Capacities (FOC) within 2011, and maximal utilization of the existing KSF capacities as to insure the security of life and property of all Republic of Kosovo citizens, as well as to offer support to the local and central institutions in fulfilling their duties in the area of security” (Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force Priorities for 2011-2014, mksf-ks.org).

Indeed, in order for the KSF to declare its Full Operational Capabilities among other criteria needs to fulfill as soon as possible the following:

- Threshold for the manning of the KSF and the declaration of FOC is 75% for active members, but it will have to reach the required number of 2500 active members.
- Threshold for the manning of the KSF and the declaration of FOC is 75% for the reserve members, but it will have to reach the required number of 800 reserve members.
- Thus, to be fully manned in 2011, 2500 active members
- Thus, to have 800 reserve in 2012
- A recruitment campaign policy and plan that support the KSF reaching the goal of minimum 10% minority.
- A recruitment campaign policy and plan that support the KSF reaching the goal of minimum 15% females.
- A self-sustainable recruitment, screening and selection process.
- Approval and implementation of the National Security Strategy (Government)
- Approval and implementation of the Kosovo Security Force Strategy
- The KSF must be manned and equipped with the right equipment, and train its personnel to support the mission and it must evolve towards developing an expeditionary logistics capability to operate beyond the borders of Kosovo as cited in the adopted laws (MKSF staff and KFOR discussions for those requirements).

Since the Minister has given a priority to reach the FOC by the end of 2011, the current recruiting campaign (fall 2011) will have to meet the above mentioned requirements.
Table 5.1: KSF composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total active Members</th>
<th>2136 FOC 2500</th>
<th>85.4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>7.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trained</td>
<td>2136</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Personnel Department, MKSF

According to this data, the MKSF has to meet the requirement by aiming to recruit more minorities, at least 2.14% more. This percentage is preferred to be met by recruiting more from Serb minorities. Also the female recruitment is very low due to the fact that they are less interested in applying to KSF.

As far as the National Security Strategy and the Kosovo Security Force Strategy they are both adopted. Regarding the last point, even though KSF has contributed twice last year in Vlora flooding, in Albania, and has proved to be very successful, the KSF still needs further work because it is not yet fully equipped and not yet capable of undertaking complicated missions beyond its border. Indeed, KSF needs to complete its requirement equipment list.

5.1 Recommendation: Equipment to Enhance KSF Capability

Considering the size of the population, its GDP of 3.80 bill € (Kosova Chamber of Commerce, oek-kcc.org), and its size of the territory, and based on the current uniformed staff that the KSF has, the latter will need the following equipments and items in the next following years to enhance its capabilities to operate successfully in Kosovo and beyond its territory, in humanitarian responses. Indeed, some of the subsequent equipments and items have been identified even by the respondents as necessary for the KSF (Some of the following equipment are in possession but do not even meet the full operational capability due to age and very limited in number):

**Trucks Category:** light trucks 4x4 for quick maneuvering; quick intervention (€150,000 to 180,000)
Medium trucks (up to 5 tons) for difficult terrains (€100,000 to 130,000)
Heavy trucks (from 5 to 20 tons) for supporting units (€200,000 to 230,000)

Special Purpose Vehicles: Special purpose vehicles 4X4 or Tactic Vehicles (additional parts integrated in them, such space for radio tactics) (€ 80,000 x 10 = €800,000)
All HQ units (5)
Communication Company
HAZMAT Company
Surveillance unit
Situation Center
Demining Company

Special Purpose Equipment:
Personal equipment/items for Demining (€25,000 per person x 20 = 500,000
e.g one locator approximately €6,000)
Personal & collective for HAZMAT protection:
Center for decontamination (€150,000 per one unit – 40 people)
Trucks with integrated equipments for boiling water needed for decontamination (12 ton. €300,000)
Tents for contaminated personnel or groups of people (1 x2500 x 10=€25,000)

Auto-ambulances 4X4 (4 x 100,000 = 400,000)

Field Kitchens: for the support units in missions (5 x 25,000 = 125,000).

Armored Vehicles (tanks are not considered as appropriate for a mobile and a professional security force). Those armored transporters must have a capacity to hold 8 to 13 people with their personal weapons. There is a need for 35 of this sort to be capable and ready for missions inside and outside Kosovo.
3 out of these vehicles must be of special purpose such as for civil unrest situations & violent demonstrators (where is not appropriate for the police force) – (€2 to 3 million)
1 with pressure water pump (€1.5 million)
1 with communication equipment and amplifiers to communicate with the mass (€2 million)
**Small ships** for search and rescue missions: for the extraction of remains and other remains as necessary in lakes and in deep water (10 x €15,000 = €150,000)

**Helicopters: 2 + 1**: two for the transportation of search and rescue units and one for first aid or transportation of injured people (2 x €10 to €15 million and 1x €7 to €10 million)

**Source:** The list was prepared in cooperation and coordination with Tafil Avdiu. Former officer in Former Yugoslavia. KLA and a KPC officer. Currently, the Head of Situation Center in MKSF.

Depending on the size, capacity, integrated parts, and the negotiation of procurement, but according to the Procurement Department officer in MKSF, the above equipments and items, without helicopters, would cost approximately €8,945,000.

The helicopters cost approximately €30 million. These figures are approximate only because the right price for all of them depends on the specifications required and the negotiations with the producers (Source: Binak Zekaj, Officer for Infrastructure in the Procurement Department, MKSF, personal communication April 20, 2011).

Considering the lack or the limited mission of the existing Kosovo Security Force which is not even equipped to respond to the least threat from any serious danger, Kosovo ought to build a security force with full defensive capability in order to obtain the role as a fully functioning state with full capability, including its capability and capacity to defend itself. Bearing in mind that KFOR is reducing its troops which so far has served as a deterrent force, Kosovo will be left almost without any defense if faced with any threat from Serbia. It does not mean that NATO will just turn its back on Kosovo merely because it is reducing its troops and the people of Kosovo should not presume that NATO will not return or respond if Kosovo is under any direct threat.

Nonetheless, Kosovo must begin planning for a defensive force in the near future. Indeed, when the study review of the Ahtisaari Plan commences in 2012, the security sector must also be reviewed. In fact, the law on KSF cannot be reviewed till 2013 regardless the political will and the enthusiasm to change it as soon as possible. Nevertheless, it is not prohibited to start planning for the 2013 so that when the time comes to change the law Kosovo be ready to adopt the changes and not waste time during this period. Indeed, the law No.03/L-046, “For the Kosovo Security Force” article 10, paragraph 10.2, adopted on 13 March 2008, states that ”the mission for the KSF cannot be reviewed earlier than 5 years” (“Legislation” mksf-ks.org). This means that the mission on KSF cannot be reviewed any earlier than March 2013, but it does not state that it cannot be changed right after 13 March.

Furthermore, the political actors have begun declaring that the Constitutional review will have to commence, so that the supervised independence come to an end. The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Mr. Hashim Thaçi had declared as early as July 2010, right after the decision of the International Court of Justice that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is not in violation of international law, that Kosovo’s supervised independence is coming to an end (Telegrafi, 25 July.2010 telegrafi.com). Indeed, just recently on April 22, 2011, the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo has established two assembly commissions that will deal with constitutional reforms, the direct election of the President and the Election Law (“Assembly adopted the Constitutional Change Commission” Gazetaexpress, gazetaexpress.com).

The head of the International Civilian Office, Peter Faith, who is also the European Union
Special Representative in Kosovo to ensure full implementation of Kosovo’s status settlement has recently declared that his role in not long term and infinite. He stated in a high school visit to Prishtina together with the Minister of Education, Science and Technology that “his role as an International Civilian Representative is ending….I am ready to support and assist the institutions, but I assure you that the period of supervised independence will end soon” (“Feith Would not Hamper the Constitutional Changes” Gazetaexpress, 21 Apr. 2011. gazetaexpress.com). This paves the road to the creation of other assembly commissions to amend the Constitution in other areas, such as the security sector.

6.1. Comparative approach with other Balkan States and the Establishment of the Kosovo Defense Force

Kosovo has not been the aggressor in the war with Serbia during 1998-1999, thus it is not just rational that Kosovo is not allowed to have defensive capabilities. It should not be that Kosovo be the only independent country in the region that has no army or any security capability to defend itself from potential risk to its territory. Each independent country needs to build its defensive capability for various reasons, best put by Theodor H. Winkler from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces stating, “every country has, in the security realm, some basic, clearly defined interests, most notably: the ability to protect and, if necessary, defend its territory, air space, sea frontiers, critical national infrastructure, and national interests; to guard its borders against illegal and clandestine entry or exit of persons and goods; to safeguard the security, physical safety and the property of its citizens and inhabitants; to protect the country against organised crime, terrorist attack or acts by any sort of group that aims to overthrow through violent means the constitutional order or the existing state structures or to gain control over at least parts of the state territory” (Winkler, DCAF, p.6).

Compared to other regional countries, Kosovo has a very limited force both in personnel and mission and with a limited crippled budget (see APPENDIX B and APPENDIX C for both armed forces personnel and expenditures in terms of GDP percentage in other Western Balkan countries). Kosovo’s population is around two million, but when looking at its neighbours and their population in correspondence with their military force, then Kosovo must increase the personnel in Security Force as to correspond more with its population size and territorial size. The armed forces personnel will be compared and illustrated starting from up north and then to
the south respectively: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, and down to Macedonia. All but Albania were part of Former Yugoslavia in Table 6.1 (See Appendix B).

**Table 6.1: Military Personnel in Eight Western Balkan Countries (Based on the last available data)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 2007</th>
<th>Year 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>14,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kosovo Year 2009</th>
<th>Year 2011 (first quarter)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1768</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Figure 6.1, Serbia and Croatia have the biggest military personnel in Western Balkans. They also have the largest territory; Serbia’s territory is 77,474sq.km with a population of 7.31 million, and Croatia has 56,594sq.km with a population of 4.48 million. The other 6 remaining some have slightly smaller territory while some are very small in comparison. Based on the square kilometers, the other countries are as follows: Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory is
Kosovo has the smallest territory of them all. Nonetheless, Kosovo has a big population and there is a huge disproportionate of military and security forces. For instance, if Kosovo is three times more populated than Montenegro but with a quite similar territorial size, than Kosovo has a small security force to defend that population and that territory. Never mind that the existing Security Force does not have the mission to defend the territory that makes it more difficult for Kosovar institutions and more disadvantageous in comparison with its neighbouring countries and those in the region. Moreover, the average military personnel in Western Balkans is 14,750, which means that the eight Western Balkan countries have 118,000 military/security forces. Let’s suppose for the sake of the argument that Kosovo must have just half of the average military personnel that the countries in the Western Balkans have. Except for Bosnia which has nine thousand and Albania just 250 less than the average, Kosovo has 12,250 less than the average. Simply put Kosovo has a security personnel only 17% of the average that the Western Balkan countries have, that translates to no more than 2500 members.

As a matter of fact, Kosovo does not have a military force per se, as other countries in the region have. The existing security force does not even meet the minimum requirement to preserve the independence of Kosovo and its sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, or the ability and capability to defend the Kosovo’s vital interests. All the countries in the region have defensive capability and some even offensive capability (which had been demonstrated not too long ago). Indeed, unless Kosovo starts developing a Kosovo Defense Force with full defensive capability, Kosovo does not meet the fundamentals required to defend itself. Regarding the national interest of each country, as quoted previously in this paper, Theodor H. Winkler states that every country has some fundamental that are concisely noted such as the capability and capacity to protect and defend its territory, its air space, sea frontiers, critical national infrastructure, and national interests. Also, the capability to safeguard its borders against illegal and clandestine entry or exit of persons and goods, to protect and secure physical safety and the property of all its citizens and inhabitants; to protect the
country against organised crime or any group that aims to overthrow the government through violent means or to disturb the constitutional order (Winkler, 2002. DCAF, p.6. dcaf.ch).

Kosovo’s territory is protected by NATO through KFOR. Kosovo’s border is watched by the border police, but it does not necessarily defend the border. Kosovo’s southern neighbour for instance, the Former Republic of Macedonia, has the national defence policy and doctrine “based upon the following basic security policy goals: to protect the lives and the personal safety of the civilians; to guarantee the independence and the territorial integrity of the state; to guarantee the material well being and the prosperity of the civilians” (Macedonian Ministry of Defense “Basics of Defence” morm.gov.mk).

6.2. Missions and Tasks of KSF

The mission of the Kosovo Security Force is stated by the Law No. 03/L-046 “Law on the Kosovo Security Force” Article 10 under Missions and Tasks of the KSF therefore it is stated:

10.1 The mission of the Kosovo Security Force, as an instrument of Security, is to support the Government of the Republic of Kosovo.

10.2 The Kosovo Security Force shall be lightly armed and possess no heavy weapons, such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability. Any changes will be determined by the International Military Presence, in coordination with the International Civilian Representative. A full review of these limits to be conducted no earlier than 5 years from the date this Law enters into force. The initial tasks of the Kosovo Security Force shall be:

a) to participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations. This will include operations outside the territory of the Republic of Kosovo where invited to do so;

b) to assist civil authorities in responding to natural and other disasters and emergencies, including as part of a regional or international response effort,

c) to conduct explosive ordnance disposal,

d) to assist civil authorities through civil protection operations.


Nowhere does this law or the mission of the KSF state anything about protecting and defending Kosovo’s territory, its air space, critical national infrastructure, and national interests.
The former Minister for Kosovo Security Force, Mr. Fehmi Mujota had declared that “[i]n 2012 we are focused in achieving full operational capacity under the Constitution and laws that Kosovo Security Force operates and it is certainly thought that after the year 2012 to have proper politico-military plans, which must be coordinated decisions for additional tasks that any professional force within a state must have” (“KSF with Additional Tasks. September. 2010 Gazeta Express. gazetaexpress.com).

In brief, the government of Kosovo ought to look at its neighbours and other NATO countries when it reviews the Constitution and the laws on Kosovo Security Force and establish the Kosovo Defense Force with the full mission and mandate that any conventional military force executes. This will not cause any problems nor will it cause any perplexing or security vacuum in Kosovo because the future Defense Force would comprise of the existing KSF members but just with additional duties and tasks.

Kosovo has one of the most open economies in the Western Balkan region, a market based system, and continues to work closely with its international partners and international community to prosper and attract foreign investment. Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe with approximately 40% unemployment. Kosovo has a GDP of 3.80 Billion Euros (Kosova Chamber of Commerce) but it still depends enormously on the international community finances and technical assistance, around 7.5% of GDP, and diaspora assistance that comprises at about 13-15% of GDP (CIA: The World Factbook “Kosovo” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html).

7.1. KSF Budget 2009 – 2011

Kosovo is export deficit and most of the budget money is collected by the customs and the Kosovo Tax Agency. The limited budget reflects and results on the cost-benefit analysis and tradeoffs. The limited budget is reflected on the KSF as well due to a small piece of the pie that is allocated to this organisation. Most of the countries do not make tradeoffs when it comes to security sector; however, due to the fact that Kosovo has many other priorities, such as economic development and social welfare, KSF receives a lot less money than other countries in the region.

Table 7.1: MKSF/KSF budget trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total in mil. Euro</td>
<td>20,465</td>
<td>31,099</td>
<td>35,372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Finance, Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force.
Even though in 2010 and early 2011, the KSF was not fully operational or at least KSF will not be fully operational till the end of 2011 or the beginning of 2012, the budget difference from 2010 to 2011 is around 13% bigger in 2011 (Note: the first time this information was collected the budget was 33.323 Million Euros, but the budget increased for approximately 2 million Euros due to salary increase that the Prime Minister had made a decision for an increase for 30% of all public servants, hence 35,372,891 Euro). In countries that allocate billions of dollars to their military or national defense forces the 13% increase would be considered a substantial increase or if that country is not as friendly such an increase would be perceived as an extensive increase or a threat to its neighbours. See Figure 7.1 the trend of budget increase in the last three years, however, Figure 7.2. illustrates the Security Force Expenditure in percentage wise respective to GDP. Kosovo’s GDP is approximately 3.80 Billion € (Kosova Chamber of Commerce. oek-kcc.org).

**Figure 7.2 Security Force Expenditure (%) of GDP in Kosovo**

Figure 7.2 illustrates that Kosovo for 2011 allocates only 0.9% of its GDP on KSF, while most of
NATO member states and NATO aspirants are encouraged to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense (NATO Emphasizes Defense Spending Despite Crisis, Reuters, 2010. reuters.com).

7.2 Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2011-2013

In the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 2011-2013 document, under the Strategic Objectives that the “strategy of development of KSF and the Long-term Plan of KSF, drafted by the Ministry of KSF, determine the road and the way of KSF development, modernization, and training to develop real capacities for realization of its constitutional mission:"

i. Achievement of Fully Operational Capacities in cooperation with NATO (2012)

ii. Increase of operational capacities and modernization of KSF (C2)

iii. Increase of capacities for participation in humanitarian operations in cases of natural disasters and in peacekeeping operations

iv. Integration in joint structures of European and Euro Atlantic structures.


Table 7.2: Mid-term Expenditure Framework 2011-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totali</td>
<td>35,756,832.00</td>
<td>36,852,258.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When considering this projection there is still a small difference in increase year by year; for example, from 2011 budget to 2012 only 1%, and from 2012 budget to 2013 only 3.05%. Some may argue that this budget is suffice when considering that NATO has established a Trust Fund for all NATO members to contribute to the stand up of the KSF.

NATO developed a KSF requirements list to allow nations to donate equipment or money and so far since 2009 the following contribution have been given for the stand up of the KSF:

- Initial requirements totaled 37.4M euro
- Trust Fund Donations – 6.87M euro
- Equipment Donations - 15.78M euro

Source: Security Cooperation Department, MKSF.

Despite the huge contribution from NATO member states, KSF still needs a bigger portion of the budget exactly because the KSF is not yet fully operational. Even if the KSF would be fully operational and fully capable, KSF needs to meet NATO requirement and encouragement that all NATO members allocate at least 2% of their GDP to military, because Kosovo has declared that it aims to be a member of the Alliance. One may argue that Kosovo does not have a defense force, and KSF does not have a defensive force mandate, therefore Kosovo does not need to spend 2% of its GDP on security force? Nevertheless, the closest organisation to the military in Kosovo is the Security Force. Yet, Kosovo must build a Kosovo Defense Force and assign to it the necessary budget as all the normal states do, as all the countries in the region do. Figure 7.3 compares the military expenditure in terms of GDP percentage in eight Western Balkan countries. Those figures are taken from the year 2008 due to data availability except Kosovo which is from 2011. See Appendix C for charts with historical data for military expenditure (%GDP) in seven Western Balkan countries.

**Figure 7.3. Military/Security Expenditure (% of GDP) in Eight Western Balkan Countries**

![](chart.png)

Source: Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/. Except Kosovo that the information is derived from the Law on Budget, Ministry of Finance and then compared with the
GDP.

Taking into consideration the limited budget, the limited mission and mandate, Kosovo must work intensively towards NATO integration so that it would be in the family of collective security. In this case it would not spend too much of its GDP on defense and it would be a partner with many other developed nations that would assist Kosovo in case of any threats.

### 7.3 Long Term Expenditure or Investment 2014-2017: Kosovo in NATO

Founded in a Development Plan drafted lately by the Government of Kosovo, Kosovo will witness an annual economic growth from 7 to 8 percent and reduction of unemployment from 8 to 10 percent (Maloku. “With a Development Plan” gazetaexpress.com). This means that if this trend of economic development continues for many years to come then KSF or the Kosovo’s future Defense Force budget must increase in parallel with economic development from 7 to 8%. Kosovo must enhance the budget for the security force if it really yearns for joining NATO so it will have to build a force that is capable of and equipped to NATO standards, meet NATO criteria and be compatible and interoperable with NATO. Indeed, increasing the budget for the force must not be perceived as expenditure but rather an investment. Later on Kosovo will see that by investing in a force that meets NATO criteria and ultimately join this organisation would mean a guarantee of security. If Kosovo for any reason does not invest in NATO membership, then it will end up making disproportionate unilateral investment to maintain a military/force budget to guarantee a survival level of security.

Still considering the priorities Kosovo has, due to numerous challenges, from unemployment to social welfare and health care, security sector is not a priority. Hence, Kosovo must join euroatlantic security structures as soon as it finds the chance. In particular, Kosovo must start the initiative and be part of NATO initiatives without wasting any time.

NATO integration for Kosovo and Kosovars is very clear as support for pursuing membership is more popular than in any other nation in the region. When looking at the Western Balkan countries, there is a trend of decrease in both military personnel and military expenditures because all of them (Please refer to Appendix B and Appendix C), except Kosovo, have begun euroatlantic integration processes, notably NATO integration initiatives. In order to support this idea, two additional countries from the southeast Europe, Bulgaria and Rumania, Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 are also considered in addition to Slovenia, Albania and Croatia (see Appendix B and
C) which have reduced their military personnel right when they began intensifying NATO integration processes, and eventually joined NATO in 2004. Undeniably, the figures show that after they joined NATO those countries continued to reduce their huge armed forced and develop professional forces.

**Figure 7.4 Bulgarian Armed Forces Personnel**

![Graph showing Bulgarian Armed Forces Personnel](image1)

**Figure 7.5 Romanian Armed Forces Personnel**

![Graph showing Romanian Armed Forces Personnel](image2)


First and foremost Kosovo must conduct a cost benefit analysis of joining NATO. It will have to learn from the countries in the region and if necessary from the southeast European countries. Building a defense force as an element of national security is a necessity for Kosovo. However, Kosovo should in parallel seek NATO integration because security cannot be ensured only by military force alone. Hence, NATO is a common security system that brings both expenses due to the contribution of member states in NATO led missions. Nevertheless, when comparing all the data from the countries that have recently joined NATO it could be witnessed that their expenditures among member states are reduced due to armed personnel cutbacks.
8. Final Discussion and Recommendations

After rapid reduction of KFOR troops in Kosovo from fifty thousand in 1999 to less than ten thousand in late 2010 and with further reduction to five thousand by early summer 2011 ought to be a great concern for Kosovo. This withdrawal of NATO troops in Kosovo perhaps reflects positively on the security environment in Kosovo, and this withdrawal is justified by the prosperous and peace situation in Kosovo. However, one big factor ought to be kept in mind and analyzed objectively: what kind of capacity and capability does Kosovo have to defend itself from any attack or threat towards Kosovo, its territory, its people and its territorial integrity and sovereignty?

In this Capstone Project a questionnaire has also been conducted in the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force and one set of this questionnaire was also sent to the Members of the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo that has incorporated the current situation Kosovo, in MKSF and KSF by gathering the data to come to an analysis as to where KSF is, where it should go, why, and how. The purpose was to ask people what they thought in general and then those responses are compared to draw conclusions and results that have given a confidence on the topic of this project.

8.1 Kosovo Security Force and its Full Operational Capability

Kosovo Security Force declared its Initial Operational Capabilities in September 2009, but as it has been argued above on this paper, KSF is not yet fully operational, or it has not yet declared Full Operational Capabilities (FOC). This means to be a force that meets all the required standards set out by NATO. But in order to declare FOC, KSF will have to reach the required number of 2500 active members and 800 reserves as required by law. It aims to reach the goal of minimum 10% minority and 15% females in this force. It is working hard towards a self-sustainable recruitment, screening and selection process. Just in the last recruiting campaign, spring 2011 there are more than 4500 applicants for 300 positions. MKSF has adopted the Kosovo Security Strategy based on the implementation of the National Security Strategy.

The KSF must be manned and equipped with the right equipment, and train its personnel to support the mission and it must evolve towards developing an expeditionary logistics capability to operate beyond the borders of Kosovo to fulfill its mission as noted in the adopted laws.
Despite the requirements facing MKSF and KSF, the latter are making a huge progress towards reaching and declaring Full Operational Capabilities. In actuality, the Minister for the Kosovo Security Force has declared numerous times that KSF will reach and declare Full Operational Capabilities by the end of 2011 (MKSF, web).

**8.2 Post 2012 KSF Mandate**

Currently, the Kosovo Security Force has a limited mandate and mission. Even though it is building up its security sector, Kosovo is not building up its defensive capability at a pace that corresponds with the rapid withdrawal of KFOR and the security needs of Kosovo as a sovereign state. In fact, building up the security sector has a different meaning in Kosovo; security sector does not comprise of an armed force or a defense force as in other countries in the region or beyond but it means the Police, the Intelligence Agency and the Security Force, the latter with a minimum security mandate. The Kosovo Security Force, the organisation that is closest to a defense force is handicapped with a mission that is closer to a civil emergency organisation rather than to a defensive one. The KSF mission is to conduct crisis response operations in Kosovo and abroad, civil protection operations within Kosovo, and to assist the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies. Such duties include search and rescue operations, explosive ordnance disposal, the control and clearance of hazardous materials, firefighting; and other humanitarian assistance tasks (MKSF “Mission”). Nowhere does this mission for the KSF include the protection and defense of Kosovo’s territory, its air space, critical national infrastructure, and national interests. Also, the capability to safeguard its borders against illegal and clandestine entry or exit of persons and goods, which is more than evident in northern part of Kosovo bordering Serbia, to protect and secure physical safety and the property of all its citizens and inhabitants; to protect the country against organised crime or any group that intends to overthrow the government through violent means or to disturb the constitutional order (DCAF). In fact, Kosovo is the most open border country in the whole of Europe, arguable even beyond Europe, and illegal and clandestine entry of persons and goods is very common in Kosovo due to this openness. Hence, Kosovo’s border can be easily perpetrated and therefore its security. Ironically, Kosovo is the most isolated country in Europe and one of the most isolated in the world whose citizens can travel without visas only to two countries.
8.3 New Legislation for Kosovo’s Defense Force

The recent developments in Kosovo regarding constitutional change increase the prospect that new legislation regarding a new Kosovo Defense Force will be adopted in the Assembly in the near future. The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Mr. Hashim Thaçi had declared as early as July 2010, right after the decision of the International Court of Justice that Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence is not in violation of international law, that Kosovo’s supervised independence is coming to an end (“Supervised Independence Successfully is Coming to an End” Telegrafi, 25 July, 2010. telegrafi.com). Indeed, just recently on April 22, 2011, the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo has established two Assembly Commissions that will deal with constitutional reforms, the direct election of the President and the Election Law (“Assembly adopted the Constitutional Change Commission” Gazeta Express, gazetaexpress.com). At the Government meeting, on April 20, 2011, Prime Minister has once more reassured his cabinet and the people that the constitutional changes will be substantial in terms of strengthening of the state and accelerate the completion of the supervised phase of Kosovo’s independence (RTK. “Constitutional Change will Accelerate the Strengthening of the State.” 20. April. 2011 rtklive.com).

The head of the International Civilian Office, Peter Faith, who is also the European Union Special Representative in Kosovo to ensure full implementation of Kosovo’s status settlement has recently declared that his role in not long term and infinite. He recently stated that the period of supervised independence will end soon” (“Feith Would not Hamper the Constitutional Changes” Gazetaexpress, 21 Apr. 2011 gazetaexpress.com).

The existing legislation would not be good for the future Kosovo Defense Force; thus it must be either amended or changed so that the new force could perform and engage in any activity that other defense forces in the region do, or any other normal independent country does for that matter. The limitation posed on the KSF by the existing laws handicap this force to be fully a defensive force and play the role a conventional force would; that is to defend the territory and the people of Kosovo by all means. The new legislation should take into consideration and through consultations with Kosovo’s friends and allies to adopt a law that both consolidates a conventional Defense Force and at the same time in compatibility with all modern defense forces.
8.4 Strategic Regional Compatibility: Euroatlantic Integration

As shown above in text in Figure 3.1: Where Kosovo Stands in European Military/Security Capabilities, Kosova is outside every Transatlantic, European and Regional initiative as far as euroatlantic structure is concerned. Kosovo has expressed its will to join those initiatives. Kosovo has certainly made some progress and order to learn from the countries that are members or ascending countries in euroatlantic family. Such progress has been made through the signing of Memorandum of Understanding between the MKSF and the Ministries of Defence from those countries, include exchange of information and experience in drafting different documents, drafting of legislation, defence and security policies, education and training, planning and programming and different doctrines.

Kosovo is working to be part of the big collective security family, and part of the euroatlantic structures. Membership in NATO is set as a priority by the government of Kosovo. However, Kosovo is outside the security capability framework, outside the European and euroatlantic military and security capabilities, as shown above in Figure 3.1. Clearly Kosovo has no capacity or capability to defend itself. Thus, that Kosovo must initiate integration into euroatlantic structures, notably NATO. Joining NATO would mean security for Kosovo and at the same time economic prosperity due to foreign investment as the investors would see Kosovo as a secure and stable country.

8.5 Future Defense Budget Enhancement

A lot of data is collected both on KSF personnel and on the budget allocated to KSF. Whilst compared with other countries in the region, it turns out that Kosovo has the smallest security/armed force in the entire region whether it is compared by territory, its population or economy.

Data on the KSF budget were also collected and studied. Those figures were gathered and then compared with other neighbouring countries of Kosovo. Some of those countries have recently joined NATO, some are close to join this Organisation whereas the others are aspirant countries. The final results are a little shocking because Kosovo not only does it have the smallest security force in number but also allocates the lowest budget to this force. Seven Western Balkan countries spend an average of 1.81% of their GDP on military expenditure.
Kosovo, on the other hand, spends on KSF only half of the average that the other countries spend, that is 0.9% of its GDP, as Figure 8.1, illustrates.

**Figure 8.1. Military/Security Expenditure (% of GDP) in Eight Western Balkan Countries**

Source: The data for 7 W.B countries is collected from Trading Economics, tradingeconomics.com/. Except Kosovo that the information derives from the Law on Budget, Ministry of Finance and then compared with the GDP.

Kosovo must start enhancing the budget whether towards KSF, or in the future, the Kosovo Defense Force. Based on Chapter 7 that illustrates budget scenarios, Kosovo must increase the portion of the budget annually by 16% so that by year 2017 Kosovo is able to allocate nearly 1.8% of its GDP to Security/Defense Force, as exemplified in Figure 8.2. This figure assumes that the economic growth of Kosovo’s GDP is approximately 4.5 annual growth (Kosovo Chamber of Commerce for 2009 estimate and CIA Factbook for 2010 estimate, thus an assumption is made). The figure also assumes that even if Government of Kosovo allocates the money that reflects the GDP growth to KSF/Kosovo Defense Force still it does not suffice. Kosovo, in order to catch up by 2017 with other regional countries in terms of budget allocation, which is the average of 1.8 %, to defense it must start allocating 16% annually of its GDP this year.
Table 8.1: Assumption of Annual GDP Growth and Annual Budget Increase for KSF/Defense Force 2011 – 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP Growth (€ Billion)</th>
<th>Budget Increase for KSF/Defense Force (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>€ 3.97</td>
<td>2012 – € 36,964,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>€ 4.14</td>
<td>2013 – € 38,628,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>€ 4.53</td>
<td>2015 – € 42,182,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>€ 4.73</td>
<td>2016 – € 44,081,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>€ 4.94</td>
<td>2017 – € 46,064,705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Figure 8.1, Kosovo must allocate to security/defense force almost triple what the real economic growth or the 4.5% GDP annual growth Kosovo witnesses, in order to reach the average of 1.8% of their GDP that the seven Western Balkan countries spend on military. This is the scenario that is recommended that Kosovo pursue or otherwise it will be behind other regional countries in terms of defense and perhaps in terms of joining euroatlantic structures.
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Appendix A:

Questions conducted with the personnel in the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force;
Question 1 was sent to 108 Members of Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo:

Q 1. Is the Security Sector in Kosovo consistent with the democratic principles? Answer with Yes or No?
   a. Is state security and defense fully consistent with principles and norms of democracy? Yes  No
   b. Is KSF under democratic and civilian control? Yes  No
   c. Is KSF as apolitical as possible? Yes  No

Q 2. Witnessing rapid reductions of KFOR troops in Kosovo, what will Kosovo have to do to fill the gap? Which of the following you think needs doing?
   a. Review KSF mission to meet the security needs?
   b. Change the KSF law?
   c. Build up a larger KSF?
   d. Develop a Kosovo Defense Force?

Q 3. What will Kosovo do after 2012? Circle the two most important suggestions?
   a. Review the Ahtisaari Plan?
   b. Amend the constitution?
   c. Build a military force?
   d. Transform KSF into a military organization?

Q 4. Will KSF need to go through another reform or transformation after 2012? Circle the two most important suggestions?
   a. Keep KSF as it is?
   b. Restructure of the KSF?
   c. Go through a suitable vetting process of the existing KSF members?

Q 5. Will KSF continue to enhance capacity building after 2012? Answer with Yes or No?
a. Has KSF done sufficiently in capacity building? Yes  No
b. Will KSF continue cooperating with other organizations and sectors, within and outside Kosovo to enhance its professionalism? Yes  No
c. Will KSF continue training its staff? Yes  No

Q 6. Looking at the future capability, what do you consider the most important issues for the KSF when KFOR is no longer operational in Kosova? What are KSF plans? Answer with Yes or No?
   a. Adequate build up of KSF and in compliance with NATO standards? Yes  No
   b. Ask KFOR to assist in building up the KSF capabilities as it reduces its presence? Yes  No
   c. Inquire NATO assistance in building up the KSF capability before KFOR withdraws? Yes  No

Q 7. Will Kosovo be involved in regional and international security cooperation initiatives after 2012? Prioritize from 1 to 4 from the most important one?
   a. Membership into the Adriatic Charter where the regional countries are members of and it serves as a mechanism towards euroatlantic integration?
   b. Membership in Partnership for Peace?
   c. Starting partnership cooperation with NATO?
   d. Symbolically participating in NATO-led missions?

Q 8. Assuming that the law on KSF changes after 2012, will the number of the uniformed KSF personnel increase? Circle the number you think is most appropriate?
   a. 2500
   b. 3500
   c. 4500
   d. 6500

Q 9. Assuming after 2012 (achieve FOC) the KSF reviews its mandate and mission, which of the following is most important for KSF? Prioritize them from 1 to 3 in order of importance? (1 as the most important).
   a. KSF to get ready for more heavy weapons?
b. Armored Vehicles (transporters, tanks)?
c. Special Purpose Vehicles?
d. Anti-air capability?
e. Increase its defensive capabilities?

Q 10. What does KSF need over the next 2 years in terms of equipment?
   Prioritize from 1 to 4? (1 as the most important)
   a. Trucks (light and heavy duty)
   b. Vehicles (special and specific to missions)
   c. Ambulances (4x4)
   d. Buses & minibuses

Q 11. Thinking four years ahead, which of the following is most important for KSF?
   Prioritize from 1 to 5? (1 as the most important).
   a. Weapons/guns (individual and collective, light and heavy)
   b. Equipment (demining, HAZMAT, special tents for decontamination)
   c. Tanks
   d. Armored vehicles
   e. Helicopters
APPENDIX B. Armed/Security Forces in Eight Western Balkan States

Graphs showing the number of armed forces personnel in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 2007.
APPENDIX C. Military/Security Expenditure in Eight Western Balkan States

SLOVENIA - MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)

CROATIA - MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA - MILITARY EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP)