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# Examining the New York State Gun Involved Violence Elimination Initiative's Alignment with Several Theoretical Perspectives

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Examining the New York State Gun Involved  
Violence Elimination Initiative's Alignment with  
Several Theoretical Perspectives

by

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A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Science in Criminal Justice

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Examining the New York State Gun Involved Violence Elimination Initiative's

Alignment with Several Theoretical Perspectives

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### Abstract

This research examines how well New York State's Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) initiative aligns with four theoretical domains: subculture of violence, deterrence, rational choice/situational crime prevention, and implementation theories. It reviews how procedural justice and community integration align with these theories and the evidence-based strategies that GIVE sites implement. Sites are grouped for analysis, and their characteristics are described. The literature review describes each theoretical domain's core principles as they pertain to GIVE. It shows that the theories can be compatible and that their integration is difficult but would likely make the initiative more effective. The primary research questions pertain to how closely GIVE aligns with each of these theories, as well as whether sites with similar characteristics utilize these theoretical perspectives differently. The data collection and analysis methods are described. The analysis finds that theories and strategies that readily align with traditional law enforcement functions are the most likely to be fully adopted by law enforcement agencies, so street outreach strategies tend to be under-utilized while deterrence strategies are most embraced. Larger sites with higher shooting rates tend to have more comprehensive GIVE programs and align better with theory due to having gun violence problems characterized by subcultures of violence and other principles on which the strategies are built. However, medium-sized sites tend to deliver strategies with effective dosage; larger sites struggle to deliver enough resources. GIVE implementation could be improved with more integration among strategies, community integration, and deeper recognition of the theoretical insights presented here.

*Keywords: gun violence, implementation, criminal justice theory, program evaluation*

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Examining the New York State Gun Involved Violence Elimination Initiative's  
Alignment with Several Theoretical Perspectives

**Chapter 1: Overview of GIVE**

The Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) initiative is an effort to reduce gun violence in New York State (NYS) outside of New York City. The grant program is administered by the NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and began in 2014. The seventeen counties outside New York City with the highest amounts of Part I crimes are provided funding to implement evidence-based strategies to prevent and reduce gun violence. This paper provides an overview of the GIVE initiative as part of a larger research project examining the degree to which GIVE aligns with several theoretical perspectives related to violence and its prevention. It describes the jurisdictions implementing GIVE and how they are grouped to aid in analysis.

**History and Purpose of GIVE**

From 2004 to 2014, DCJS provided funding to law enforcement agencies in the seventeen counties that account for over eighty percent of the state's Part I crimes outside of New York City for crime reduction initiatives. This was called Operation IMPACT. In 2014, DCJS began to require that these agencies focus on preventing and reducing firearm-related homicides and non-fatal shootings (NYS DCJS, n.d.). The seventeen jurisdictions were required to choose and implement at least one strategy from a list of evidence-based strategies and could supplement these strategies with other efforts to address gun violence in their jurisdiction.

In the first year of GIVE (fiscal year 2014-2015), sites could choose to implement hot spots policing, focused deterrence, street outreach, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), procedural justice, and/or problem-oriented policing (POP). Starting in the second year (fiscal year 2015-2016), sites were required to integrate procedural justice and POP principles in all aspects of their GIVE program (each strategy as well as overall organization of the initiative) rather than treating procedural justice and POP as separate strategies.

Sites are required to work with a program evaluation team from RIT's Center for Public Safety Initiatives (CPSI). The evaluation focuses on the fidelity with which sites implement the strategies, the state and local implementation processes, adaptations sites make to strategies to fit local needs, training and administrative support, and outcome measures for GIVE.

### **Organization and Structure of the GIVE Initiative**

DCJS has many departments that provide support for numerous programs, including GIVE. The Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner of DCJS actively oversee GIVE. The GIVE Program Manager is the primary coordinator of GIVE. Each of the seventeen jurisdictions is assigned one of two GIVE Unit Representatives or the Program Manager (for larger sites) as their primary liaison with DCJS. The site representatives communicate with and visit the sites regularly and report to the Commissioner. This core team of three individuals also organizes technical assistance, trainings, conferences, and site collaboration meetings; reviews funding proposals; monitors finances; and coordinates with the evaluation team.

DCJS designated a State Director of SNUG Anti-Violence Initiatives to oversee SNUG, a statewide effort to implement street outreach in cities experiencing dispute- and gang/group-driven gun violence. Street outreach is one of the GIVE strategies. SNUG sites are required to partner with law enforcement for data to choose a target area, receive notifications about shootings, and vet potential street outreach staff. There are several SNUG sites in New York City that are not GIVE sites, and there are several GIVE sites that implement street outreach activities that are not part of SNUG. In either case, street outreach efforts are led by non-profit agencies.

In each county, the police department(s) of the major cities usually lead GIVE, but the initiative is highly collaborative. Typically, funded partners include the primary police department(s), the county office of probation, the county district attorney's office, the county sheriff's office, and a non-profit or community partner agency. Some GIVE sites provide funding to a research partner from a local university, and some utilize Crime Analysis and Intel

Center resources. Unfunded law enforcement partners are frequently involved with GIVE, including parole, NYS Police, federal agencies (ATF, ICE, US Attorney's Office, etc.), and neighboring police departments. For the purposes of evaluation, the seventeen counties are treated as nineteen separate sites, since two counties have two distinct cities within them that operate distinct GIVE programs; note that they do share county-level agencies.

DCJS has provided training, technical assistance, and networking opportunities for GIVE sites. Training refers to classroom-style sessions that are provided to individuals from multiple jurisdictions. Trainings are provided regularly on each of the strategies and on emerging issues of interest. Technical assistance (TA) refers to contracting with a TA provider to deliver direct, customized strategy support to a site over a period of time. TA is provided as requested by sites, especially for sites implementing focused deterrence. The DCJS GIVE team also organizes meetings of GIVE sites by region as well as an annual two-day conference for all sites for additional training and to share site learnings.

The GIVE evaluation involved regular phone calls and site visits with each site about their implementation. The evaluation methodology is described in detail in the next paper in this series. Evaluators provided regular reports (written and verbal) to DCJS and participated in a monthly conference call with the Commissioner of DCJS and all departments that support GIVE.

Note that sites' research partners are distinct from evaluators. Research partners focus on a specific research project that is of interest to the site or provide more intensive on-the-ground assessment of the site's implementation. Because RIT CPSI is Monroe County's GIVE research partner as well as the GIVE evaluation team, a separate agency, the Center for Governmental Research, performs the evaluation of the Monroe County GIVE site to avoid a conflict of interest. Monroe County is therefore not included in this analysis.




**Description of Jurisdictions**

The GIVE sites are diverse on a number of dimensions, including levels and types of gun violence. For the purposes of this capstone, the eighteen sites part of CPSI’s evaluation are split into five groups. This analysis compares and contrasts the sites within and among these groups.

The sites are grouped according to rates of shooting victimization for the jurisdiction in 2016,<sup>1</sup> with some exceptions. Group H (high) consists of the three sites with the highest rates of shooting victimization. Group M (medium) has the four sites with the next highest rates of shooting victimization, followed by the four sites in Group L (low). Group A consists of the five sites that have little gun violence and focus on aggravated assaults (often domestic violence). Group C consists of the two sites whose jurisdictions are counties rather than cities. These sites have areas with high rates of gun violence (where GIVE efforts are concentrated), but the large county populations make the shooting victimization rates for the entire jurisdiction quite low.

The following charts convey some of the diversity within and among these groupings. Figure 1 shows the shooting victimization rates by group (i.e., how the sites were grouped).

*Figure 1: 2016 Shooting Victim Rate Ranges for Site Groups*



1 Crime/violence data is from the NYS DCJS Greenbook data published in February 2017 for the full calendar year of 2016. I used the 2015 Census population estimates for each city to calculate the rates and in Figure 2 below.

From Figure 2, it is evident that the sites in Group C have much larger populations than all other sites. Group H (with the highest rates of shooting victimization) tends to have larger populations, except one small site that has unusually high shooting rates. While Group M has higher shooting victimization rates than Group L, Group L tends to have larger populations. Finally, Group A, with low levels of gun violence, have, on average, the smallest populations.

Figure 2: Population Ranges for Site Groups (2015 Population Estimate)





Figure 3 shows the large diversity in domestic violence aggravated assault victimization rates among the GIVE sites. Only some of the sites in Group 4 are approved to use GIVE funds to address domestic violence aggravated assaults due to having low levels of gun violence.

Figure 3: 2016 Domestic Violence Aggravated Assault Rate Ranges for Site Groups



These charts illustrate the diversity among GIVE sites in shooting victimization rates, population, and domestic violence aggravated assault rates. There is, of course, even more diversity in the jurisdictions' contexts, personnel, leadership structures, and other qualitative areas. Throughout this research, I will discuss the differences (and similarities) among GIVE sites and the applicability of the GIVE strategies and overall initiative to these diverse jurisdictions.

### **Conclusion**

The NYS GIVE initiative is an innovative effort to promote the use of evidence-based practices to reduce and prevent gun violence among law enforcement agencies. This multi-site, state-run initiative is, to evaluators' knowledge, the most extensive effort to do so in the nation. The transition from IMPACT to GIVE reflects an effort by NYS DCJS to increase the use of evidence-based practices in its funded programs, to focus on more specific problems, and to evaluate the program closely, and to provide technical assistance and training to practitioners.

Throughout this research, I will examine how the design and implementation of GIVE at the state and jurisdiction levels align with four theoretical perspectives: subculture of violence theory, rational choice/situational crime prevention theories, deterrence theory, and implementation theories. I will provide recommendations for how the program may be made more effective by better aligning with theory. The GIVE sites are diverse but often face similar challenges. The groupings presented above (and that will be used throughout the research) will illustrate the common challenges of implementing this ambitious initiative. The next paper in this series will discuss the four theoretical perspectives stated above and how they relate to urban gun violence in general and to GIVE specifically. It will also detail the methodology for this analysis. The research overall explores how GIVE addresses aspects of these theories while failing to address other aspects.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review and Statement of Research Purpose**

Research and interventions grounded in theory are more likely to be effective (Stewart & Klein, 2016; Davies, Walker, & Grimshaw, 2010). This paper reviews literature from four theoretical domains that relate to the New York State (NYS) Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) initiative. GIVE funds law enforcement agencies in seventeen counties to implement evidence-based strategies to reduce gun violence as well as an implementation and outcome evaluation conducted by the Center for Public Safety Initiatives (CPSI) at Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT). The four theoretical domains that will be examined here were chosen for their broad applicability to the components and goals of GIVE and include subculture of violence theories, deterrence theory, rational choice theories, and implementation theories. This research will examine the effort's degree of theoretical alignment.

Research questions to be explored include how closely the GIVE effort at the state and jurisdictional levels aligns with each of these theories, using evaluation data from GIVE sites. It will examine how sites with various characteristics adhere to and implement theoretical perspectives differently. It will focus on the compatibility among these theories and whether their combination is likely to be effective in directing strategy implementation.

### **Summary of the GIVE Initiative**

The GIVE initiative is an effort to reduce gun violence in New York. This grant program is administered by the NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and funds law enforcement efforts in the seventeen counties outside of New York City with the highest amounts of Part I crimes. The twenty participating police departments report 87% of the state's violent crime outside of New York City. In 2016, there were 1,047 total shooting victims in these jurisdictions, 141 of whom were killed (NYS DCJS, 2017).

DCJS requires that funded partners focus on preventing and reducing firearm-related homicides and non-fatal shootings (NYS DCJS, 2017) by implementing at least one strategy

from a list of evidence-based strategies: focused deterrence, hot spots policing, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and street outreach. The principles of procedural justice and problem-oriented policing (POP) are to be integrated in all GIVE efforts.

Implementation is collaborative. The police departments of the counties' major cities usually lead the GIVE program for that county. Other funded partners typically include probation, the district attorney's office, the sheriff's office, and sometimes a non-profit, community partner agency, or research partner. Unfunded partners participate in GIVE as part of their normal work, including parole, NYS Police, federal agencies (e.g., ATF and US Attorneys), and neighboring police jurisdictions. Sites are also required to work with the evaluation team from RIT's CPSI. The evaluation focuses on the fidelity of strategy implementation, the state and local processes and trainings that support implementation, adaptations sites make to strategies to fit local needs, and developing outcome measures regarding GIVE's efficacy.

### **Importance of Theory in Criminal Justice Program Development**

Criminology focuses on the causes of crime, whereas criminal justice studies the response to crime. There is a much richer discourse regarding the former. Theorists often assume a "rational model" of criminal justice, implying that there is no need to study criminal justice actions because actions would simply align with what is known from criminology to reduce crime (Duffee, 2015). There are reasons to doubt this assumption. Program evaluations often find little or no effect on crime because of implementation problems. Further, research in other fields has shown that "knowledge about how to improve behavioral health is not sufficient to improve behavioral health" (Duffee, 2015, p. 17-18). Therefore, in addition to studying criminological theory, it is important to study criminal justice agents and institutions.

Implementation researchers note that being "aware of the relevant theory... is more likely to result in an effective intervention" (Stewart & Klein, 2016, p. 616). Implementation theories can explain the processes by which a new intervention is successful or not. Nonetheless, Davies,

Walker, and Grimshaw (2010) found that theories were explicitly used in less than a quarter of studies that developed guideline and implementation strategies; when theory was used, “there was poor justification of choice of intervention and use of theory” (p. 1).

This review will first discuss criminological theories that relate to GIVE and then implementation theory. While criminological theory is of course beneficial, understanding implementation theory is critical in examining whether GIVE is likely to reduce gun violence.

**Relation of Selected Theoretical Perspectives to GIVE Components**

This paper explicates four theoretical domains that relate to the implementation and purpose of GIVE: subculture of violence, deterrence, rational choice and situational crime prevention, and implementation theory. Table 1 displays which theoretical domain(s) are most relevant to each GIVE strategy.

*Table 1: Theoretical Domains Most Relevant to Each GIVE Strategy*

	Focused Deterrence	Hot Spots Policing	Street Outreach	CPTED	POP	Procedural Justice
Subculture of Violence	somewhat		X			X
Deterrence	X	X				
Rational Choice/Situational Crime Prevention		X		X		
Implementation Theory	X	X	X	X	X	X

**Subculture of Violence Theory**

Subculture of violence theory draws on differential association theory to explain why some groups experience and commit violence at higher rates, particularly dispute-related gun violence among young, impoverished, African-American males (Cullen & Agnew, 2006). The fundamental thesis is that some individuals hold “definitions” or a “code of the street” that makes them see “violence as an appropriate, even required response to a wide range of provocations” (Cullen & Agnew, 2006, p. 147). Anderson (1999) argues that persistent and systemic racial discrimination, the de-industrialization of the US workforce, concentrated

poverty, and the proliferation of guns and drugs has left residents of the most impoverished inner-city communities with a profound sense of alienation from mainstream society. Many residents believe that institutions such as police and schools have failed them and that they must fend for themselves. They have developed a “code of the street” that determines rules of social conduct in public spaces, built upon the notion of respect. Without conventional means to obtain respect (e.g., fulfilling employment), respect is gained by displaying a tendency towards violence for protection of self and loved ones as well as by acquiring material goods. The code also often moderates violence by encouraging people to confront others only when it is deemed truly necessary due to the likelihood that some individuals will escalate provocations to an extreme.

Anderson (1999) contends that for protection, most people in impoverished inner-city communities must act and sometimes be violent, even if they are not fully invested in the code. Those who deliver violence gain a violent reputation for this and gain safety and respect; others are less willing to confront him. The code perpetuates, even demands, violent retaliation or demonstrations of power in response to actions viewed as disrespectful so that others learn that the person will not tolerate disrespect. Further, many individuals rely on the drug trade for their livelihood. Threats to their business threaten their lifestyle and safety and must also be met with force to regain or maintain respect. In communities where violence is common, people are more apt to carry weapons, and guns are relatively easy to obtain. Combining this with the sale and use of drugs adds to the volatility of public life in inner-city communities (Anderson, 1999; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1982/2006). One measure of respect and credibility is how many people can be brought together to avenge a person, such as family or friends. Thus, families and groups provide mutual protection to their members. When violence occurs between groups, members feel they must avenge one another, and such feuds can continue for years (Anderson, 1999).

Compared to mainstream culture, violence is viewed as acceptable or required in a broader range of events, but this subculture does not approve of violence in all situations. The

subculture, in order to exist at all, must share some values with mainstream culture. People hold subcultural values to varying degrees, dependent upon personality factors, age, life circumstances, and home environment and learnings. The more a person assimilates subcultural values, the number of kinds of situations in which he or she uses violence will increase (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1982/2006). Within certain inner-city communities, to respond nonviolently to certain situations is to risk social isolation or victimization (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1982/2006). Anderson (1999) argues, though, that all individuals living in such communities, even those who do not hold violent subcultural values, must learn the code of the street and abide by it in certain situations (particularly in public) or risk victimization. The theory holds that subcultural values are learned through differential learning and differential association (Cullen & Agnew, 2006). Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1982/2006) note that aggression is behaviorally reinforced by the reward of inflicting pain and injury upon the victim and by extrinsic rewards present in the subculture of violence for behaving in such ways (e.g., respect, status, wealth, self-esteem, and protection). Further, since the violence is encouraged in certain situations by the social code of conduct, perpetrators avoid feeling guilt, especially if the violence is committed against others who hold these values.

Empirical evidence has found support for the subculture of violence theory, including the mechanisms of socialization in gangs and commission of violence (Stretesky & Pogrebin, 2007) and motivations for carrying weapons (Brennan & Moore, 2009). Empirical evidence has found that “while race does not appear to be related to the subculture of violence, young people, males, residents of deprived communities, Southerners, and possibly lower-class people may be more likely to hold certain values conducive to violence” (Cullen & Agnew, 2006:147).

It is reasonable to try to prevent violence by deterring it with legal sanctions. Such efforts are founded in rational choice and deterrence theories (discussed in more detail below) and involve increasing the costs or decreasing benefits for engaging in violence. This is not entirely



opposed to the subculture of violence thesis. However, deterrence efforts should recognize how would-be offenders within a subculture of violence would weigh the risks and benefits of a violent act. It must recognize the realistic ability of institutions of social control (e.g., police, courts, and prisons) to effectively operate in these communities, as well as the perceived legitimacy of such agencies, which is often sorely lacking in alienated communities.

**Integration of the subculture of violence theory in GIVE.** The subculture of violence thesis is perhaps the best explanation for the violence that occurs in the GIVE sites with the most violence. The subculture is an adaptation to stressors and macro-societal structural conditions, developed and entrenched over time. Most gun violence occurs in impoverished areas of cities with strong racial and economic segregation. Gun violence is perpetuated by very few individuals in the most alienated pockets of the cities who form groups or gangs, and many feuds began years ago. The vast majority of the shooters and victims are young black males. These communities are described as abiding by a code of the street, though the degree of this varies both within a city and across GIVE jurisdictions. In some GIVE sites, the subculture of violence is arguably not present; violence is driven by other factors such as intoxication and domestic problems and rarely escalates to the use of guns. Nonetheless, the cities in which the subculture of violence is alive and well tend to account for the majority of gun violence in the state.

GIVE only directly acknowledges and addresses these conditions through street outreach and procedural justice. Procedural justice, which is a set of principles that are to be integrated in all GIVE efforts, recognizes, like subculture of violence theory, the profound alienation and lack of trust that impoverished, urban, African-American communities have in criminal justice agencies, which has led to the code of the street to govern public life. Legitimacy is increased if criminal justice agents exercise authority in a procedurally just way. Quality of the decision-making process (fairness and neutrality) and the quality of treatment (courtesy and respect) influence perceptions of procedural justice (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Meares, 2010).

Street outreach much more directly aligns with subculture of violence theory. It involves hiring individuals who are formerly part of the gang and/or violence subculture – ideally with high street credibility – who have ceased violence and are working on being successful in mainstream society. Street outreach uses a public health approach, recognizing that violence spreads like a disease. Street outreach workers develop trusting relationships with those most at-risk for shooting or being shot, discourage them from using violence, and intervene in violent disputes. They help resolve disputes in a way that maintains allegiance to the code but prevents violence. This strategy draws on many elements of the subculture of violence thesis, recognizing the importance of respect, credibility, and the rules of conduct that individuals in the subculture feel are legitimate (Skogan, Harnett, Bump, & Dubois, 2009).

### **Rational Choice and Situational Crime Prevention Theories**

Most GIVE strategies and much of the criminal justice system assume that individuals choose to commit crimes, including violent crime and “offenses that [are] pathologically motivated or impulsively executed,” after weighing the costs and benefits (Cornish & Clarke, 1980/2006, p. 422). In rational choice theory, an individual will engage in crime if the benefits outweigh the costs. Individuals first consider other ways of meeting a need. The decision that one is willing to commit crime in general is based on direct and vicarious personal learning and experience (i.e., morals, view of self, and ability to plan and implement a plan), individual traits, and social and demographic characteristics. Then, the individual must choose whether to commit a particular crime in a given context. The factors considered will differ by situation and crime type. Importantly, rational choice theory focuses on explaining criminal events rather than the criminal disposition of offenders. The theory examines the “situational factors related to opportunity, effort, and proximal risks” (Cornish & Clarke, 1986/2006, p. 424).

Building on this theory is situational crime prevention theory, which explicitly recognizes environmental influences on criminal offending. Clarke (1980/2006) argues that situational

crime prevention is far more practical for crime control than dispositional or “root cause” theories of offending. Physical opportunities and the risks of being caught are the two categories of situational factors that can be manipulated to prevent crime. A situational focus is needed to understand why crime occurs in some places and circumstances and not in others.

Rational choice theory as applied to gun crime can be thought of as a series of decisions: decisions to carry guns, to be in a setting where guns may be present, to pursue a dispute, to show or threaten a gun, and to use a gun (Brennan & Moore, 2009). This is heavily influenced by social forces and evaluations of risk, which in turn are related to youths' developmental stage and circumstances regarding their perceived life outcomes (which is also acknowledged by subculture of violence theory). Personality traits, social impression management, and the social group's perspectives on violence all contribute to the decision. Researchers have also noted that gun offenders learn and use scripts about violence involvement and may be more likely to decide to commit gun violence because the youths lack other methods of resolving disputes (a key component of rational choice theory). Various costs and benefits factor into each stage of the decision to commit violence, many of which are influenced by the code of the street and socioeconomic conditions. “Weapon use needs to be understood not just as a corollary of violence, but as a behavior with its own dynamics, antecedents and consequences. Furthermore, weapon use needs to be understood within the wider social context of deprivation and subcultures of violence” (Brennan & Moore, 2009, p. 223).

**Integration of Rational Choice/Situational Crime Prevention Theories in GIVE.** The most GIVE strategy most explicitly related to situational crime prevention is CPTED. In CPTED, areas experiencing crime are assessed for environmental factors that (1) may contribute to crime and (2) could be changed to increase the difficulty of crime commission or the risk of being caught. By design, CPTED addresses surveillance, access control, territorial reinforcement, and maintenance of target areas. However, in practice in GIVE sites, surveillance

(cameras and improved lighting) and maintenance (general clean-up) receive the most attention, partially due to the costs associated with access control (e.g., better locks, security guards, metal detectors, etc.) and possibly because of the natural inclination of law enforcement towards strategies that increase the likelihood of arrest (rather than prevent the commission of crime).

The focused deterrence strategy is related to rational choice theory in that it presents violence-prone individuals with information that should factor into perceived costs for crime both by communicating an informational deterrence message and through the process of enforcement (which serves both specific and general deterrence, discussed more below). Hot spots policing, in its most basic form, provides increased police surveillance to high-crime areas, thus changing one of the key factors in an offenders' decision to commit a crime. Street outreach strategies align with rational choice theory because rational choice theory recognizes the role of the person's prior learning and experiences as well as the social factors of a situation when deciding to engage in any crime, including violence. Street outreach strategies are designed specifically to give people alternative options to committing violence.

POP and procedural justice are difficult to connect directly with rational choice and situational crime prevention theories. POP is a broad method to analyze and solve problems; thus, some of the interventions chosen will be related to these theories, but other strategies that do not would certainly be acceptable under a POP framework. Procedural justice can only be related in that offenders are influenced by their perceptions of criminal justice system legitimacy in their weighing of the likelihood and impact of legal risks when considering violence.

### **Deterrence Theory**

Deterrence theory shares the assumption with rational choice theory that individuals choose actions that are most beneficial considering costs. However, deterrence theory is focused on the application of legal sanctions to deter criminal behavior (Stafford & Warr, 1993/2006). It is less concerned with social and environmental influences. Both specific deterrence (direct

punishment for a crime) and general deterrence (knowing about the punishment of others) are theorized to reduce crime. Deterrence work has also examined the swiftness, certainty, fairness, and sometimes severity of punishment and rewards (Kleiman, 2016; Howe & Loftus, 1996).

Stafford and Warr (1993/2006) recognize that each individual has experiences with general and specific punishment and with punishment avoidance that will affect perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment. "It is possible that punishment avoidance does more to encourage crime than punishment does to discourage it. Offenders whose experience is limited largely to avoiding punishment may come to believe that they are immune..., even in the face of occasional evidence to the contrary" (Stafford & Warr, 1993/2006, p. 416-417).

There is significant empirical evidence that deterrence strategies can reduce gun violence. The original evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire, which evolved into the focused deterrence model, found statistically significant reductions in shootings (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Morrison Piehl, 2001). These results held in a future study that used more rigorous propensity score matching of "treated" and "non-treated" gangs, and there were also significant reductions in shootings by vicariously treated gangs (Braga, Hureau, & Papachristos, 2014). Makarios and Pratt (2012) found that "the most effective programs combined both punitive and supportive strategies to effectively reduce gun violence" (p. 238). Thus, deterrence strategies can be strengthened by other approaches.

**Integration of Deterrence Theory in GIVE.** The concept of punishment avoidance is clearly relevant to the high-violence urban areas, where crimes with little to no punishment are a fact of life. In fact, assailants are arrested in only a small fraction of shooting incidents. Therefore, while the main GIVE agencies are essentially formed on the basis of deterrence, there is little reason to believe that the traditional effort to deliver legal punishment is effective. This point is not lost on those implementing GIVE who bemoan their frequent inability to arrest, incarcerate, or deter those committing serious crimes.

Nonetheless, it appears that deterrence is the main operating strategy in GIVE. Because the structures and belief systems in the criminal justice agencies align so readily with deterrence, this is the most readily-implemented theory. Only a few GIVE strategies, however, directly align with deterrence theory. Focused deterrence is the most clearly deterrence-based strategy. It recognizes that a very small portion of individuals is almost always responsible for the vast majority of gun violence in a jurisdiction, and these individuals are usually part of groups or gangs. The strategy involves bringing these individuals to a session (or communicating with them in the community) to deliver a deterrence and a support message. The individuals are given a formal notification that members of the next group to commit violence will be met with the full force of resources from all partnering criminal justice agencies. They encourage the individuals present to spread this message among their groups. They offer social and support services to help the individuals engage in more positive behavior. The strategy is dependent upon the effective delivery of deterrence when violence occurs and support when requested. Groups that commit violence and become the focus of law enforcement serve as examples for others (general deterrence) (Braga et al., 2001). This strategy is clearly deterrence-based, but it recognizes the important role of the social connections among groups and, to some degree, the socioeconomic conditions under which serious violent offenders live. While the strategy, by design, effectively addresses the swiftness, certainty, and fairness of punishment (fairness by explaining to people exactly what will happen if violence is committed), it is rare for this to actually occur in practice in GIVE sites, perhaps due to the degree of change needed in the legal system(s) to have agencies act swiftly and with certainty in full accordance with this model.

Hot spots policing also generally holds to a deterrence framework, at least in practice in GIVE sites. Crime tends to occur in small geographical areas, and geographical patterns persist over time. Hot spots policing focuses resources on such areas both for deterrence and to change the underlying conditions that are believed to be contributing to the persistence of crime (Braga

& Weisburd, 2010). In practice, hot spots policing often feels to police agencies like what they have always done (go to where the crime is), but the strategy by design promotes a much deeper problem-solving effort in hot spot areas. When in hot spot areas, officers generally engage in surveillance, gather information, and work to improve communication with the community, but this is often done with the primary goal of eventually arresting those involved in gun crimes. It is common for GIVE sites to focus police resources, attention, and time in hot spot areas, hoping that increased presence will increase the likelihood (or at least perceptions of the likelihood) of being caught, therefore deterring crime.

CPTED, as noted above, is more akin to situational crime prevention and rational choice theory than it is a deterrence strategy, at least by design. In implementation, however, most GIVE agencies utilize CPTED as another arm of deterrence. Instead of changing underlying environmental conditions that contribute to crime, most GIVE sites increase surveillance and close get-away paths to increase the likelihood of arrest. Many GIVE sites clean up lots in hot spot areas, secure vacant housing, and so on, but these efforts are rarely directly connected to causes of violent crime; rather, they address “eye-sores” and deter low-level crime like drug use and loitering. Only in the areas with the most severe gun violence do CPTED strategies directly connect to the violence (e.g., removing shrubbery in which gangs hide drugs and guns).

### **Implementation Theory**

As can be seen from the discussion so far, GIVE strategies pertain in some ways to deterrence, rational choice, and subculture of violence theories. GIVE overall, at both the state coordination and site activity levels, is also informed by implementation theory. Implementation science studies the processes by which intended changes to everyday practice are integrated into sustained routine (May, 2013). Its application to criminal justice is still in its infancy.

Implementation theory draws from organizational and network theories to understand the social processes and contexts in which implementation occurs. Agency theory, for instance, “is a

general model of social relations involving the delegation of authority” and how the authority figure controls those tasked with implementation (Kiser, 1999, p. 146). It is derived from rational choice theory but recognizes that action is not always strictly “rational” in traditional economic terms of increasing cost effectiveness and efficiency; some actions are based on morality, integrity, desires for power, and other cultural determinants. Because implementers’ interests are often different from those of the authority figure, agency theory also examines monitoring mechanisms and sanctions and incentives to promote implementation.

Successful implementers generally are not so risk-averse that they resist change; have the ability and resources to act effectively; and are dependent upon the authority promoting the intervention. The more resources the implementer has besides those provided by the authority, the more challenging the implementation will be to control. Agencies will also be more likely to implement a strategy if they believe the authority figure is legitimate. It is also particularly challenging to monitor and control those with expert knowledge. In these cases, personal staffs are often appointed as an intermediary form of control and are “selected on the basis of personal ties and loyalty; they are usually dependent on the [political leader], and if all else fails they can be sanctioned severely and arbitrarily” (Kiser, 1999, p. 159). Overall, compliance can be increased through monitoring and sanctions or by promoting beliefs in legitimacy (Kiser, 1999).

May (2013) creates a general theory of implementation to explain the social processes involved in implementation. Implementation is a process rather than an outcome and involves material, cognitive, and social processes. Individual and collective actions are pragmatic, strategic responses to circumstances as well as expressions of commitment to values (or lack thereof). Practices are operationalized through coherence (shared beliefs), cognitive participation (who does what), collective action (what they do), and reflexive monitoring (how outcomes are assessed) (Stewart & Klein, 2016). Incorporating a complex intervention in a social system “depends on agents’ capacity to cooperate and coordinate their actions” (May, 2013, p. 6).



Organizational readiness “is a shared psychological state in which people are committed to change and confident they can do it” (May, 2013, p. 6). One must consider how much agency members value the change and their perceptions of capability, which is in turn informed by their perception of task demands, resources, and a history of making change.

In summary, an intervention is most likely to be normalized into practice (1) “if its elements, and their associated cognitive and behavioral ensembles can be... integrated in everyday practice;” (2) “if the social system... provides normative and relational capacity” to bring about change; (3) “if agents both individually intend and collectively share a commitment to operationalizing it;” and (4) “if agents invest in operationalizing it” (May, 2013, p. 5-9).

**Implementation Theory Applied to Criminal Justice.** While general models of networks can be helpful in interpreting agency actions, there are unique features of criminal justice agencies that warrant special attention. Snipes and Maguire (2015) note that criminal justice theory, “the study of the official response to behavior that may be labeled criminal,” is still in its infancy (p. 33). While the various criminal justice agencies are interdependent in some ways, they have “separate but related duties and goals” (Snipes & Maguire, 2015, p. 29). As noted above (Kiser, 1999), individuals employed by agencies can have goals that differ from organizational goals. Criminal justice employees frequently interact with people from other agencies. Such “informal linkages are often much stronger than the formal linkages,” and people will work together for mutual convenience (Snipes & Maguire, 2015, p. 30).

Institutional theory pertains to “how an organization’s environment... influences its operations, structures, and service delivery” (Renauer, 2015, p. 121). For example, a grant encourages agencies to at least symbolically adopt a strategy, but it does not ensure actual implementation. Grants are effective coercive forces because rational organizational leaders will try to maintain the funding. Agency structures and routines are a response to the various forces at work on an agency and can indicate the degree of implementation. In general, “at its core, the

organization lacks commitment to... changes and responds by adopting symbolic or ceremonial structures, policies, and practices” (Snipes & Maguire, 2015, p. 38). Criminal justice agencies often “refract” strategies to fit their local context. “The organization rarely adapts to the intended changes but rather adapts the change to the department” (Renauer, 2015, p. 123).

Renauer (2015) identifies three relationship networks that support or constrain change: centrist (between state and local agencies), local (among politicians, government agencies, businesses, and resident groups), and internal police department (among the chief, city executive, unions, and police culture). “Each relationship network simultaneously influences the range of operational choices a police department can engage in by exerting mimetic, normative, or coercive institutionalizing forces” (Renauer, 2015, p. 126). Mimetic forces involve mimicking other organizations to maintain organizational legitimacy, often resulting in symbolic adoption. Normative forces encourage departments to adopt structures, policies, and behaviors that align with what others deem as appropriate goals and activities. Coercive forces relate to an agency’s ability to monitor conformity and reward or sanction behavior. A grant will be more coercive if it forms a larger part of the department’s total budget, if guidance and training are provided, if the goals and strategies are clear, and if oversight mechanisms are strong.

Dearing (2009) examines dissemination of evidence-based practices through the lens of diffusion of innovation theory. First, those who choose to adopt a strategy usually have higher authority than those who will implement it, and authority figures do not often know how well the program is being implemented. Indeed, “implementers often subvert or contradict the intention of adopters” (Dearing, 2009, p. 504; Kiser, 2009). True adoption will occur if the strategy is perceived to be advantageous, low in complexity, compatible with established methods, has observable processes and outcomes, and does not require immediate full adoption. While knowledge can be transmitted from central authority figures, persuasion regarding the merits and implementation of the intervention occurs through channels of social influence, led by opinion

leaders who are not generally authority figures. These leaders can be identified and informed or trained, and their natural, existing channels of influence will promote diffusion of the innovation. Senior management must also support implementation because staff time will be required.

Several common mistakes in strategy dissemination are directly relevant to GIVE. “We assume that evidence matters in the decision making of potential adopters,” “introduce interventions before they are ready,” “assume that information will influence decision making,” “confuse authority with influence,” and “fail to distinguish among change agents, authority figures, opinion leaders, and innovation champions” (Dearing, 2009, p. 509). He notes that offering a choice of interventions to potential adopters, like GIVE does, improves implementation quality because people cherish the right to choose. He cautions that “adopters are more likely to select an intervention that is readily compatible with their organizational context” (Dearing, 2009, p. 510). However, once one intervention is adopted, the agency is usually more willing to adopt another.

“Adherents of program fidelity believe that working to insure that adopters make as few modifications as possible is key to retaining the success of the original program,” while “adherents of the program adaptation perspective [like May (2013)] counter that it is only through allowing adopters to change a program to suit their needs that the likelihood of sustainability is increased” (Dearing, 2009, p. 514). Aspects of both the work environment and the intervention should be altered in implementation. Successful implementation is more likely if adopters understand which aspects of the intervention are critical and which can be changed. Such modifications can make the change more sustainable (May, 2013).

**Implementation Theory Applied to GIVE.** GIVE draws on implementation theory and theories about agency relations and operations. GIVE funds changes to how criminal justice agencies prevent and respond to shootings. Agencies resist change for many reasons (Dearing, 2009; May, 2013). From the start, DCJS built in systems to monitor and support implementation

with state staff and a third-party evaluator. They provide training and technical assistance and designate liaisons at each site. While it is possible that communicating with authority figures may be effective in a hierarchical law enforcement agency, effective implementation is most likely if implementers believe the authority is legitimate, if they are dependent on the authority, and if the authority is an opinion leader (Kiser, 1999; Dearing, 2009). This research examines how well GIVE practices at state and local levels align with implementation theory.

### **Research Purpose**

The goal of this research is to examine the extent to which GIVE, in design and implementation, aligns with theories of subculture of violence, deterrence, rational choice, situational crime prevention, and implementation. Deterrence theory as applied to GIVE focuses on increasing the consequences of gun violence. Rational choice and situational crime prevention theories attempt to increase the cost and decrease the benefits of committing crime and alter the environmental conditions to do so. Approaches that integrate the subculture of violence note that those who abide by the code of the street use violence because their honor depends on it, and they do not feel the police are legitimate. Implementation theory recognizes that pre-existing organizational goals and structures and the local environment will influence how strategies are implemented. While these theories can all be applied to the problem of gun violence, they are not necessarily consistent with one another in assumptions or application.

In this research, I will examine whether the design of GIVE is consistent with the theories presented here, focusing on the internal consistency (or lack thereof) among the theoretical domains. I will also examine the degree to which the criminal justice agencies tasked with implementing GIVE follow each of these theories or if they prioritize other organizational goals and interests. I predict that deterrence will be emphasized in GIVE strategy implementation regardless of the strategy because police departments specifically and the criminal justice system generally is already built upon deterrence. Rational choice theory and situational crime

prevention will have the next level of influence to the degree that they align well with law enforcement functions. Efforts that draw on subculture of violence theory will largely be excluded from strategy choice and implementation, even though they likely best explain the nature of urban violence, because the agencies tasked with implementing GIVE are not well-designed to address the constructs identified in this theory. Nonetheless, there are ways that GIVE encourages jurisdictions to consider aspects of subculture of violence theory. Finally, findings from implementation science inform the causal mechanisms by which these strategies come to be implemented in GIVE sites in various forms. Insights from implementation theories will help to explain how and why the goals of GIVE differ from actual implementation. The research will also comment on the theoretical consistency among these strategies and between these strategies and the principles of procedural justice and POP, a key aspect of GIVE's design.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

GIVE is an innovative initiative to reduce gun violence through the use of an array of evidence-based strategies by law enforcement and community-based agencies. The state-level design of GIVE as well as the local-level implementation of the strategies align in different ways with subculture of violence theory, deterrence theory, rational choice theory, situational crime prevention theory, and implementation theory. The rich evaluation data (both quantitative and qualitative) provide insight into how different sites' align with these theories in principle and in practice. The methods described in the next paper will help to illustrate the challenges and successes of the GIVE initiative in addressing gun violence.

### **Chapter 3: Methods and Instrumentation**

This paper describes the data collection and analysis methods for an examination of how well the GIVE initiative aligns with several theoretical perspectives. It also describes how the data was originally collected for the purposes of the GIVE evaluation. CPSI received a grant from NYS DCJS to evaluate the GIVE program beginning in July 2014, and the evaluation is ongoing. The scope of the evaluation and the data collection and analysis methods changed over time to meet the needs of the evolving program. Only the methods and data from calendar year 2016 are described here.

#### **Grouping of GIVE Sites for Analysis**

Two of the seventeen GIVE counties have two distinct implementation efforts in different cities, so there are nineteen total sites. Because CPSI is the Monroe County GIVE's research partner, this site is evaluated by a third party and is not included in this analysis. Sites are grouped as having high shooting rates, medium shooting rates, low shooting rates, little to no shootings, and large geographies. Analysis compares sites within and among these groups.

#### **Data Collection Procedure**

The GIVE evaluation is mixed-methods, with qualitative data coded into quantitative ratings on several instruments designed by the evaluators. During 2016, evaluators held monthly phone calls and quarterly site visits with each GIVE site.<sup>2</sup> Semi-structured interview topics were tailored to each interview to understand implementation. Questions were based on who would be interviewed, gaps in knowledge, and known changes to strategies. Phone call topics were provided to interviewees in advance of the calls so they could obtain needed information. Notes were taken by all present evaluators. Interviewees would vary by site and by month. In most cases, the liaison was present. Others were often targeted for interviewing to fill in knowledge

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<sup>2</sup> One of two evaluators was assigned as the lead for each GIVE site. Phone calls were prepared for, scheduled, and led by the lead evaluator, and the other evaluator attended the actual call. For most sites, only the lead evaluator conducted site visits. Both evaluators attended site visits for the five largest sites.

gaps or to speak to representatives of a funded partner agency that has not been interviewed recently. Unfunded partners or those with small and unchanging roles were interviewed as needed. In general, evaluators focused on one strategy on each call as well as on changes to other strategies or personnel, funding, politics, etc. Calls lasted fifteen to sixty minutes.

Evaluators used site visits to witness GIVE implementation and to conduct more in-depth interviews.<sup>3</sup> Most GIVE work happens in planning meetings or spontaneously in response to violence. This made observation difficult to schedule, so some site visits only consisted of interviews. Site visits would last between two and eight hours. Appendix A includes examples of interview topics for monthly calls and example site visit itineraries and topics.

### **Description of Instruments, Measures, and Coding**

Each month, both evaluators reviewed the notes and rated the site on three instruments.<sup>4</sup> Evaluators compared ratings, discussed discrepancies, and decided on final ratings. There are monthly ratings for each site on each instrument from January through August 2016. For the last quarter of 2016, ratings were completed quarterly due to low monthly variation and the difficulties addressing all instrument items sufficiently each month. Data was collected as described above for each of the three months, but ratings were done using all three months' data. Also, the instruments were reduced from a total of 153 items to 88 items in September 2016 after statistical analyses of item redundancy. The revised instruments are available upon request.

The Implementation Assessment Review (IAR) has been used since the start of GIVE to monitor key aspects of implementation, such as leadership, organization, partner integration, and data use. Nine items are rated from one to four, with higher ratings indicating higher quality.

Strategy checklists note the presence or absence of strategy components (coded as one or zero, respectively). There are checklists for focused deterrence, hot spots policing, CPTED, and

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3 Observing implementation was accomplished by attending required monthly meetings of GIVE partners, by getting tours of the city's hot spot and CPTED areas, observing focused deterrence call-ins, attending police-community relations events, or attending strategy planning meetings.

4 A formal scoring guide was developed and finalized in September 2016.

street outreach, each of which includes items about procedural justice and POP integration. The number of items on each checklist differs, so the total rating is a percentage of items present.

The fidelity and dosage rubric captures strategy quality. The same rubric is used for each strategy. Strategies are assessed on a 1-4 scale in one area (intensity) to measure dosage and in four areas to measure fidelity (adherence, quality of delivery, participant responsiveness, and adaptation). The fidelity rating is the four areas averaged and rounded to the nearest integer.

### **Analysis Plan**

The goal of this research is to examine how well the GIVE initiative aligns with several theoretical perspectives: subculture of violence, deterrence, rational choice, situational crime prevention, and implementation theories. Descriptive statistics of the instrument ratings (mean, median, range, and standard deviation) will be presented by site group for the last available data point (September-December 2016). The descriptive statistics will be shown for the total strategy checklist scores for each strategy, each area of the fidelity/dosage rubrics for each strategy, and each item on the IAR. This data will aid in comparisons among and within groups.

Implementation theory perspectives can be ascertained from many instrument item ratings because the instruments were all designed to measure implementation in some ways. All IAR items pertain to implementation and will be reviewed closely. Other items that relate to implementation theory are the intensity, quality of delivery, participant responsiveness, and adaptation areas of the fidelity/dosage rubric. These capture how the sites chose to implement each strategy, including their enthusiasm and belief in strategies. Quantitative ratings will be supplemented by summaries of qualitative information from interviews in which strategy organization, leadership, principles, and buy-in were discussed. Themes will be extracted from such discussions to compare and contrast site groups. Historical information regarding state-level implementation support will elucidate some aspects of implementation theory.



The strategy checklists and fidelity/dosage rubrics on street outreach provide the most insight into sites' perspectives on subculture of violence theory. Qualitative themes will be gleaned from 2016 site visit and phone call interviews regarding the street outreach strategy or other discussions of culture and the social environment of violent groups (such as when asking site representatives to describe the nature of their group violence).

To examine perspectives on deterrence theory, descriptive statistics by site group will be shown for the focused deterrence total strategy checklist rating and each fidelity/dosage rubric item. Qualitative data pertaining to deterrence, such as increasing arrests, prosecution, sanctions, and other legal strategies to decrease crime, will be summarized. Only interviews where such efforts were described in detail, including the sites' philosophy and methods, will be used.

Finally, data regarding CPTED will yield the most information regarding rational choice and situational crime prevention theory. In most sites, this was intertwined with hot spots policing efforts. Items to be examined include the strategy checklists and fidelity/dosage rubrics for hot spots and CPTED. Qualitative themes will be drawn from discussions related to environmental factors that contribute to violence and other non-criminal justice methods to make commission of gun crime more difficult.

### **Methodology Critique and Limitations**

The original data collection and evaluation effort for GIVE faced numerous challenges. Evaluators have had to modify methods and instruments over time to meet changing needs and learnings. Each GIVE site uses different strategies and different partners, and strategies are always at different stages of implementation across sites and even within one site. These challenges made it inefficient to ask the same questions each month or to each site. The interview protocols had to be more flexible, but this limits their analytical strength. Although systematic analysis is not possible on such data, examining themes should illustrate consistencies and diversity among sites related to the research questions.

A serious limitation is that different people in a site have different perspectives on strategy implementation, but not everyone could be interviewed every month. Efforts were made to interview all relevant individuals periodically. There were also times when data could not be collected, usually due to scheduling conflicts or consistent nonresponse from a liaison. The latter was mitigated by gathering information from other representatives. In the former case, during the next contact with the site, evaluators noted the timing of changes and completed ratings for the missing month. This issue decreased with moving to quarterly ratings.

These limitations affect the present analysis as well, especially the fact that the interviews and instruments were designed with a different purpose from the present study. The analysis requires repurposing and reinterpreting some data. For instance, strategy checklists only note the presence or absence of strategy components, but the percentage of present items by strategy as well as which items were present lend insight into the sites' theoretical bases for implementation and their buy-in for particular strategies and components. Conclusions are supplemented with descriptive information of their perspectives. Nonetheless, it is not always straightforward to map specific items onto specific research questions when doing this secondary data analysis. It is also worth reiterating that all instruments were designed by the CPSI evaluation team and have not been thoroughly tested for validity and reliability.<sup>5</sup> All conclusions should be made and interpreted with caution, and caution is warranted for performing statistical analyses.

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5 Some testing was done to eliminate duplicative items from the set of instruments. The shortened instruments were used beginning in September 2016, and the quantitative data shown here is from these shortened instruments.

## Chapter 4: Results

This research examines how well the GIVE initiative aligns with four theoretical domains (described in earlier papers). This paper summarizes the findings from the qualitative analysis, supplemented by evaluation rating information, as described in the previous methods paper.

### Subculture of Violence Theory

**Subcultures of violence in GIVE sites.** The first question when applying the subculture of violence theory to GIVE is whether subcultures of violence exist in the GIVE sites. Overall, when representatives described the types of gun violence in their jurisdictions, less than a third described a situation as extreme as described in the subculture of violence theory. Evaluators periodically asked site representatives to describe the types and trends of group violence and other initiatives in inner-city areas to address poverty and violence; the qualitative information here is drawn from such conversations. The most common interview theme that connected to the subculture of violence theory was that the violence in all GIVE sites tended to occur in the jurisdictions' most impoverished areas among young African-American males.

The three sites in Group H (with the highest gun violence rates) and the two sites in Group C (with county-level GIVE programs) appear to have many of the features of a subculture of violence. Site representatives routinely talked about serious gun violence perpetuated by only a few gangs in their areas, and only a few members of those gangs were responsible for most of the gun violence. These groups and individuals were the primary targets of focused deterrence, street outreach, and, to a lesser degree, hot spots policing and CPTED efforts.

The other GIVE sites that seemed to lack a strong subculture of violence sometimes had indications of a milder form of this subculture. A theme expressed (in almost all sites) that relates to the subculture of violence was the "no snitching" mentality. Law enforcement personnel often discussed this with a tone of frustration, since the communities' resistance to cooperating with law enforcement to address violence made law enforcement efforts far more

complicated. Some representatives recognized this as a symptom of the communities' alienation and histories of mistrust with mainstream society and police. Rarely, representatives went so far to say that they recognized that the criminal justice system had failed these communities. Many sites talked about the "no snitching" mentality as a fact, and they adjusted their strategies to not rely on community involvement (e.g., by installing more police cameras).

Most of the gun violence in the small- and medium-sized GIVE sites (Groups L and M) was situational. It tended to be related to drug sales and group conflicts, but such conflicts did not sustain or get as violent as those experienced by sites in Groups H and C. Still, several sites did not seem to have a subculture of violence at all. Sites in Group A, which had so little gun violence that they focused on aggravated assaults, had violence characterized by random incidents, domestic violence, and bar- and alcohol-related fights. Guns were rarely used.

Therefore, the subculture of violence theory appears to only be directly applicable to the GIVE sites with the highest rates of violence or those with pockets of very high violence where such subcultures most likely do dictate social interactions as described in the theory. Despite most GIVE sites lacking this subculture or having a mild form of it, the theory should still be informative to GIVE implementers in some ways. The theory recognizes the impoverishment and alienation of certain communities from mainstream culture and how this leads to self-policing, alternative methods to find respect, and ultimately to violence. It seems as if GIVE strategies would be enhanced by more fully recognizing the situational and social conditions that lead to violence in a particular context as well as the long-term historical conditions that have led to such alienation and social proclivities towards violence.

**Integration of subculture of violence theory into GIVE strategies.** The street outreach strategy is the most directly-aligned GIVE strategy with subculture of violence thesis. Only about half of the GIVE sites actively use this strategy, although most stated that they would use it so are rated on the evaluation instruments for this strategy. As shown in Table 2 below, sites in

Groups M and A received the lowest average ratings on both the strategy checklist and the fidelity and dosage rubric, while the sites with the highest levels of violence (Group H) adhered the best to the strategy.

The street outreach programs in GIVE sites were operated by non-profits, and they were expected to partner with local law enforcement for staff background checks, identification of target geographical areas, and learning from law enforcement about violent incidents as soon as possible. The strategy is to hire credible messengers who have lived a life within the subculture of violence but no longer engage in drugs and violence. These outreach workers build relationships with area youth and try to learn about and intervene in violent disputes. They often help youth desist from gangs. This strategy aligns with the subculture of violence thesis in recognizing the cultural conditions that lead to violence, especially the notion of respect.

In practice in GIVE sites, most sites with thriving street outreach programs struggled to narrow their target area, to hire reliable staff who did not re-engage in the subcultural lifestyle, to manage staff time to target only those at highest risk of violence, and to have resources to offer tangible alternatives to gun violence and drug selling. Conversations with GIVE representatives revealed the tension between the programs and law enforcement, even in the most cooperative sites. Both partners, in general, tended to distrust one another and felt they had somewhat differing goals. The most successful street outreach programs had law enforcement and program personnel who understood the others' role in reaching the same goal, but this was rare.

Although most GIVE sites selected this strategy, less than half truly implement a street outreach program as per the Cure Violence model. Some use slight variations on this model. Some sites seem to completely misunderstand what street outreach is and use a small non-profit agency or law enforcement personnel to do general community relationship-building. Such efforts do not tend to integrate concepts from the subculture of violence theory; they rather emphasize choice and encouraging the community to inform law enforcement about violence.

Table 2: All Evaluation Instrument Item Ratings for Street Outreach Strategy by Site Group

Group	Stat	SO Strategy Checklist Total	SO Strategy Checklist Percentage	SO Rubric: Intensity	SO Rubric: Adherence	SO Rubric: Quality of Delivery	SO Rubric: Partner Responsiveness	SO Rubric: Adaptation	SO Fidelity Rubric: Total	SO Fidelity Rubric: Percentage
H	Mean	9.67	74.4%	3.00	3.33	3.33	4.00	3.67	14.33	89.6%
	Median	10.00	76.9%	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	14.00	87.5%
	Std. Dev.	0.58	4.4%	0.00	0.58	0.58	0.00	0.58	1.53	9.5%
	Min.	9.00	69.2%	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	13.00	81.3%
	Max.	10.00	76.9%	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	16.00	100.0%
	Range	1.00	7.7%	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	3.00	18.8%
	N				3	3	3	3	3	
M	Mean	2.75	21.2%	1.50	1.75	1.50	1.75	1.75	6.75	42.2%
	Median	1.00	7.7%	1.00	1.50	1.50	1.50	2.00	7.00	43.8%
	Std. Dev.	4.19	32.3%	1.00	0.96	0.58	0.96	0.50	2.63	16.4%
	Min.	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	25.0%
	Max.	9.00	69.2%	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	9.00	56.3%
	Range	9.00	69.2%	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	5.00	31.3%
	N			4	4	4	4	4		
L	Mean	10.00	76.9%	2.75	3.25	2.75	3.25	2.75	12.00	75.0%
	Median	9.50	73.1%	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.50	3.00	12.00	75.0%
	Std. Dev.	2.16	16.6%	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.96	0.50	1.63	10.2%
	Min.	8.00	61.5%	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	10.00	62.5%
	Max.	13.00	100.0%	3.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	14.00	87.5%
	Range	5.00	38.5%	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	25.0%
	N			4	4	4	4	4		
A	Mean	8.00	61.5%	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	9.00	56.3%
	Median	8.00	61.5%	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	9.00	56.3%
	Std. Dev.									
	Min.	8.00	61.5%	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	9.00	56.3%
	Max.	8.00	61.5%	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	9.00	56.3%
	Range	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.0%
	N			1	1	1	1	1		
C	Mean	9.00	69.2%	2.00	3.00	2.50	2.50	1.50	9.50	59.4%
	Median	9.00	69.2%	2.00	3.00	2.50	2.50	1.50	9.50	59.4%
	Std. Dev.	2.83	21.8%	0.00	1.41	0.71	0.71	0.71	3.54	22.1%
	Min.	7.00	53.8%	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	7.00	43.8%
	Max.	11.00	84.6%	2.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	12.00	75.0%
	Range	4.00	30.8%	0.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.00	31.3%
	N			2	2	2	2	2		
All Sites	Mean	7.57	58.2%	2.29	2.71	2.43	2.86	2.43	10.43	0.65
	Median	9.00	69.2%	2.50	3.00	2.50	3.00	2.00	11.00	0.69
	Std. Dev.	4.01	30.9%	0.83	0.99	0.85	1.10	0.94	3.50	0.22
	Min.	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	0.25
	Max.	13.00	100.0%	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	16.00	1.00
	Range	13.00	100.0%	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	12.00	0.75
	N			14	14	14	14	14		

Sites tended to poorly integrate street outreach strategies into the overall GIVE strategy and failed to see the benefit of having such a strategy purposefully supplement other GIVE strategies. Therefore, compared to other GIVE strategies, sites did not have as much buy-in and tended to invest few resources into street outreach. This is revealed in the SO Rubric: Intensity column in Table 2, which shows that no sites managed to achieve the highest rating for delivering enough intervention to match the violence problem. Only the three sites in Group H, three of the four

sites in Group L, and one of the two sites in Group C made conscious, frequent efforts to build partnerships among law enforcement and street outreach programs and to integrate the strategy into GIVE. (See the SO Rubric: Partner Responsiveness column in Table 2.)

The other way that GIVE most reflects a recognition of the subculture of violence thesis is the effort to integrate procedural justice principles into all GIVE strategies. Both subculture of violence theory and procedural justice recognize the profound alienation of inner-city communities from mainstream society in general and from the police in particular. In practice, though, GIVE sites struggled to understand procedural justice and to integrate its principles into their everyday work. Site representatives frequently spoke of their lack of understanding about how to implement these principles, and many felt they understood it as police-community relations but failed to see the deeper aspects of the principles. Whereas procedural justice would encourage attention be paid to the criminal justice systems and processes to which individuals and communities are subject, interviews with GIVE representatives generally tried to integrate procedural justice by doing community outreach and education about law enforcement functions or simply holding listening sessions with the community.

Some sites trained officers in basic procedural justice principles, but conversations revealed that officers often interpreted this as asking them to be kind and respectful towards people, which they felt they already do, particularly “when people deserve it.” The trainings rarely went deeper than this. However, one site in Group L invested tremendous resources in officer training on various procedural justice-related topics, and this site and one in Group H made conscious efforts to integrate the principles throughout their strategies. They tended to recognize more than their colleagues the paradigm shift that procedural justice demands.

Many GIVE representatives felt that the deterrence message delivered at focused deterrence call-ins about how the GIVE partners would respond to violence supported procedural justice principles of transparency and fairness. Its failure, however, to also integrate listening to

those affected and changing processes that may be seen as harsh or unfair undermines this effort, from the perspective of evaluators.

The IAR and hot spots policing strategy checklist and fidelity ratings also revealed that very few sites successfully integrated community partners into problem-solving around gun violence. While GIVE representatives may recognize the many societal and community forces at play as explicated in the subculture of violence theory, they rarely made substantive efforts to address such conditions. For instance, they recognized that an individual's failure to respond to certain provocations could put him or her at risk of social isolation and victimization, but most strategies focused on trying to get people to choose not to be violent or to cooperate with law enforcement. There seemed to be a lack of creativity about how to tackle the entrenched problems in the communities experiencing the most serious violence.

### **Rational Choice, Situational Crime Prevention, and Deterrence**

The two theoretical domains of rational choice/situational crime prevention and of deterrence theory are discussed together here because many of the concepts are connected in GIVE implementation. Rational choice theory states that individuals engage in crime if the benefits outweigh the costs and they perceive a lack of viable alternatives. Deterrence theory emphasizes the role of legal sanctions in increasing the risks and decreasing the benefits of crime. These principles are easily integrated into most GIVE strategies and align well with pre-existing law enforcement practices. In interviews, these concepts were more readily articulable and effectively translated into implementation compared to subculture of violence concepts.

Rational choice and situational crime prevention concepts were readily apparent in all GIVE-menu strategy, but they were most relevant in CPTED and hot spots policing. These strategies were often intertwined because CPTED was implemented in hot spot areas. Deterrence concepts were most obvious when personnel discussed the focused deterrence strategy but also were very much present in CPTED and hot spots policing discussions as well.



Interviews revealed that GIVE personnel frequently designed strategies to increase the risk of being caught – either by being seen by other residents or by law enforcement – with the goal of arrest. Hot spot patrols were the most common GIVE strategies across all sites. They assigned officers to hot spot areas at times when violence tended to occur for targeted patrols. Officer activities typically included low-level crime enforcement to prevent more serious crimes, responding more quickly to violence, and patrolling or gathering intelligence about targeted individuals or locations. For the smallest sites with the lowest levels of violence (Group A), such patrols were infrequent and only implemented in response to intelligence and crime analysis that indicated violence was likely on a given day and time. Visibility was a goal of hot spots patrols. Some sites directly noted that this increases general deterrence (if, for example, individuals watch others be arrested for engaging in violence) as well as the perceived likelihood of being caught. Others expressed a goal of simply disrupting the daily routines of gangs/groups selling drugs, increasing the amount of effort the individuals would need to expend in order to continue committing crimes in that area. Another way to view this in situational crime prevention terms is decreasing the opportunity to commit crime in general and violence in particular. All of these activities align well with the normal functioning of law enforcement, and Table 3 below shows that sites across all groups except Group A implemented almost all of the components of the hot spots strategy listed on the strategy checklist.

While hot spots policing, by design, encourages a thorough analysis of the crime problem and the use of broad community interventions, sites generally ignored these components and preferred to assign additional law enforcement resources to hot spot areas for a deterrence effect. It is important to note that broader community efforts could be in line with rational choice theory because it could potentially result in gun-involved individuals being better connected to mainstream society and having “more to lose” for engaging in violence, thereby increasing the risks of engaging in crime. While this idea was discussed in a few GIVE sites, it rarely, if ever,

Table 3: All Evaluation Instrument Item Ratings for the Hot Spots Strategy by Site Group

Group	Stat	Hot Spots Strategy Checklist	Hot Spots Strategy Checklist	Hot Spots Rubric: Intensity	Hot Spots Rubric: Adherence	Hot Spots Rubric: Quality of Delivery	Hot Spots Rubric: Partner Responsiveness	Hot Spots Rubric: Adaptation	Hot Spots Rubric: Fidelity	Hot Spots Rubric: Fidelity
		Total	Percentage						Total	Percentage
H	Mean	<b>11.33</b>	<b>81.0%</b>	3.33	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.33	<b>15.33</b>	<b>95.8%</b>
	Median	<b>12.00</b>	<b>85.7%</b>	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	<b>15.00</b>	<b>93.8%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>2.08</b>	<b>14.9%</b>	0.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.58	<b>0.58</b>	<b>3.6%</b>
	Min.	<b>9.00</b>	<b>64.3%</b>	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	<b>15.00</b>	<b>93.8%</b>
	Max.	<b>13.00</b>	<b>92.9%</b>	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>16.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
	Range	<b>4.00</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	<b>1.00</b>	<b>6.3%</b>
	N			3	3	3	3	3		
M	Mean	<b>12.25</b>	<b>87.5%</b>	3.50	3.50	3.25	3.75	2.50	<b>13.00</b>	<b>81.3%</b>
	Median	<b>12.00</b>	<b>85.7%</b>	3.50	4.00	3.00	4.00	2.00	<b>13.00</b>	<b>81.3%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>1.50</b>	<b>10.7%</b>	0.58	1.00	0.50	0.50	1.00	<b>2.45</b>	<b>15.3%</b>
	Min.	<b>11.00</b>	<b>78.6%</b>	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	<b>10.00</b>	<b>62.5%</b>
	Max.	<b>14.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>16.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
	Range	<b>3.00</b>	<b>21.4%</b>	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	<b>6.00</b>	<b>37.5%</b>
	N			4	4	4	4	4		
L	Mean	<b>13.25</b>	<b>94.6%</b>	3.25	4.00	3.50	4.00	3.00	<b>14.50</b>	<b>90.6%</b>
	Median	<b>13.50</b>	<b>96.4%</b>	3.00	4.00	3.50	4.00	3.00	<b>14.50</b>	<b>90.6%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>0.96</b>	<b>6.8%</b>	0.50	0.00	0.58	0.00	0.00	<b>0.58</b>	<b>3.6%</b>
	Min.	<b>12.00</b>	<b>85.7%</b>	3.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	<b>14.00</b>	<b>87.5%</b>
	Max.	<b>14.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	<b>15.00</b>	<b>93.8%</b>
	Range	<b>2.00</b>	<b>14.3%</b>	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	<b>1.00</b>	<b>6.3%</b>
	N			4	4	4	4	4		
A	Mean	<b>8.80</b>	<b>62.9%</b>	3.20	3.20	2.80	2.60	2.80	<b>11.40</b>	<b>71.3%</b>
	Median	<b>8.00</b>	<b>57.1%</b>	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	<b>11.00</b>	<b>68.8%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>2.17</b>	<b>15.5%</b>	0.84	0.84	0.45	0.55	0.45	<b>1.67</b>	<b>10.5%</b>
	Min.	<b>6.00</b>	<b>42.9%</b>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	<b>9.00</b>	<b>56.3%</b>
	Max.	<b>11.00</b>	<b>78.6%</b>	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	<b>13.00</b>	<b>81.3%</b>
	Range	<b>5.00</b>	<b>35.7%</b>	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	<b>4.00</b>	<b>25.0%</b>
	N			5	5	5	5	5		
C	Mean	<b>12.50</b>	<b>89.3%</b>	2.50	3.50	3.50	4.00	2.50	<b>13.50</b>	<b>84.4%</b>
	Median	<b>12.50</b>	<b>89.3%</b>	2.50	3.50	3.50	4.00	2.50	<b>13.50</b>	<b>84.4%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>0.71</b>	<b>5.1%</b>	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.00	0.71	<b>2.12</b>	<b>13.3%</b>
	Min.	<b>12.00</b>	<b>85.7%</b>	2.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	2.00	<b>12.00</b>	<b>75.0%</b>
	Max.	<b>13.00</b>	<b>92.9%</b>	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	<b>15.00</b>	<b>93.8%</b>
	Range	<b>1.00</b>	<b>7.1%</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	<b>3.00</b>	<b>18.8%</b>
	N			2	2	2	2	2		
All Sites	Mean	<b>11.39</b>	<b>0.81</b>	3.22	3.61	3.33	3.56	2.83	<b>13.33</b>	<b>0.83</b>
	Median	<b>12.00</b>	<b>0.86</b>	3.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	<b>13.50</b>	<b>0.84</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>2.30</b>	<b>0.16</b>	0.65	0.70	0.59	0.70	0.62	<b>2.06</b>	<b>0.13</b>
	Min.	<b>6.00</b>	<b>0.43</b>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	<b>9.00</b>	<b>0.56</b>
	Max.	<b>14.00</b>	<b>1.00</b>	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>16.00</b>	<b>1.00</b>
	Range	<b>8.00</b>	<b>0.57</b>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	<b>7.00</b>	<b>0.44</b>
	N			18	18	18	18	18		

was implemented. This is reflected in the ratings in Table 3. Community involvement and problem analysis tended to be the items on the strategy checklist that sites did not implement. The lack of problem-solving efforts were a common reason why the rubric ratings for adaptation were not consistently high. Overall, though, sites implemented this strategy with fidelity due to the strategy’s heavy emphasis on rational choice and deterrence concepts.

Similarly, CPTED programs in GIVE sites tended to focus on increasing surveillance, visibility, and lighting with the primary goal of increasing the likelihood of being arrested

(deterrence theory) or increasing the perceived likelihood of being caught (rational choice/situational crime prevention). Although physically altering the environment to increase the difficulty of committing crimes is a key component of CPTED as well as situational crime prevention theory, sites tended not to utilize these components of the strategy. Table 4 shows that sites therefore did not meet many items on the strategy checklist and did not adhere all that well to the model or deliver CPTED with an intensity that matched their violence levels.

Table 4: All Evaluation Instrument Item Ratings for the CPTED Strategy by Site Group

Group	Stat	CPTED Strategy Checklist	CPTED Strategy Checklist	CPTED Rubric: Intensity	CPTED Rubric: Adherence	CPTED Rubric: Quality of Delivery	CPTED Rubric: Partner Responsiveness	CPTED Rubric: Adaptation	CPTED Fidelity Rubric: Total	CPTED Fidelity Rubric: Percentage
		Total	Percentage							
H	Mean	<b>5.00</b>	<b>55.6%</b>	2.33	3.00	2.67	3.00	1.67	<b>10.33</b>	<b>64.6%</b>
	Median	<b>4.00</b>	<b>44.4%</b>	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	<b>10.00</b>	<b>62.5%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>1.73</b>	<b>19.2%</b>	0.58	0.00	0.58	1.00	0.58	<b>0.58</b>	<b>3.6%</b>
	Min.	<b>4.00</b>	<b>44.4%</b>	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	<b>10.00</b>	<b>62.5%</b>
	Max.	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	2.00	<b>11.00</b>	<b>68.8%</b>
	Range	<b>3.00</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	1.00	0.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	<b>1.00</b>	<b>6.3%</b>
	N			3	3	3	3	3		
M	Mean	<b>3.50</b>	<b>38.9%</b>	2.00	2.50	2.25	2.50	1.75	<b>9.00</b>	<b>56.3%</b>
	Median	<b>3.50</b>	<b>38.9%</b>	2.00	2.50	2.50	2.50	1.50	<b>9.00</b>	<b>56.3%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>2.89</b>	<b>32.1%</b>	0.82	1.29	0.96	0.58	0.96	<b>3.65</b>	<b>22.8%</b>
	Min.	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	<b>5.00</b>	<b>31.3%</b>
	Max.	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	3.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	<b>13.00</b>	<b>81.3%</b>
	Range	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	<b>8.00</b>	<b>50.0%</b>
	N			4	4	4	4	4		
L	Mean	<b>6.33</b>	<b>70.4%</b>	1.67	2.67	3.00	2.67	2.67	<b>11.00</b>	<b>68.8%</b>
	Median	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	<b>11.00</b>	<b>68.8%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>3.06</b>	<b>33.9%</b>	0.58	0.58	1.00	1.53	1.15	<b>3.00</b>	<b>18.8%</b>
	Min.	<b>3.00</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	<b>8.00</b>	<b>50.0%</b>
	Max.	<b>9.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	2.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>14.00</b>	<b>87.5%</b>
	Range	<b>6.00</b>	<b>66.7%</b>	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	<b>6.00</b>	<b>37.5%</b>
	N	<b>3</b>	<b>300.0%</b>	3	3	3	3	3		
A	Mean	<b>5.50</b>	<b>61.1%</b>	2.00	2.25	2.00	2.00	1.50	<b>7.75</b>	<b>48.4%</b>
	Median	<b>5.50</b>	<b>61.1%</b>	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.50	<b>7.50</b>	<b>46.9%</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>3.51</b>	<b>39.0%</b>	1.15	1.50	1.15	0.82	0.58	<b>3.86</b>	<b>24.1%</b>
	Min.	<b>2.00</b>	<b>22.2%</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	<b>4.00</b>	<b>25.0%</b>
	Max.	<b>9.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	3.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	<b>12.00</b>	<b>75.0%</b>
	Range	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	<b>8.00</b>	<b>50.0%</b>
	N	<b>4</b>	<b>400.0%</b>	4	4	4	4	4		
C	Mean	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	<b>4.00</b>	<b>25.0%</b>
	Median	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	<b>4.00</b>	<b>25.0%</b>
	Std. Dev.									
	Min.	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	<b>4.00</b>	<b>25.0%</b>
	Max.	<b>7.00</b>	<b>77.8%</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	<b>4.00</b>	<b>25.0%</b>
	Range	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.0%</b>
	N	<b>1</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	1	1	1	1	1		
All Sites	Mean	<b>5.13</b>	<b>0.57</b>	1.93	2.47	2.33	2.40	1.80	<b>9.00</b>	<b>0.56</b>
	Median	<b>4.00</b>	<b>0.44</b>	2.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	<b>10.00</b>	<b>0.63</b>
	Std. Dev.	<b>2.75</b>	<b>0.31</b>	0.80	1.06	0.98	0.99	0.86	<b>3.30</b>	<b>0.21</b>
	Min.	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	<b>4.00</b>	<b>0.25</b>
	Max.	<b>9.00</b>	<b>1.00</b>	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>14.00</b>	<b>0.88</b>
	Range	<b>9.00</b>	<b>1.00</b>	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	<b>10.00</b>	<b>0.63</b>
	N			15	15	15	15	15		

All GIVE sites implementing CPTED struggled with having resources to make large environmental changes that would have been more in line with situational crime prevention theory, such as demolishing abandoned buildings and installing locks and barriers. Most sites did find resources outside of GIVE funding to install and maintain surveillance cameras, do general property cleanup through municipal public works departments, and improve lighting. In all but the sites with the most serious violence, it was rare for CPTED implementation to be directly connected to gun violence deterrence, risks, and situational factors. It was more commonly used to address quality of life issues in high-crime areas such as property maintenance, community engagement, and low-level crimes such as trespassing in abandoned houses and drug use. Several sites noted that this general crime-prevention work connected to gun violence because community residents may be more likely to call the police, and community members (including potential gun offenders) would see visible signs of law enforcement involvement in community improvement efforts (both deterring violence and increasing police legitimacy).

It is evident from interviews that for most, the primary goal of GIVE was to identify, arrest, and effectively prosecute gun offenders – very much in line with deterrence theory as well as the normal role of law enforcement. There was somewhat less emphasis on preventing violence before it happened and much less emphasis on addressing root causes of violence. Law enforcement partners typically distrusted, felt uncomfortable, or did not believe in the efficacy of street outreach strategies because they did not have this primary goal, although both law enforcement and street outreach programs wanted less violence in their communities. Street outreach programs' goal was to prevent and intervene in violence. Law enforcement tended to see arrest and prosecution as the only effective way to stop violence. There was a general sense of disagreement between street outreach programs and their law enforcement partners.

Street outreach strategies align somewhat with rational choice and deterrence concepts. Rational choice theory notes that the decision to carry and use guns is heavily influenced by

social forces (the code of the streets), socioeconomic forces, and evaluations of risk and is also related to age and perceived life outcomes. It recognizes that gun offenders frequently have learned and use scripts related to the decision to use a gun in particular situations. Street outreach strategies recognize these factors. Outreach workers attempt to help youth perceive more positive futures. They remind them of the emotional costs of committing violence, including its effect on their families and community members, and help them learn new scripts and find alternatives to gun violence that maintain their respect in the subculture. In practice, GIVE law enforcement partners typically (all but about three sites) consistently expressed frustration that outreach workers would not give information to law enforcement to lead to arrest and otherwise better align with deterrence goals; in other words, they were frustrated that the strategy did not better support deterrence goals. Most did recognize the above alignment with rational choice goals, but this was not valued as highly as deterrence goals.

The focused deterrence model, as the name implies, aligns quite well with deterrence and rational choice/situational crime prevention theories. In call-ins and custom notifications, likely gun offenders are presented with information about what law enforcement knows about their activities and how law enforcement partners will respond to the next group that commits a shooting. The theory is that this information will factor into individuals' decision-making process to commit gun violence by increasing. It should increase the perceived risks for engaging in violence (e.g., federal charges and longer sentences) and through specific and general deterrence when potential gun offenders witness law enforcement carrying out the promised enforcement against either their own group/gang or others in the community.

Several GIVE sites were enthusiastic about the focused deterrence strategy (reflected in high rubric scores in Table 5 for some sites in quality of delivery and partner responsiveness) and often expressed liking it because it gave potential gun offenders fair warning about what would happen to them. The focused deterrence concepts proved challenging for GIVE sites to

Table 5: All Evaluation Instrument Item Ratings for Focused Deterrence by Site Group

Group	Stat	FD Call-In Strategy Checklist	FD Call-In Strategy Checklist	FD Custom Notification Strategy Checklist	FD Custom Notification Strategy Checklist	FD Rubric: Intensity	FD Rubric: Adherence	FD Rubric: Quality of Delivery	FD Rubric: Partner Responsiveness	FD Rubric: Adaptation	FD Fidelity Rubric Total	FD Fidelity Rubric Percentage
		Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage							
H	Mean	12.33	68.5%	7.00	70.0%	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.33	2.33	11.67	72.9%
	Median	11.00	61.1%	7.00	70.0%	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	11.00	68.8%
	Std. Dev.	5.13	28.5%	1.00	10.0%	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.58	0.58	3.06	19.1%
	Min.	8.00	44.4%	6.00	60.0%	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	9.00	56.3%
	Max.	18.00	100.0%	8.00	80.0%	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	15.00	93.8%
	Range	10.00	55.6%	2.00	20.0%	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	6.00	37.5%
M	Mean	10.67	59.3%	2.67	26.7%	2.33	2.33	2.33	3.00	2.67	10.33	64.6%
	Median	14.00	77.8%	0.00	0.0%	2.00	2.00	2.00	4.00	3.00	11.00	68.8%
	Std. Dev.	9.45	52.5%	4.62	46.2%	1.53	1.53	1.53	1.73	1.53	6.03	37.7%
	Min.	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	25.0%
	Max.	18.00	100.0%	8.00	80.0%	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	16.00	100.0%
	Range	18.00	100.0%	8.00	80.0%	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	12.00	75.0%
L	Mean	12.25	68.1%	2.50	25.0%	2.50	2.50	2.50	3.00	2.50	10.50	65.6%
	Median	16.00	88.9%	0.00	0.0%	2.50	2.50	2.50	3.50	2.50	11.00	68.8%
	Std. Dev.	8.22	45.7%	5.00	50.0%	1.29	1.29	1.29	1.41	1.29	5.20	32.5%
	Min.	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	25.0%
	Max.	17.00	94.4%	10.00	100.0%	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	16.00	100.0%
	Range	17.00	94.4%	10.00	100.0%	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	12.00	75.0%
A	Mean	3.00	16.7%	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.00	5.50	34.4%
	Median	3.00	16.7%	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	1.50	2.00	1.00	5.50	34.4%
	Std. Dev.	4.24	23.6%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	0.71	1.41	0.00	2.12	13.3%
	Min.	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	25.0%
	Max.	6.00	33.3%	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	7.00	43.8%
	Range	6.00	33.3%	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.00	1.00	2.00	0.00	3.00	18.8%
C	Mean	0.50	2.8%	4.50	45.0%	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.00	8.50	53.1%
	Median	0.50	2.8%	4.50	45.0%	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.00	8.50	53.1%
	Std. Dev.	0.71	3.9%	6.36	63.6%	1.41	1.41	1.41	2.12	1.41	6.36	39.8%
	Min.	0.00	0.0%	0.00	0.0%	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	25.0%
	Max.	1.00	5.6%	9.00	90.0%	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	13.00	81.3%
	Range	1.00	5.6%	9.00	90.0%	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	9.00	56.3%
All Sites	Mean	8.93	0.50	3.43	0.34	2.29	2.29	2.36	2.86	2.21	9.71	0.61
	Median	9.50	0.53	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	10.00	0.63
	Std. Dev.	7.61	0.42	4.20	0.42	1.20	1.20	1.15	1.29	1.12	4.56	0.29
	Min.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	0.25
	Max.	18.00	1.00	10.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	16.00	1.00
	Range	18.00	1.00	10.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	12.00	0.75

implement, however, which is why many of the evaluation ratings are not consistently higher.

The concepts of direct and vicarious learning about punishment and punishment avoidance are crucial to rational choice and deterrence theories. In these communities, low-level crimes as well as serious crimes like shooting assaults and homicides do not usually result in arrest. Therefore, gun offenders have learned either directly or vicariously about numerous experiences of punishment avoidance. Focused deterrence is meant to increase the certainty that gun offenses will be prosecuted, but it does this only by focusing pre-existing law enforcement resources on particular groups. The strategy did usually result in more coordination across law enforcement partners than is typical and efforts to enforce low-level offenses to make groups involved in

violence feel some deterrence even if not being directly prosecuted for the violence itself. However, the GIVE strategies did not do much else to increase the quality of evidence regarding who committed shooting incidents, and arrest and prosecution therefore proved very difficult. Legal proceedings also progressed very slowly, decreasing the impact of deterrence.

Some GIVE sites in Group H began implementing efforts to increase the swiftness, certainty, and fairness of the law enforcement response to violence. These efforts brought into focus the difficulties that were also faced in the focused deterrence strategy of adjusting the criminal justice processes to achieve effective deterrence. Judges have legal restrictions on reviewing facts outside of the case at hand, preventing prosecutors from asking for special processing of cases involving select individuals or groups. It usually takes time to gain evidence and prepare charges for an arrest, so even when an arrest does occur, it rarely occurs swiftly, diminishing the deterrence effect. In the focused deterrence strategy, this is why (1) law enforcement partners enforce small crimes committed by groups they believe committed the violence and (2) ideally inform them that the enforcement is a direct result of the shooting.

Overall, despite law enforcement personnels' initial enthusiasm for focused deterrence strategies, many expressed frustration with the strategy by the end of 2016 due to a perceived inability to actually achieve a deterrence effect. Even some targeted groups with whom arrests were successfully made on serious charges continued to commit violence in the most high-crime areas. One site in Group H reported significant decreases in violence, and this may be because the focused deterrence resources delivered better matched the levels of violence in that site. Some of the small cities in Groups M and L also felt the strategy had some positive results and success, but their levels of violence were low enough that it was hard to measure the effect. The larger sites in Group H with more serious violence struggled to keep up with enforcement efforts and effectively deliver on the deterrence message, perhaps leading to punishment avoidance being a more common experience than punishment. The rubric ratings for intensity were not

generally high, indicating that the resources delivered did not match the levels of violence in most sites regardless of site group. The strategy checklists also indicate that sites failed to deliver, on average, half of the strategy components. The standard deviations within the groups are high, though, indicating that within any given group, some sites delivered many more components, and others delivered very few.<sup>6</sup>

To summarize, deterrence concepts appear to have been readily implemented into GIVE strategies and align well with existing law enforcement structures and duties. Many sites struggled to provide the amount of resources that effective deterrence required, but some felt they were having success in deterring violent crime. Rational choice and situational crime prevention concepts were utilized but often with the goal of deterrence; it was rare for a site to try other ways to increase the risks of committing violence or decrease the benefits besides increasing the likelihood of arrest or severity of charges. Deterrence efforts may be more effective if they recognized how community residents within a subculture of violence weigh the risks and benefits of violence. Because police and law lack legitimacy in these alienated communities and individuals have frequent experiences of direct and vicarious punishment avoidance, a deterrence program may have to be quite targeted and strong to be effective. Any program must recognize the ability of law enforcement agencies to effectively operate and deliver on their deterrence promises in their design so that the program goals are more realistic.

### **Implementation Theories**

GIVE reflects many aspects of implementation theory in how it was designed and coordinated at the state level and in how it is implemented at the jurisdictional level. This discussion applies implementation theory concepts to each level.

**Conflicting goals and monitoring.** As stated in the literature review, implementation theory was born out of fields such as health care but has clear application to criminal justice.

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<sup>6</sup> The sites in Groups A and L often stated they would implement focused deterrence but did not; they were still rated on the evaluation instruments but had most components absent, resulting in the low ratings in Figure 4.



The social systems and dynamics in criminal justice as well as legal restrictions must be acknowledged when applying these theories to GIVE. The GIVE partner agencies typically are police departments, probation departments, district attorney's offices, and sheriff's offices, all of which have specific roles and jurisdictions within each community. They tend to have strong hierarchical social structures. Most of their funding is derived from their local communities, so as per agency theory, local politicians and, to a lesser extent, citizens have the most influence over criminal justice agency operations. NYS DCJS provides funding for GIVE as well as other initiatives but does not have decision-making power over the operations of these agencies. As a state agency, they provide support but are not necessarily a licensing or oversight agency. They do have influence in state-level funding decisions and statewide initiatives, and in that sense it behooves GIVE agency executives to remain in good standing with DCJS. This, as well as the GIVE funding itself, are coercive forces that promote compliance with the state's requirements.

In line with agency theory, DCJS's influence appears markedly higher in jurisdictions in which the GIVE funding is a larger portion of the agencies' operating budgets. The sites with the largest geographies (Group C) stand out in interviews as the most independent and least concerned with state requirements, which appears to be at least in part because of their large pool of alternative resources. The smallest sites (Group A) express appreciation for GIVE funding but sometimes lack the organizational resources and structures to meet all of the demands of GIVE. They also tend to receive very little funding from the state. For example, several sites in Group A only receive enough funding for overtime wages for police officers to do hot spot patrols a few times a month in warmer months. Their GIVE activities are quite low in the winter. Therefore, it appears to be the sites in Groups H, M, and L that receive sizable GIVE funding and frequently express a desire to meet grant requirements and consistently acted in this way.

Implementation theory notes that implementers' interests are often different from those of the authority figure or funder. This is true between DCJS and GIVE sites as well as between

GIVE site administrators and the agency personnel who carry out the GIVE strategies every day. There are also sometimes conflicting priorities among GIVE partner agencies, sometimes by design within the criminal justice system. This may be between street outreach programs and police and prosecutor as described above, and even between agencies like probation (who tend to focus on community-based rehabilitation) and police (who tend to focus on arrest). At all levels, monitoring mechanisms are used to promote implementation. Implementation theory notes the importance of program administrators appointing individuals as an intermediary form of control who usually have political and collegial interests that align with the administrator. DCJS appointed personnel to coordinate directly with sites, and each site designated a primary liaison. Mechanisms within each site varied but tended to abide by the hierarchical systems already in place. The liaison, assuming he or she had appropriate legitimacy in that community, was generally able to monitor and leverage the support and commitment of partner agencies, with executives stepping in as needed. Sites had better implementation if specific individuals were assigned to oversee program components and if collective groups (particularly of administrators) monitored processes and outcomes. Smaller jurisdictions (Group A) did not need to have such formal structures and often operated GIVE through small informal working groups.

The evaluation team also served as a monitoring role between the state and sites. The evaluators strove to measure implementation quality well as organizational readiness to implement evidence-based strategies. The evaluation reported when GIVE began on the degree to which agencies had a history of successful partnerships with the other agencies, structures in place to monitor implementation, buy-in at administrative and mid-level management levels, and the resources and structures in place to effectively implement the strategies.

Many of the sites also used crime analysts to help monitor outcomes and direct strategies. Items seven and nine on the IAR (see Table 6) relate to the availability and use of data to direct implementation decisions. Sites struggled to collect data specifically to feed back into decision-

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Each IAR Item Ratings by Group

Group	Stat	IAR#1	IAR#2	IAR#3	IAR#4	IAR#5	IAR#6	IAR#7	IAR#8	IAR#9	IAR_ Total	IAR Percent
		ProgInfo Knwldg	LinkPrblm Intrv	RoleActivity StructLead	Activity ofPart	Grp Processes	Review Planning	Avlibility Data	Use Resource	Report Out		
H	Mean	3.33	3.67	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.67	3.67	4.00	3.33	<b>33.67</b>	<b>93.5%</b>
	Median	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	<b>34.00</b>	<b>94.4%</b>
	Std. Dev.	0.58	0.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.58	0.58	0.00	0.58	<b>2.52</b>	<b>7.0%</b>
	Min.	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	<b>31.00</b>	<b>86.1%</b>
	Max.	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>36.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
	Range	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	<b>5.00</b>	<b>13.9%</b>
	N	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3		
M	Mean	3.00	3.50	3.25	2.75	3.50	2.75	3.00	4.00	2.75	<b>28.50</b>	<b>79.2%</b>
	Median	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.00	3.50	3.00	3.00	4.00	2.50	<b>29.00</b>	<b>80.6%</b>
	Std. Dev.	1.15	0.58	0.96	0.50	0.58	1.26	0.82	0.00	0.96	<b>6.24</b>	<b>17.3%</b>
	Min.	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	4.00	2.00	<b>21.00</b>	<b>58.3%</b>
	Max.	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>35.00</b>	<b>97.2%</b>
	Range	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	0.00	2.00	<b>14.00</b>	<b>38.9%</b>
	N	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4		
L	Mean	3.75	4.00	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	3.75	3.75	3.75	<b>34.50</b>	<b>95.8%</b>
	Median	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>34.50</b>	<b>95.8%</b>
	Std. Dev.	0.50	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.50	0.50	<b>1.29</b>	<b>3.6%</b>
	Min.	3.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	<b>33.00</b>	<b>91.7%</b>
	Max.	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>36.00</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
	Range	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	<b>3.00</b>	<b>8.3%</b>
	N	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4		
A	Mean	3.20	3.20	3.40	2.40	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.60	2.60	<b>27.40</b>	<b>76.1%</b>
	Median	3.00	3.00	4.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	<b>27.00</b>	<b>75.0%</b>
	Std. Dev.	0.84	0.84	0.89	0.55	0.71	1.22	1.22	0.89	1.14	<b>7.09</b>	<b>19.7%</b>
	Min.	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	<b>17.00</b>	<b>47.2%</b>
	Max.	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>34.00</b>	<b>94.4%</b>
	Range	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	<b>17.00</b>	<b>47.2%</b>
	N	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5		
C	Mean	3.50	3.50	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00	3.50	<b>31.50</b>	<b>87.5%</b>
	Median	3.50	3.50	3.00	3.50	3.50	3.50	3.50	4.00	3.50	<b>31.50</b>	<b>87.5%</b>
	Std. Dev.	0.71	0.71	0.00	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.71	0.00	0.71	<b>3.54</b>	<b>9.8%</b>
	Min.	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	<b>29.00</b>	<b>80.6%</b>
	Max.	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>34.00</b>	<b>94.4%</b>
	Range	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	<b>5.00</b>	<b>13.9%</b>
	N	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2		
All Sites	Mean	3.33	3.56	3.50	3.17	3.56	3.33	3.33	3.83	3.11	<b>30.72</b>	<b>0.85</b>
	Median	3.50	4.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	4.00	3.50	4.00	3.00	<b>33.50</b>	<b>0.93</b>
	Std. Dev.	0.77	0.62	0.71	0.79	0.62	0.97	0.84	0.51	0.90	<b>5.46</b>	<b>0.15</b>
	Min.	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	<b>17.00</b>	<b>0.47</b>
	Max.	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	<b>36.00</b>	<b>1.00</b>
	Range	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	<b>19.00</b>	<b>0.53</b>
	N	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18		

making. Group L was rated the highest on this. No groups stood out on the use of data, but sites that lacked technology or administrative buy-in for data collection were rated the lowest.

Theory also suggests the use of sanctions and incentives to monitor compliance, but this is used in GIVE to a lesser degree. The state requires that each funded partner agency attends monthly meetings; if they do not, one twelfth of their annual funding (equating to one month) may be withheld. There is also an implied risk that funding may decrease for GIVE or for other programs if sites are particularly uncooperative. Sanction and reward mechanisms within each site vary, but this specific topic rarely came up in interviews.

The employees of criminal justice agencies frequently interact with people from other agencies, so while their agencies' goals may be opposing by design, the individuals tend to engage in mutually-beneficial processes and decisions that may differ from agency-level goals. Because evaluators spoke with mid-level managers and executives, it is difficult to ascertain the degree of buy-in from the personnel implementing the strategy every day. One theme from interviews was that personnel who had significant portions of their work time funded by and dedicated to GIVE tended to have much more stake in the outcomes and more interest in quality implementation compared to others for whom GIVE was just a piece of their work. GIVE agency executives did vary in their alignment with DCJS's principles and goals, and deviations were most obvious regarding strategies that were less compatible with traditional law enforcement functions such as street outreach and procedural justice. As implementation theory would suggest, those who lacked buy-in but felt they had to implement the strategies tended to adopt them symbolically and allocate few resources. Groups A and M stand out as the lowest-rated on average on the IAR item four that measures the role and activity of partners. The highest rating was only granted if community partners were actively involved in GIVE. All of the sites in Group H (highest rates of gun violence) and all but one in Group L (low rates of gun violence) received the highest rating.

DCJS knew that asking law enforcement agencies to implement evidence-based strategies could be difficult due to resistance and inevitable difficulties in changing how agencies operate. DCJS worked to put proper supports in place. Factors in successful implementation, according to theory, are that implementers are willing to take on a moderate amount of risk, have sufficient resources, and believe the authority figure promoting the change is legitimate. For the day-to-day implementers of a strategy, adoption of change is most likely if it is perceived to be advantageous, compatible with established methods and goals, low in complexity, has observable processes and outcomes, and can be adopted in stages. Opinion leaders who are not necessarily

authority figures often have substantial influence on these perceptions. DCJS has worked to offer broad trainings from individuals and sources likely to be seen as legitimate by the implementers of GIVE strategies. The DCJS personnel that work most closely with the sites tried to encourage opinion leaders to engage in these activities and met with implementers frequently.

The first IAR item on program information and knowledge addresses whether the sites' administrators and personnel are trained in strategies. Higher ratings indicate that the site is generally well-informed about strategy models, and experts share this knowledge with others. Most sites were rated highly with little variation among or within groups. The most variation and lowest mean was in Group M (sites with medium rates of gun violence). Interviews revealed that even some trained personnel continued to interpret strategy components or theory from the lens of their prior experience and knowledge. This applies a finding from implementation theory for agencies to the individuals; just like organizations, individuals will tend to adapt strategies to fit their own goals, rather than adapting their goals to fit the strategy.

The second IAR item on linkage of problem and intervention rates how well the sites' interventions matched their violence problem. Sites were rated highly with little variation among groups. Sites focusing on aggravated assaults (Group A) had the most struggle linking their interventions with their violence problem, possibly because the GIVE strategies are designed for gun violence rather than assault. Interestingly, the sites with low levels of gun violence (Group L) had the most consistently high ratings. This appears to be because the scale of their violence problem tended to be manageable and matched the resources available from GIVE.

It is important to remember that GIVE was a shift for the state from funding Part I crime reduction efforts to focusing resources on gun violence. It is challenging because NYS had a historical and political expectation to provide funding to sites that do not have substantial gun violence. At the end of 2016, DCJS was exploring other evidence-based strategies that may better suit the needs of these sites related to drug trafficking and domestic violence.

Implementation theory notes the importance of executive buy-in for effective allocation of resources and staff time to support implementation. The fifth IAR item measures the quality of working group processes and the degree of leadership involvement. Executives were consistently involved in sites in Groups H and L. This was mostly true in other sites as well, but it was not as consistent to have active executive involvement. Executives sometimes designated strategy coordinators and otherwise had little oversight of the strategies. The third IAR item measure the quality of the implementing structure and leadership. Low ratings correspond to little leadership involvement, and high ratings correspond to strong leadership involvement and clear implementation structures. Most sites were rated highly, as they held monthly partner meetings and had designated individuals or teams at most partner agencies coordinating implementation within and among partner organizations. One site each in Groups M and A received low ratings due to a lack of structure and leadership support.

Implementation is viewed by implementation theory as a process rather than an outcome. Agency and individual actions reflect their response to circumstances as well as their beliefs and values. In GIVE sites where the partner agencies shared beliefs and those beliefs aligned with those of DCJS, implementation was more enthusiastic and thorough.

While GIVE generally funded overtime initiatives and special projects, the hope was that the evidence-based practices would get integrated into the everyday processes of the partner agencies as to how they address gun violence. Implementation is most effective when it is integrated into everyday practice through normative social processes among individuals who are committed to operationalization. Almost all sites received the highest rating on the eighth IAR item, which indicates that they found and used additional resources to supplement the GIVE funding. This was typically the staff time of unfunded partner agencies and the regular (non-overtime) hours of funded partner agency personnel. Most sites integrated the principles and

operations of strategies into their everyday work practice to some degree. Several district attorneys' offices restructured their gun violence prosecution staff.

Implementation theory acknowledges that implementers must feel capable of making the change and feel they have the appropriate amount of resources to meet the demands, which has proved to be a challenge in focused deterrence, CPTED, and street outreach, as noted above. Many GIVE sites feel that more financial resources would be necessary to implement these strategies with effective dosage, oversight, and funds for environmental changes.

Criminal justice implementation researchers note the particular tendency towards symbolic change rather than true implementation in such organizations. Organizations tend to maintain their own goals but work to appear like they are pursuing the funders' goals so that funding can be maintained. There is a strong tendency to adopt change to the agency rather than to change the functional systems of the agency to fit the new strategy. Implementation theory also notes the competing demands on criminal justice agencies – from the state, local politicians, citizens, businesses, police unions, agency executives, other similar agencies nationwide, and so on. Agencies either make change by mimicking others to maintain organizational legitimacy (symbolic adoption), adopting change due to normative forces, and adopting change through coercion. DCJS appeared to be aware of all of these forces and tendencies. By holding trainings and symposiums across sites and espousing the research literature behind the evidence-based strategies, they helped to promote at least mimicking if not normative forces; coercion was a last resort through the grant funding. Much discussion centered around how the GIVE strategies do actually align with the goals of the partner agencies, though they sometimes require restructuring some processes and systems. Many agencies, over time, came to see that strategy components could make their jobs more efficient and effective.

GIVE has certainly faced some of the common strategy dissemination mistakes described in the literature review. Both DCJS executives and GIVE agency executives expressed

awareness of timing implementation to match readiness; they work to obtain buy-in and understanding through training and related efforts before fully implementing a strategy. The state must acknowledge that evidence does not always matter in decision-making; potential adopters sometimes have other goals or opinions about the legitimacy of research. They therefore tried to promote feelings of legitimacy through normative forces (e.g., having colleagues in other jurisdictions share their perspectives on the strategy's efficacy, rather than citing researchers). Also, due to the hierarchical nature of criminal justice agencies, it is easy to confuse authority with influence. Across the state, DCJS worked to identify innovation champions and give them platforms to talk about their implementation with other jurisdictions. DCJS's work within each jurisdiction tended to focus on gaining the buy-in of executives and/or GIVE liaisons overseeing the strategy. Less work is done to identify opinion leaders and innovators within the GIVE-funded agencies, though trainings and technical assistance is hoped to reach such individuals.

Implementation theory notes that offering choices in implementation can greatly enhance buy-in because agency executives can choose strategies that they prefer, which tend to be ones that already align with their organizational goals and processes. DCJS offered a menu of strategies for sites to choose what they felt would best fit their jurisdiction and also strategies they were most able and willing to implement. Sites could also choose to supplement these strategies with other efforts to fit local needs. Site representatives did sometimes indicate some resentment to being compelled to do particular actions, so offering a choice was likely effective in overcoming resistance and recognizing the diversity of the GIVE sites.

The GIVE evaluators were keenly aware of the importance of adapting GIVE strategies while maintaining fidelity to their models. Theorists have shown that adaptation can be beneficial if adopters understand which aspects of the intervention can be changed and which cannot. Higher ratings on the fidelity/dosage rubric adaptation area indicate that changes were



made that upheld the principles of the strategy and made the strategy more effective for that jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, sites at which the executives and implementers had high degrees of knowledge about strategies and felt the strategies were effective and legitimate tended to make positive adaptations to the strategies. This was the exception, however. Most sites adapted the strategies somewhat to fit local needs but without much consideration of the models. This tended to occur within sites that were relatively disengaged from the overall GIVE process. Others made no overt attempts to adapt strategies to be more effective for their jurisdiction; this occurred when the sites felt they could not change any components of an evidence-based strategy in order to maintain fidelity. DCJS and evaluators responded to both situations with increased education and promoting discussions among sites. Interviews revealed that this, over time, helped sites in the latter category feel more confident about adapting strategies to their needs, especially if proposed changes were discussed with DCJS representatives beforehand.

DCJS's design of GIVE from the start of the program appeared well-informed about implementation theory and the challenges of asking criminal justice agencies to make a change to how they approach gun violence. Many of these strategies appear effective, but sites still vary in their degree of buy-in, firm structures to support implementation, and ultimately effectiveness.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

The GIVE strategies (focused deterrence, hot spots policing, street outreach, and CPTED) and GIVE's emphasis on the integration of procedural justice principles align well with many of the concepts in subculture of violence theory, rational choice and situational crime prevention theory, and deterrence theory. Misalignment with theoretical principles can be understood through the lens of implementation theory. The best alignment tended to occur across all strategies with deterrence theory. As hypothesized, this theory best aligns with the pre-existing structures and functions of the funded criminal justice agencies. Agencies were therefore readily able to implement deterrence-related strategies and processes. Interestingly, despite the close

theoretical alignment between rational choice/situational crime prevention theory and deterrence theory, rational choice concepts were implemented and discussed much less frequently in interviews. When resources were found to make modify criminogenic environmental conditions, they tended to have the primary purpose of increasing the likelihood of arrest rather than making crime commission more difficult. The street outreach strategy by design integrates many of the concepts from subculture of violence theory, but, as hypothesized, the law enforcement personnel leading the GIVE strategy tended to discount the value or distrust these methods.

GIVE is a great opportunity to study the integration of various strategies and theoretical perspectives in implementation across diverse sites. The next paper in this series elaborates on these findings by more closely examining whether the GIVE strategies align with the procedural justice principles expected to be integrated throughout GIVE.

## **Chapter 5: Procedural Justice and Communities**

New York State's Gun Involved Violence Elimination (GIVE) initiative seeks to reduce the incidence of shootings and shooting-related deaths in the state by funding the implementation of evidence-based strategies and related initiatives in the seventeen highest-crime counties. Funded partner agencies are expected to focus on the people and places at highest risk for gun violence while promoting alignment of resources among partner agencies and engagement of the community. Evidence-based strategies that sites could choose include focused deterrence, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), street outreach, and hot spots policing. Sites are required to use problem-oriented policing (POP) methods and promote procedural justice principles in each all GIVE strategies.

This paper will examine how the GIVE program may impact the communities in which it operates, focusing on GIVE partners' implementation of procedural justice principles. Funded law enforcement agencies are expected to acknowledge the needs of and work closely with community agencies and residents, but this is often difficult. There are both logistical and philosophical problems that impede the effective integration of community members and organizations into GIVE strategies and create potential for negative impacts of strategies on the community, even if violent crime is reduced. This paper will review these problems as discussed in literature on each strategy and based on what has been learned from evaluating GIVE sites. Each evidence-based strategy will first be reviewed for how they may impact communities and how community members and organizations can have a role in the strategy. Common problems across strategies and possible frameworks through which to view potential solutions are presented.

### **“GIVE-Menu” Evidence-Based Strategies**

Several GIVE strategies are meant to address gun violence primarily through policing and prosecutorial practices. Community members have integral roles, though, in reaching high-risk

individuals for prevention and intervention and in assisting in prosecution. In this section, we review each of the GIVE strategies that jurisdictions could choose to implement. They are reviewed independently here to explicate how the strategies' models integrate and affect communities, though multiple strategies are implemented together in reality.

**Procedural justice.** The Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) that oversees GIVE has mandated that GIVE jurisdictions integrate the principles of procedural justice into each GIVE strategy and into their overall work. They are also encouraged to generally engage with community members and organizations in comprehensive violence reduction plans.

The concept of procedural justice begins with the acknowledgement that if people believe that police authority is legitimate, they are more likely to cooperate with police orders and obey the law (Tyler & Fagan, 2008; Meares, 2010; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). People perceive police as legitimate if they feel that police are trustworthy, honest, and concerned about citizens' well-being (Meares, 2010). Research in police legitimacy finds that different groups of citizens such as minority groups, illegal immigrants, or those with certain cultural backgrounds differ in the degree to which they feel that police and law have legitimacy; police and the criminal justice system must understand these different perspectives to garner the support and compliance of estranged communities (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Clearly, police legitimacy is important for any crime prevention or intervention strategy, especially in communities impacted the most by gun violence. It is crucial to the police's role in maintaining order and in securing cooperation from witnesses and community members in police initiatives and investigations.

Actual experiences with the police can increase a person's sense of police legitimacy if the way in which the officer exercises his or her authority is seen as procedurally just (Tyler & Fagan, 2008). Extensive research has shown that quality of the decision-making process (fairness and neutrality) and the quality of treatment (courtesy and respect) in a citizen-police interaction both influence perceptions of procedural justice. If citizens perceive police actions as

procedurally just, citizens are more likely to have favorable feelings towards police and the decisions they make, no matter the outcome or decision made (Meares, 2010; Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Blader & Tyler, 2003). Blader and Tyler (2003) further note that in addition to the actions and decisions of individual law enforcement personnel, the systems and rules within the criminal justice system operates must be perceived as procedurally. In practice, then, procedural justice principles of fairness, trust, respect, and listening to what citizens have to say are especially important for promoting police legitimacy in communities experiencing high degrees of violence, where police-citizen interactions are more common and often more crucial.

The major difficulty GIVE sites have had with implementing procedural justice is that it is a philosophy rather than a strategy. DCJS acknowledged this and moved from treating it as a strategy in the first year of GIVE to treating it as an underlying philosophy in the second year. Jurisdictions were to incorporate principles of procedural justice into all GIVE efforts and across all partner agencies. This has been very difficult because there is not a manual or many readily-available trainings on how to “do” procedural justice or effectively integrate it into the strategies.

A further concern is that the reaction of criminal justice personnel to the procedural justice philosophy is often contradictory. Some expressed in evaluator interviews that they do not need training because they already treat people fairly and respectfully. They feel that current training in ethics and community policing, for instance, is sufficient. Others expressed dislike for some of the fundamental tenants, such as acknowledging the historical role police have played in enforcing racist policies. One said, “My officers are not about to apologize for things that happened 300 years ago.” A more common complaint was that officers did not have time to explain their actions to people or did not see the importance of focusing on citizen perceptions considering their other duties of safety and security. Though not stated directly, many implied that they reserve using procedural justice for those who are not in conflict with the police; once

someone commits a crime, particularly gun crimes, criminal justice personnel are less apt to maintain these principles in systemic and individual interactions, for both safety reasons or because they believe it is their duty to remove high-risk individuals from the community.

This overview of procedural justice will be referenced throughout this paper. Each strategy will be discussed in terms of how procedural justice principles can be upheld as well as how strategies, in design and implementation, integrate and impact residents and organizations.

**Problem-oriented policing (POP).** Similar to procedural justice, POP was treated in the first year of GIVE as a strategy; in the second year, DCJS mandated that POP be used in each of the four other strategies. POP requires police to identify, analyze, and respond to underlying problems that contribute to crime. This is a shift away from traditional policing that is focused on responding to calls for service. The framework demands that police draw on a wide range of potential solutions to crime, including criminal law, civil law, other governmental agencies, and community resources. The SARA model is frequently used in POP approaches, which describes the steps of scanning for problems, analyzing the problem and potential responses to it, responding to the problem using a wide range of methods and resources, and assessing the effectiveness of the responses utilized. These principles have been effective in addressing diverse problems at both small and large scales (Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy (CEBCP), "Problem-Oriented Policing," n.d.). Research has shown that POP strategies that include the involvement of citizens may reduce the prevalence of murder (White, Fyfe, Campbell, & Goldkamp, 2003). Ideally, any POP strategy will draw on community resources and insights and promote the mobilization of residents and organizations as part of the solution. "Effective problem solving requires responsiveness to citizen input about community needs as well as about the best ways the police can help address them" (Skogan et al., 1999, p. 66).

Community members are likely to identify different problems or prioritize them differently than law enforcement and therefore should be involved in the scanning step of the

SARA process. The analysis stage should consider the communities' ideas for solutions. Often, law enforcement agencies are not aware of community resources available or of certain dynamics of a problem, so collaboration in analysis stage is crucial. Finally, assessment of the strategy outcomes should measure community impact such as satisfaction and engagement.

Despite the clear community role at every stage of SARA, "rarely can the community at large help with the specialized technical work involved in problem analysis, solution development, and evaluation" (Clarke & Eck, 2005, p. 22). Another challenge is securing and maintaining the involvement of the public in problem-solving efforts, especially in disorganized communities; sustained collaboration requires major shifts in how police and communities interact to solve problems (Skogan et al., 1999). Maquire, Uchida, and Hassell (2015) showed that in one city, problems to be addressed were nominated by law enforcement in 69.2% of POP efforts. The community was most involved in the response stage, and businesses were more involved than citizens. The levels of community engagement in scanning and analysis seem lower than the POP model seems to dictate, even in a city well known for its strong use of POP.

Finding a role for the community in addressing gun violence can be particularly difficult due to the threats against those who assist police and that those involved in gun violence tend to be particularly alienated from law enforcement and sometimes even their community. Further, individuals involved in gun violence make up a very small portion of people in even the highest-crime areas. Police are often surprised to find the public more concerned about disorder and quality of life issues than violence (Skogan et al., 1999). Lastly, law enforcement strategies to address gun offenders are often harsh and can alienate communities.

In terms of impact, POP strategies have been shown to have a small but statistically significant effect in reducing levels of crime and disorder (Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2008). It is less clear how else the strategy affects communities. One study found no statistically significant changes to perceptions of crime and disorder, perceived safety, satisfaction with

police, or procedural justice after POP was implemented in hot spots in Philadelphia (Ratcliffe, Groff, Sorg, & Haberman, 2015). It is plausible, though, that achieving reduced crime and disorder would have positive effects on the community, unless the methods used to achieve such results were overly harsh, perceived as unfair, or otherwise alienated the community.

**Hot spots policing.** Hot spots policing strategies focus police resources in the small geographic areas where crime is concentrated as well as on chronic offenders. The actual interventions generally involve traditional policing such as saturation patrols, zero tolerance, and “broken windows” type policing (National Institute of Justice, n.d.). Ideally, POP methods are used to address underlying conditions that contribute to the persistent crime problem, and procedural justice is used to promote police legitimacy in the area.

While research has shown that having police simply spend more time in a hot spot or do traditional policing activities can reduce crime levels in hot spots and diffuse some benefits to surrounding areas (CEBCP, “Hot Spots Policing,” n.d.; Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2014), POP and situational crime prevention yield consistently better crime reductions (Braga & Bond, 2008; Braga & Weisburd, 2010). POP and situational crime prevention involve examining problems beyond the traditional scope of policing. There is therefore an inherent and necessary role for community residents, organizations, and governmental agencies beyond law enforcement in hot spots policing: to help address the underlying factors contributing to the crime problems.

“Regardless of the specific approach employed or tactics engaged, hot spots policing will generate an increased amount of police-citizen contacts in very small areas” (Weisburd & Braga, 2013, para. 5). Police behavior will influence residents’ sense of police legitimacy and procedural justice. “Like crime, poor police-community relationships are not evenly spread throughout city environments” (Weisburd & Braga, 2013, para. 6). Residents in hot spot area are the most vulnerable to victimization and are often dissatisfied with police because of high crime levels or because of negative police interactions. Engaging community members in POP



strategies within hot spots and focusing enforcement efforts on only serious offenders is likely to both prevent crime and improve police-community relations (Weisburd & Braga, 2013).

Research regarding hot spots policing's impact on communities is mixed. Hot spots policing can have negative impacts on police legitimacy, police satisfaction, feelings of safety, and procedural justice, especially in nonwhite and poor neighborhoods with historically poor police relations (Braga & Weisburd, 2010; Haberman, Groff, Ratcliffe, & Sorg, 2016). Also, some researchers warn that some types of hot spots policing activities could contribute to the destabilization of neighborhoods by increasing the likelihood that more low-income, nonwhite men will be involved in the criminal justice system and incarcerated (Kille, 2013).

Haberman et al. (2016) found that residents in violent crime hot spots who were younger, more educated, more fearful of crime, perceived higher social disorder, or perceived higher procedural injustice had lower levels of police satisfaction. While different demographic groups had different sentiments towards police, the same study found no statistically significant differences in perceptions of crime and disorder, perceived safety, satisfaction with police, or procedural justice on pre-/post-intervention surveys, regardless of whether the policing efforts conducted were foot patrols, POP, or offender-focused policing (Ratcliffe, Groff, Sorg, & Haberman, 2015). Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega, & Ready (2011) also found "that recent criticisms of hot spots policing approaches which focus on possible negative 'backfire' effects... may be overstated... [R]esidents are not aware of, or much affected by, a three hour per week dosage of aggressive order maintenance policing on their blocks" (p. 297).

Research may be mixed because of the range of interventions that are used in hot spots and because of the diverse contexts in which the strategy is implemented. Even if there is not a negative impact of most hot spots strategies on communities, it seems advisable for efforts to take a problem-solving and procedurally just approach that integrates the community to increase the chance it will reduce crime, improve relations, and maintain positive results.

**Focused deterrence.** Focused deterrence is POP method in which law enforcement and social service providers target the highest-risk gun offenders. It aims to deter gun violence by explaining to high-risk offenders that violence will not be tolerated, informing them of the consequences for engaging in violence, and offering services (National Institute of Justice (NIJ), “Focused Deterrence Strategies,” n.d.). In GIVE, this strategy is typically operationalized through “offender call-in” events in which representatives of gangs or groups are delivered the deterrence and support message at a highly coordinated event. Many jurisdictions also use “custom notifications” to deliver the deterrence and support messages to individuals at home.

Focused deterrence strategies integrate community members by “decreasing opportunity structures for violence” through POP/situational crime prevention, “deflecting offenders away from crime” through social services, “increasing the collective efficacy of communities” through community collaboration, and “increasing the legitimacy of police actions” by using procedural justice when communicating with offenders (Braga & Weisburd, 2012, p. 26). The model for call-ins requires that presenters include social service providers, community members affected by gun violence to “lend moral voices against gun violence,” and former gang- or gun-involved individuals who can bring credibility to the message about changing one’s life choices (Griffiths & Christian, 2015, p. 574). Several GIVE jurisdictions involve “influentials” (family and loved ones of targeted individuals), hoping that they can help to influence the person’s behavior.

Achieving this community engagement is often problematic. Social service agencies and community members are often quite willing to participate in the call-ins and support targeted offenders. Law enforcement, however, has less belief in the value of the services and community components. Law enforcement’s belief tends to be that very few targeted individuals will engage with services, and even fewer will make significant-enough behavioral changes. For the most part, they have been correct; only a few targeted individuals in all sites actually engage with services, and many recidivate. Nonetheless, most law enforcement personnel feel that it is

important to offer the targeted individuals alternatives to violence and gangs, and they value the support and engagement of community members and service agencies.

There are two other major obstacles to the ideal community role in focused deterrence. First, social service agencies are rarely a funded GIVE partner, limiting the resources they can spend on this very high-risk, high-need, and difficult-to-engage population. Some jurisdictions hired a case manager that connects the targeted individuals with services, and this was helpful in promoting engagement with services. Secondly, focused deterrence strategies are meant to use multiple resources to change the behavior of those involved in violence through deterrence, support, and decreasing opportunities for crime. Most jurisdictions monitor violence after call-ins and conduct enforcement against groups involved in violence to deliver on deterrence message. This usually only involves law-enforcement, rarely involving or consulting community partners. Also, reducing opportunities for crime through situational crime prevention or POP is usually seen as separate from focused deterrence and implemented disjointedly if at all.

Brunson (2015) notes a third concern. In formulating partnerships with community leaders and groups for focused deterrence, law enforcement should not avoid working with “unconventional” groups or people such as prior offenders or “organizations that have previously openly challenged the department’s crime control policies,” as these groups “might have huge credibility among neighborhood residents” (p. 511). Such engagement can provide further legitimacy to law enforcement’s deterrence message and the message of wanting to support those involved in gun violence in ceasing such activity because the community cares about them. In Boston, where this strategy was developed, a community collaborative worked between police and the community to promote trust, legitimacy, and the anti-violence message (Brunson, 2015).

The impact of focused deterrence on police-community relations or other community indicators has not been researched as thoroughly as other strategies. In theory, focused deterrence directs police efforts at chronic, high-risk offenders, rather than indiscriminately

policing entire neighborhoods or demographic groups like stop and frisk or zero tolerance. This should increase the community's sense of police legitimacy (Brunson, 2015). The partnerships between law enforcement, service providers, and community groups should also lead to stronger violence reduction efforts and perhaps more holistic resources to address the problem.

Furthermore, informing those involved in group violence about what law enforcement knows about their activities and the consequences for continued violence promotes transparency. Nonetheless, empirical evidence is lacking about whether call-in participants or their loved ones or associates actually perceive legitimacy in this process. One study has shown that the public in areas where focused deterrence strategies are implemented had increased confidence in the police and interest in partnering in police efforts when they perceived fairness and program effectiveness in reducing crime (Brunson, 2015). "Legal authorities' public displays of procedural justice and compassion for call-in participants might lead to greater police legitimacy and community support" (Brunson, 2015, p. 509). Indeed, several GIVE jurisdictions have noticed increased positive feelings, buy-in, trust, and engagement from targeted offenders' family members once the deterrence message was supplemented with messages of support and provision of services. This shows the importance of actually following through on both the deterrence and support promised during call-ins and custom notifications to gain and maintain trust. It is important to remember that law enforcement is likely to only be aware of a small portion of the criminal activity in which participants are involved and likely is not aware of their non-criminal goals and behaviors. Erratic, delayed, or weak deliverance of the promised deterrence or support can undermine perceived fairness, trust, and legitimacy.

A final concern is that the law enforcement definition of group/gang associations may differ from the community's or group members' definitions. Often in GIVE sites, participants deny involvement with the groups they have been associated with by law enforcement, and law enforcement sees this as lying to claim innocence. It is possible, though, that law enforcement's

definitions are inaccurate or do not capture the complexity of the social structures in which participants are engaged. If participants feel unjustly targeted, fairness is undermined; if police data is simply wrong, legitimacy and fairness are undermined. Using information other than law enforcement data could help determine accurate group associations. In one GIVE site, street outreach workers review the potential call-in invitees to determine if they are still active in gangs and violence so they do not deliver the focused deterrence message to those who do not need it.

Griffiths and Christian (2015) note that violent gangs exist within non-criminal social networks. If participants' law-abiding associates perceive law enforcement efforts against the participants as aggressive, unwarranted, or in violation of civil rights, police-community relations can be harmed. This can result in a vicious cycle of decreased community cooperation in solving violent crimes, which then undermines law enforcements' ability to follow through effectively on the deterrence message. Law-abiding friends and family should be seen as allies in the behavior change process for gun-involved individuals. Law enforcement must recognize that such people often have the same goal as law enforcement – to stop the person's involvement in gangs and with guns – but do not wish to see them harmed or treated unfairly.

The focused deterrence strategy is challenging due to its requirement for sustained, focused enforcement and support. The unique features of implementation determine the impact on the community and police-community relations. It is “important to evaluate directly the perceptions and responses of those who are the subjects of focused deterrence interventions and to consider the broader collateral consequences of any initiative with a threat-based component for police-community relations” (Griffiths & Christian, 2015, p. 578).

**Street outreach.** Most GIVE sites that use street outreach implement SNUG, a New York State-funded replication of the Chicago Cure Violence model with some modifications. Cure Violence uses a public health approach to reduce gun violence by using “credible messengers” (those formerly involved in gun violence) to engage with the individuals in the

community at highest risk for shooting or being shot. Outreach workers and violence interrupters conduct street-level outreach to build relationships with gun-involved groups, educate the wider public, organize community mobilization events, and involve faith leaders, service agencies, and law enforcement to change the norms about the appropriateness of gun violence and interrupt and resolve violent disputes. Community members play a large role in providing information about violent disputes to outreach workers so they can intervene. The programs also support gun-involved individuals in accessing social services and opportunities such as employment and education to address their underlying needs (NIJ, "Program Profile: Cure Violence (Chicago, Illinois)," n.d.).

The community role is larger in this strategy than in most GIVE strategies because the outreach programs are led by non-profits. Programs hold regular meetings of partners, and resources are leveraged from partner agencies to connect gun-involved community members to services. Partner agencies also assist in public education. Community members attend marches and vigils. Churches provide services and promote community organizing in addition to their spiritual functions, and clergy serve as opinion leaders in the community. Business owners often display posters as part of the public education effort and can provide employment opportunities and monetary support. Outreach staff also do presentations at schools and work with staff to address youth concerns (Skogan et al., 2009).

Outreach programs often have strained relations with law enforcement, but a relationship is necessary. The programs need police information about shootings and homicides to identify target areas and plan responses. Police often support the outreach events with personnel and security, and police often serve on the hiring panels for outreach program staff. However, if the outreach programs were to share information with police, their credibility and perhaps safety would be threatened; as such, some animosity is often evident between outreach programs and

police because police feel the programs should provide more information to the police. Law enforcement also often believe the outreach staff may still be involved with gangs and guns.

While community organizations and residents have a very clear role in street outreach, there is little research specifically on the impact of these programs on communities except that they have been proven to reduce gun violence. One study found that youth in an area with street outreach workers felt that the outreach workers made their community a better place and that the workers were helpful and respected by youth. Many youth who did not interact with outreach workers did not know of them, but those that did work with them often got help finding a job or resolving a conflict (Pollack, Frattaroli, Whitehill, & Strother, 2011).

Other presumed community benefits of street outreach programs include (1) more social organization and collective efficacy through community mobilization and public education efforts to change norms about violence, (2) more ability for disconnected neighborhoods and community members to access resources (social capital), and (3) if effective at connecting youth to resources such as jobs or education, increases in human capital. Research is needed on whether these impacts are actually realized in areas that employ street outreach workers.

GIVE law enforcement representatives in most jurisdictions reported positive feelings about community marches and vigils organized by the programs in response to shootings as well as effective de-escalation of violent disputes, but it is rarer for other community impacts to be discussed. A street outreach program director from one site felt that community mobilization efforts after shootings actually distance the community and increase fear of crime because the efforts appear short-lived and do not solve underlying problems. More attention should be paid to measuring the community impact and the nature of the relationship between the programs and the community as well as the relationship the outreach programs have with law enforcement.

**Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).** CPTED strategies use “the proper design and effective use of the built environment [to] lead to a reduction in the fear

and incidence of crime, and an improvement in the quality of life” (C. Ray Jeffrey, 1971, as quoted in National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC), 1997/2009). CPTED practitioners assess the environmental features of areas with high and/or chronic crime to promote access control (how people enter and leave spaces), surveillance (maximizing visibility), territorial reinforcement (defining ownership of spaces, rules, and regulations), and maintenance (upkeep of structures and properties) (NCPC, 1997/2009, p. 8).

CPTED is a problem-solving strategy that falls under the umbrella of POP. As such, it is most effective when it integrates law enforcement as well as community organizations, parochial institutions, governmental agencies, and residents. In assessing spaces for crime-supporting features, practitioners are encouraged to inventory the community's available resources. While law enforcement personnel often lead CPTED initiatives, many of the possible solutions to underlying problems cannot be achieved by law enforcement alone. Common CPTED strategies include improving lighting, removing foliage, eliminating hiding spots, changing foot and vehicular traffic patterns, installing cameras, posting rules about the proper use of spaces and consequences for violations (and enforcing it), installing locks or barriers, using police foot and bicycle patrols to reach hidden areas, holding events in public spaces, boarding vacant properties, painting community murals on graffiti-prone walls, organizing clean-up activities, changing business operation hours, and organizing neighborhood watch groups (NCPC, 1997/2009).

CPTED initiatives begin with an assessment of an area's characteristics that provide opportunities for crime, inventorying area resources and crime and demographic data, documenting observations, and conducting community surveys. The survey should involve interviewing residents, business owners and employees, and property owners about the nature of the problem, their resources to address it, and their ideas for solutions. Community organizations and residents then work to devise a strategy to address the problems, drawing on diverse



resources to form a holistic response. The final step is evaluating the impact of the strategy and ensuring the sustainability of positive results (NCPC, 1997/2009).

The community role is therefore an inherent part of a proper CPTED initiative. Even the basic planning activities benefit community capacity building, cohesion, and efficacy. Benefits include “increasing the capacity of residents to act in concert rather than individually,” “fostering citizen participation and strengthening social cohesion,” promoting an “interdisciplinary approach to urban problems” that shares responsibilities and skills, encouraging better police/community relations through community service and resident-involved anti-crime programs, bringing external resources such as development and revitalization funding to communities, and institutionalizing crime prevention policies and practices into private and public agencies (e.g., by altering building codes and regulations) (Fennelly & Crowe, 2013, p. 33-35). If properly done, CPTED strategies promote collective efficacy, social organization, and social capital.

Saville and Cleveland (2003a, 2003b) discussed a “second generation CPTED.” They note that the traditional CPTED concepts are only created, enforced, and maintained through social capacity and cohesion; the goal is for community members to maintain control and ownership of spaces for legitimate, positive purposes by appropriate people. “CPTED builds the social connections between people, local culture and their social ecology by bringing them together in common purpose” (Saville & Cleveland, 2003a, p. 8). First-generation CPTED focuses on altering the physical built environment, while second-generation emphasizes the need for establishing proper social controls over areas. Without proper social integration, first-generation CPTED “can unintentionally create desolate and alienating places” and promote a “fortress mentality” (Saville & Cleveland, 2003a, p. 8). They suggest access control and surveillance strategies that do not barricade people from interacting with one another. “CPTED strategies must aim to build... a sense of community” (Saville & Cleveland, 2003a, p. 8).

Second generation CPTED promotes four concepts in addition to traditional CPTED components: community culture, connectivity, neighborhood threshold, and social cohesion. Community culture promotes community events and art. Connectivity relates to positive relationships among neighborhoods and with others outside the neighborhood for resources. The threshold concept notes that neighborhoods, like ecosystems, need balanced diversity of land uses and activities for residents. "If the activities and land uses within a neighborhood are out of balance, they can tip over into crime," such as when there are too many abandoned buildings or bars in a given area (Saville & Cleveland, 2003b, p. 5). The social cohesion concept promotes opportunities for positive social interactions and the training and practice of positive social skills such as communication, conflict resolution, and community justice.

In practice, second generation CPTED requires more work in the original assessment phase, including understanding local social and political dynamics. Action research is necessary for sustained community involvement, feeding back information to those involved and incorporating their feedback. It emphasizes problem-based learning for a wider set of community stakeholders than in traditional CPTED, which focuses on the designated CPTED team.

Some issues are evident in GIVE sites. Several sites noted tensions between trying to reclaim spaces from illegitimate users (e.g., drug dealers or homeless people) and the fact that those community members need spaces to exist; the main criticism of CPTED is the likelihood of displacement. There is limited coordination between CPTED practitioners and institutions such as homeless shelters to create spaces for all segments of the community. While many sites note the need for community involvement in CPTED, they are attempting to implement such strategies in communities that lack resources. This limits the ability to make physical changes or promote positive social cohesion in neighborhoods. Nonetheless, most sites recognize the relationship between CPTED and other GIVE strategies, and that connection hinges on improving social networks, police-community relations, and resources in high-crime areas.

### **Summary of Common Problems and Solutions in Violence Reduction Efforts**

There are many common themes as to how GIVE strategies pertain to communities. Communities have a necessary role in each strategy, and these partnerships tend to make the strategies more effective. The strategies can have positive or negative impacts on communities (e.g., on community cohesion, resources and capital, residents' sense of safety, and rates of crime) depending on how strategies are implemented. This section summarizes the common problems and dilemmas for communities when implementing law enforcement-driven violence reduction strategies such as GIVE and possible avenues for the resolution of these dilemmas.

**Clarity of community's role.** Perhaps one of the most fundamental concerns is that in each GIVE strategy, there is a clear theoretical role for community residents and organizations. However, this role becomes much less clear upon implementation, especially when the strategies are applied to gun violence. Law enforcement agencies are often reluctant to use community members and agencies to address extremely high-risk places and people. Traditional policing is strongly upheld under the unspoken assumption that the fundamental goal is to identify and remove dangerous individuals from the community, even though each strategy in actuality encourages a more holistic approach. For the most part, strategies are implemented with fidelity by law enforcement, but the community role is limited. The emphasis on arrest and prosecution overrides other (i.e., community-based) efforts. Typically, community engagement is conceptualized only as having the goal of gaining community trust so that victims and witnesses of shootings are more willing to cooperate with law enforcement in investigations and prosecutions. There is little creative thinking about other benefits of community cooperation and resources.

One reason for this struggle may be that police are trained to patrol and arrest, probation officers are trained to monitor and limit risk, and prosecutors are trained to prosecute. Also, though this is an oversimplification, community residents who are willing to engage with the

police often expect the police to solve problems when called, and those unwilling to engage with police avoid law enforcement. There are few models in people's everyday experiences in which effective police-community cooperation has successfully addressed deeply-rooted, complex problems like gun violence. When there are successful efforts, they tend to be short-term, and conditions often return to their prior state. Training or technical assistance from jurisdictions that have achieved effective partnerships could help law enforcement and community members see how the theoretical roles in each strategy translate into actual implementation.

**Community resources needed to be effective partners.** The communities suffering from high amounts of gun violence tend also to be communities where numerous residents live below the poverty line, lack education, are unemployed, and interact frequently with the police. Businesses and community organizations struggle with few resources, the threat of crime, and a low-income and high-need client base.

While DCJS funds support overtime pay for law enforcement personnel to engage in GIVE-related activities, there is comparatively little funding for community organizations or other municipal agencies. This reflects the assumption that the primary and most effective strategy for addressing gun violence is traditional policing; other efforts are assumed to be ancillary. This assumption is not necessarily incorrect, as law enforcement has the primary responsibility for combating crime, but it does help to explain low levels of funding and thus low engagement of community organizations in GIVE strategies in most jurisdictions. Just as the police cannot conduct extra patrols without the funding to pay the officers, other agencies cannot devote staff time and resources without financial support. Yet the expectation remains from law enforcement that residents and community organizations participate in strategies. Frustration is often expressed at how few residents, for instance, attend community meetings or events, despite demands from the community for law enforcement to "do something" about gun violence; the

recognition is often missing that these residents may lack resources to participate if, for instance, event organizers do not provide child care, transportation, or effective advertising.

Residents and community groups do participate, using the resources at their disposal, as gun violence is a major concern in these neighborhoods. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that the possible role community partners can play is necessarily limited by their deficit of resources. If the community role is to truly be promoted, investment is likely needed.

**Recognizing community strain.** Agnew's (1999) general strain theory of community differences in crime rates is a helpful framework for understanding some of the problems with the community role and impact in GIVE strategies. His theory is that community-level factors can increase the strain experienced by individuals in a community, and this individual strain as well as community factors influence rates of crime. This acknowledges that much of the community-level strain is borne from factors outside of the community's control such as economics and historical segregation and racism.

According to this theory, "high-crime communities are more likely to select and retain strained individuals, produce strain, and foster criminal responses to strain" (Agnew, 1999, p. 126). They are especially likely to attract and retain people experiencing economic strain due to their need for affordable housing. Community characteristics influence the goals people pursue and their ability to achieve them through legitimate means. People who are blocked from legitimate means to pursue economic goals, goals for status and respect, and goals to be treated fairly often find illegitimate ways to achieve them. Criminal cultures can develop to provide structures to achieve such goals. Strain is strongest when people feel deprived from achieving their goals yet are exposed to others that do achieve them. Community factors such as culture and access to technology can influence this sense of relative deprivation. Further, community characteristics can increase the likelihood that residents will be exposed to aversive stimuli and increase their sensitivity to those stimuli. In fact, local cultures can come to define what stimuli

are defined as aversive (such as small signs of disrespect). These residents are more likely to experience negative emotions. By consequence, residents are more likely to interact with angry and frustrated individuals. All of these factors make it more likely that someone will respond criminally to strain. Experiencing crime directly or vicariously also increases strain. These strains on individuals increase levels of community strain. Other community characteristics can make it harder for people to cope with strain in legitimate ways. Community factors can make it less costly to engage in crime and increase people's disposition towards engaging in crime. As such, Agnew (1999) argues that "deprived communities generate strain and crime, whereas crime contributes to a further deterioration in the community and more strain" (p. 128).

The areas in which GIVE strategies are implemented are certainly strained communities. There is some recognition in GIVE strategies regarding the factors external to the communities that influence the communities' strain. For instance, social service work often focuses on job skill development, job placement, and improving education for clients. When trying to engage community members or groups, however, the recognition of strain and its effects are lacking. Crime and the lack of community engagement with GIVE efforts should be recognized as normal responses to excessive levels of individual and community strain. This recognition can lead to better implementation that attempts to combat underlying conditions that lead to strain and therefore crime as well as more realistic goals for community engagement in GIVE.

**Just fixing broken windows.** There is an assumption that addressing quality of life issues and disorder decreases crime, increases public trust in law enforcement, and increases cooperation with investigations. There is some anecdotal evidence in GIVE sites that citizens are pleased to see police addressing underlying problems and disorder (such as abandoned properties) rather than arresting and ticketing the common resident. The more complex reality is that many people live in communities and cultures in which cooperating with police is often unhelpful, if not dangerous.

The idea that “just fixing broken windows” will improve community engagement is most evident in CPTED strategies. There is often an assumption on the part of both community members and law enforcement that quick fixes to environmental conditions will result in quick changes to crime. Sustained effort is often lacking, and law enforcement and community members want to see results quicker. In a few GIVE sites, this led to some frustration and hopelessness with strategies, which deteriorates the enthusiasm with which jurisdictions try to improve what they do, including engagement with the community.

Clearer articulation of how specific activities fit into larger strategies could counter some of these forces. As noted in Carr's (2005) descriptions of successful community activism efforts, achieving small tangible goals is necessary for maintaining citizen involvement in long-term efforts. Rarely has a GIVE site laid out a comprehensive plan that specifies clear activities for residents and community groups and framed it as part of a larger strategy.

**Policies, procedures, and sustaining change.** Many GIVE strategies are implemented with fidelity but often superficially. It is uncommon for law enforcement to change policies and practices, though some have. Many jurisdictions credit GIVE with providing the impetus for inter-agency collaboration. This collaboration, however, is frequently in line with traditional law enforcement and prosecutorial functions. Rarely do sites address policies and procedures related to community engagement and procedural justice beyond acknowledging that procedural justice implementation requires a cultural shift and training. Amending institutional policies as well as metrics for success can help to sustain all GIVE strategies as well as community integration and procedural justice.

**Engaging all segments of the community.** As well as not changing policies and procedures, only some GIVE partners have changed who they work with in the community. GIVE law enforcement agencies often engage primarily with those who already support their work. When discussing procedural justice, for instance, it is far too often conceptualized as

something to be used selectively with those who have not done something wrong, and it is not typically conceptualized as something that applies to law enforcement interactions with the highest-risk gun offenders.

Engagement with high-risk neighborhoods and groups is crucial to the success of many GIVE strategies. Procedural justice research has shown that people who feel they were treated unfairly by police are less likely to comply with the law. Family and friends are the most likely to have an impact on gun-involved community members, but they are often alienated from police and community resources. These individuals, as well as the gun-involved individuals themselves, can provide useful feedback about proposed strategies to tackle gun violence. Street outreach workers could be excellent resources for law enforcement to learn to work better with estranged communities. Efforts should be made to ensure those relevant to the problem of gun violence are truly being integrated into the GIVE strategies, in line with many of the strategy models.

**Watering down procedural justice.** Many GIVE representatives confuse procedural justice with community engagement. Jurisdictions often have little direction in how to implement the principles of procedural justice and the mandate for community engagement. Many procedural justice efforts therefore amount to educating the community about how police function. These efforts can promote transparency (people understand why police take the actions they do), trust (citizens build relationships with officers and can better predict their actions), and fairness (police practices and policies make more sense and seem less discriminatory or random). Common programs implemented for procedural justice are Citizens Police Academies and Youth Police Initiatives. These are more effective if they build long-term relationships between officers and people at high risk for involvement in the criminal justice system and if the officers work to address residents' needs. Nonetheless, these programs do not address system-level procedural justice, how officers interact with citizens, how the department treats its personnel, and integrating the feedback of citizens into policies, procedures, or trainings. Further, procedural



justice is important in all aspects of criminal justice system; it is too commonly conceptualized as police-community relations while agencies like probation, parole, and prosecutors struggle to conceptualize how to address it.

Further, the field of community-building notes the importance of combating traditional power dynamics when trying to affect change. Chavis (2001) reminds us of the importance of conflict transformation within problem-solving groups that recognizes the institutionalized power structures in communities. Power conflicts between group partners (e.g., between law enforcement and a grassroots organization) must be specifically “transformed” to promote positive change. This is sorely lacking from GIVE strategies, which rely on the assumption that arrest and incapacitation of high-risk individuals are the most effective means of crime control.

Therefore, while educational programs may be necessary for promoting procedural justice and can be a good and tangible place to start, it is important that police departments do not see them as sufficient for procedural justice. More GIVE jurisdictions are actively seeking innovative ways to promote procedural justice more holistically and across all partner agencies.

**Measuring community involvement.** Measuring and setting clear goals for community engagement, involvement in strategies, or procedural justice is notoriously difficult, making it difficult to judge progress. Some GIVE jurisdictions anecdotally note levels of shooting witness and victim cooperation and clearance rates to measure community willingness to cooperate with the police. Others note attendance levels at community meetings and the sentiments shared. Sites with educational programs note enrollment rates, but these only somewhat measure the community's interest in engaging with and learning about police. This is a narrow way to view community engagement. It relegates the role of residents and community organizations to the traditional policing model in which it is the police's job to inform residents of crime problems and how they are being addressed.

A research partner of several GIVE sites is conducting community surveys to measure procedural justice and police-community relations, and this is promising. Measures of sentiments towards police and levels of involvement in GIVE efforts are likely the best measures of community engagement, but this data is costly and difficult to collect.

**Reciprocal relationship between cooperation and effectiveness.** Trying to improve community involvement in gun violence reduction strategies is a bit of a “chicken-and-the-egg” problem: community members’ cooperation with police depends on their belief in the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, their feelings of safety if they were to cooperate, and high shooting clearance rates, all of which, in turn, depend on community cooperation and engagement. Most GIVE strategies promote a problem-solving approach to slowly build community trust and capacity, but law enforcement often wants community members to cooperate rather quickly. Longer-term relationship building and effective partnering are likely to address both sides of this dilemma, and many sites are working to achieve this.

**Strained police-community relations and expectations.** As a summary note, many residents in areas with high rates of gun violence have grown distrustful of police due to having personal or vicarious negative experiences with police. The police are often distrustful of citizens as well, especially if they are associated with those involved in crime. There are also mutually high expectations on the part of both parties: community members want police to prevent and prosecute crimes and keep them safe in fair and just ways, and police want community members to do more to police themselves. These strained relationships and failures to meet one another’s expectations make it difficult to implement the community aspects of GIVE strategies. This is where true collaborative problem-solving can help build better working relationships and more effective strategies. If law enforcement are able to bring other partners, including residents, schools, businesses, and community organizations, to the table to assess problems, plan, share concerns, and implement strategies with the combined expertise and

resources of all involved, then this could go a long way to having communities feel respected and listened to by police (and vice versa) and promote long-term collaboration.

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

Community participation in GIVE strategies has been difficult for a number of reasons. Resources are limited, and there is little creativity about how to effectively utilize community residents and groups to address gun violence. However, research is clear that holistic problem-solving approaches that include input and participation of community groups are more successful and better sustained than law enforcement efforts alone.

POP and procedural justice serve as useful frameworks for integrating community members and for conceptualizing the community impact of strategies. To have positive effects on police-community relations and the community's willingness to engage in strategies, GIVE partner agencies should be careful about implementing heavy-handed enforcement (such as hot spots policing and focused deterrence) so that they do not appear indiscriminate, unfair, or overly aggressive. Gradual relationship-building, especially with the highest-risk community members, seems to be a productive strategy and is occurring with increasing comprehensiveness statewide.

Given the right resources and roles, the models for the GIVE strategies provide ample opportunity for law enforcement to work with communities to solve even the most significant problems, like gun violence. Such problem-solving techniques could build community capacity, social organization, and collective efficacy, all of which can further reduce crime.

Recommendations for improving the community engagement aspects of GIVE strategies can be derived from McNeely's (1999) seven requirements for successful community building:

1. Focus on shared values to bring about positive change with specific, achievable initiatives.

Implementation should expand the skills and capacities of all people and agencies involved (human capital) and the relationships between them (social capital).

2. Initiatives should be community-driven with broad resident involvement.

3. Strategies should be “comprehensive, strategic, and entrepreneurial,” addressing impoverished neighborhoods’ “multiple, interrelated challenges” by tackling concrete priority issues quickly to build confidence and capacity while developing a long-term strategy (p. 745).
4. Strategies and collaboration should be asset-based. “Identify the community’s assets and develop plans that build on them” (p. 746).
5. Efforts should be “tailored to neighborhood scale and conditions” and the goals (p. 746).
6. Local work should be linked to resources external to that community “to strengthen community institutions and enhance outside opportunities for residents” (p. 746).
7. The collaborative work should consciously work to change institutional racism and barriers. Conflicts should be resolved with solutions that promote use of every partners’ perspectives and assets, rather than blaming. “Racial prejudice can neither be ignored nor made the centerpiece” (p. 747). Race should be recognized as part of the context of the problem.

Though most of these requirements are present in GIVE jurisdictions to some degree (especially items one, five, and six), action is not often strong and the goals not explicit in community-law enforcement collaborations. This paper identifies many reasons why achieving these goals is difficult when addressing gun violence and when implementing GIVE strategies, but it is limited in its ability to provide clear instructions for meeting the goals outlined above. The intention is to provide a discussion of key frameworks through which community engagement in GIVE strategies can be viewed while acknowledging the challenges. Actions must be driven by diverse partners in each jurisdiction with the support of state resources.

## Chapter 6: Summary and Key Findings

A firm and consistent theoretical foundation can improve GIVE's effectiveness. While DCJS designed the program in ways well-aligned with implementation theory and theories related to gun violence, sites vary in their understanding and use of theory. Examining criminological theories related to gun violence (subculture of violence theory) and how to respond to it (deterrence theory and rational choice/situational crime prevention theory) can inform implementation. These theories are consistent with the GIVE strategy models to varying degrees, but none of these theories and strategies are necessarily contradictory; they can complement one another to form a holistic gun violence reduction strategy in any one site. Also, the discussion of procedural justice principles and the potential impact of GIVE strategies on communities confirms that the goal of integrating procedural justice and community engagement into GIVE can be consistent with the strategies used to prevent and respond to gun violence.

Nonetheless, criminal justice and implementation theories remind us of the difficulties of achieving implementation with fidelity to models and theory. One of the most significant challenges is that any agency tends to resist change unless it aligns well with how they already function and their goals. Full implementation of any GIVE strategy requires significant resources and often changes to how criminal justice agencies interact with one another and other community stakeholders.

Therefore, while the design of GIVE is flexible enough to allow the theories presented here to be used as needed in any given site, implementation is not generally as comprehensive as theories or models would recommend. Sites with the most successful implementation tend to utilize many additional agency resources, other grants, and community resources beyond what is provided directly by GIVE. Criminal justice agencies in these sites engage in strong partnerships with community organizations, take advantage of DCJS and other training opportunities, and make changes to their institutional structures to support implementation.

Several key findings can be derived from this analysis and inform GIVE efforts.

1. Comprehensive gun violence reduction strategies should be developed after a careful analysis of the problem, its causes and reasons for sustainment, immediate and long-term solutions, and agency and community resources. Persistent gun violence is a problem involving many facets of a community, and law enforcement resources form only one piece of the solution. These aspects of POP and hot spots policing models are often neglected in GIVE implementation.
2. Street outreach is perhaps the GIVE strategy with the most potential for improvement. Efforts to improve this strategy must be informed by implementation theory and subculture of violence theory. In particular, DCJS and GIVE site personnel must recognize the tendency for sites to under-utilize this strategy or to develop strategies that do not reflect the subculture of violence's impact on the community and gun violence. Because this strategy does not align with traditional law enforcement functions, few resources tend to be devoted to this strategy by criminal justice agencies compared to other strategies, and community organizations operating street outreach programs often lack significant resources to hire, train, and manage these programs. A more concerted effort to see how street outreach complements other GIVE strategies is warranted. Model street outreach sites could train other sites, capitalizing on the legitimacy and credibility law enforcement and street outreach workers feel for their colleagues around the state.
3. Deterrence efforts are more effective if they acknowledge and alter strategies in accord with the subcultures of violence (considering subcultural costs and benefits of violence), community contexts and resources, and the community's and individuals' historical experiences with punishment and punishment avoidance. A general lack of this acknowledgement in GIVE sites may explain why many are frustrated with a perceived lack of deterrence effect from strategies such as focused deterrence.

4. GIVE sites with low levels of gun violence can certainly benefit from the lessons about community integration, procedural justice, deterrence, situational crime prevention, and POP, but the problems they experience do not match the problems in other sites. There is not significant evidence that subcultures of violence are strong in these sites, so strategies such as street outreach and focused deterrence are likely inappropriate.
5. GIVE agency partners should have an honest understanding of their agency's and their partner agencies' readiness and purpose for implementation. For instance, do administrators intend to make changes to agency operations, personnel time, and management structures to support implementation, or do they endeavor to use the grant funding to support already-existing functions? Are they implementing GIVE driven by normative, mimetic, or coercive forces? Are there sufficient resources to accomplish goals? How well are the problem and strategies understood by agency and community partners? If buy-in is not consistent across partners or there are not enough resources, having this honest understanding will help those who actively want to improve implementation to strategize more effective changes.
6. Trainings and technical assistance should engage opinion leaders, and they should specifically address how the strategy can integrate procedural justice, community partners, and theory to form comprehensive strategies tailored to community conditions.
7. Regularly reassessing strategy implementation, the readiness and resources of partners, and the nature of the gun violence problem will ensure that resources continue to be used in the most effective ways to address changing problems and conditions.

This research highlights the numerous challenges of such an ambitious statewide initiative to reduce gun violence as well as the ample opportunities for strong GIVE strategies if they are informed by the insights of the theories presented here and the ideal GIVE strategy models.

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### Appendix A: Sample Phone Call and Site Visit Interview Itineraries

Below are three examples of monthly phone call topics and two examples of site visit itineraries and topics. Site names and any identifying information have been redacted.

#### Monthly Call Topics: Example 1 (medium-sized site)

1. October crime trends and how you've responded
2. Hot spot strategy updates
3. Street Outreach updates: update on [the map made by the street outreach team vs. the hot spot map created by the police department]
4. Focused deterrence:
  - a. Plans for the call-in (any changes, who is invited, etc.)
  - b. Activities of working groups (community, services, enforcement, etc.)
  - c. Will you do custom notifications?
5. Procedural justice integration [and results from research partner's survey]
6. Prosecution strategies for top offenders, focused deterrence participants
7. Any CPTED updates? How would new projects emerge?
8. Upcoming DCJS trainings and symposium attendance
9. November call/visit

#### Monthly Call Topics: Example 2 (large site)

1. Custom notification updates since mid-September (from probation and [police])
2. Hot spot updates: specific strategy responses, what is working well for you, future plans
3. DA: Status of... federal case work [against a particular gang]
4. At GIVE meeting, [someone] noted [that there are] different procedures at the [area's] 2 hospitals. Is this a concern? Any plans right now to address it?
5. General question: you have a lot of GIVE-related efforts.... What works well for you in organizing and integrating it all?
6. Start planning November site visit:
  - a. Meet with the service contact person for focused deterrence
  - b. Hot spot tours if we can
  - c. Any events?

#### Monthly Call Topics: Example 3 (large site)

1. New crime trends/problems and responses
2. Hot spot strategy updates
3. Why are call-ins done at the current frequency?
4. What criteria should people meet to be "right" for call-ins?
5. CPTED site selection based on gun violence
6. Can you send us the written plan for how CPTED sites are selected/assessed and the list of current CPTED sites?
7. Procedural justice in each strategy
8. Upcoming DCJS training/event attendance

#### Site Visit Itinerary and Topics: Example 1 (Large Site)

- I. Meet [with police CPTED coordinator] for a tour of [hot spot/CPTED] areas. Questions:
  1. What's your background/training? Will you be attending upcoming CPTED trainings?
  2. What problems do you want to address in each place?
  3. What changes were made in each area and how long ago? Is an update needed?
  4. Any trends as to "what works" (i.e., what has long-lasting impact)?
  5. What is your long-term goal for CPTED work?
- II. Meet with Probation Supervisor [and other probation representatives]. Questions:
  1. Confirm/check back in on general organizational structures: who attends GIVE meetings, coordinates efforts, makes decisions (GIVE-related), status of partnerships, etc.?
  2. Updates on hot spot work (geographical areas and top offenders)
  3. Updates on focused deterrence work
    - a. What specific work do you/PO's do before and after call-ins and custom notifications?
    - b. Do probationers ever talk about the call in or custom notification with their PO afterwards?
    - c. Are top offenders placed on particular people's caseloads?
  4. Social media report: usage, what is helpful, improvements?
  5. Does probation ever have direct contact with the [street] outreach programs...?
  6. Any recent changes you've made to improve GIVE strategies or processes? Any improvements you would like to see about probation's role?
  7. Status of [a particular program/effort being considered]: What is attractive about the program? What are you considering doing?

#### Site Visit Itinerary and Topics: Example 2 (Small Site)

- I. Meet with CPTED coordinator: Questions:
  1. CPTED coordinator: what is your background?
  2. What kinds of recommendations do you tend to make? Are they well-received and successfully implemented?
  3. Our notes said that 4 police officers attended the advanced CPTED training in June. Did anyone else attend?
  4. Is the [CPTED-related, city-funded] program still going out once a month?
  5. Have the kinds of recommendations you make been focused on reducing violence?
  6. What has the community response to CPTED been like? How do you share info on the program?
- II. Meet with GIVE liaison: Questions:
  1. RMS [record management system] updates: how is the roll-out going?
  2. GIVE partner attendance update, and funding of those partners
  3. Did [hot spot] details start again yet? Any need?
  4. Community engagement [updates]
  5. Is it fair to say that the DV strategies are focused on DV offenders? You don't have a top offender list..., right?